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Abstract 
 
This dissertation analyzes and evaluates government policies regarding private sector 
livestock disease control. The first essay takes common uncertainty into account when 
designing the optimal livestock indemnity scheme. Relative performance evaluation method 
is suggested and justified in some special cases. The second essay provides an empirical 
analysis on the comparative shortage of food animal veterinarians in the United States. Based 
on this result we also evaluate the veterinary medicine loan repayment program implemented 
in 2010. The third essay studies the dynamic interactions among farmers’ participation 
decisions to a voluntary livestock disease control program. Through a simulation with 
Johnes’ disease the role of government subsidies on achieving tipping is illustrated. The 
fourth essay focuses on a susceptible-infected-susceptible type of disease and explores the 
interactions between farmers’ biosecurity and eradication efforts. Our analysis provides 
evidence in favor of public prevention programs over public cure programs. 
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Chapter 1. General Introduction 
 
Optimal design of government policies in private sector livestock disease control is of 
great importance due to increasing social cost of the disease. This dissertation analyzes and 
evaluates relevant policy issues with a series of four essays, each emphasizing a different 
facet of the problem.  
While common uncertainty is not uncommon when it comes to livestock industry, it has 
not been incorporated in the optimal livestock indemnity design. Using a principal multi-
agent framework, my first paper suggests that relative performance evaluation (RPE) method 
is most justified either when high correlation exists between farmers' disease prevalence rate 
or when the effectiveness of biosecurity effort proves to be low.  
One aim of my second paper is to provide an objective evaluation of comparative 
shortage of food animal veterinarians in the United States. The other target of it is to evaluate 
the Veterinary Medicine Loan Repayment Program (VMLRP), implemented in 2010 to 
address the perceived regional shortages in veterinary occupations. On the whole the 
program appears to perform quite well. However, comparative shortage is generally more 
severe in states that have no VMLRP designated private practice shortage counties than in 
states that do. 
When it comes to voluntary livestock disease control program, neither the magnitude nor 
the time length of government subsidy required in motivating participation is clear. The third 
paper demonstrates a strategic complementarity among participation decisions, where after a 
slow start momentum can build such that the market premium for participation and the 
participation rate increase sequentially. Guided by this finding, we identify plausible 
conditions under which temporary government subsidies to the least cost effective producers 
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could cause tipping toward full participation to occur.  
On the farm level, an infectious livestock disease could be eradicated. However, 
permanent immunity from all livestock diseases is not possible. Moreover, once one farm 
contracts the disease, all the neighboring farms could be immediately affected. In this 
context, the fourth paper provides a succinct two-agent model to explore the interactions 
between farmers’ biosecurity and eradication efforts. Intra-farm temporal interactions and 
inter-farm contemporaneous interactions coexist. Our model suggests a preference to the 
subsidy on biosecurity effort rather than on eradication efforts.  
  
3 
 
 
 
Chapter 2. Livestock Disease Indemnity Design under Common 
Uncertainty: A Multi-agent Problem 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article develops a principal multi-agent model to study the optimal livestock 
indemnity design. We show that both within farm disease prevalence and average regional 
disease prevalence are key factors in the determination of optimal second-best indemnity 
scheme. The properties of first-best indemnity payment scheme are studied. Special second-
best cases exist where the perfect risk sharing property of the first-best still applies. A 
numerical example is provided. Results suggest that relative performance evaluation is most 
useful if there is high correlation of farmers' disease prevalence rates or if the effectiveness of 
biosecurity effort proves to be low.  
INTRODUCTION 
Government indemnity programs are based on the Fifth Amendment of the US 
Constitution, which specifies that compensation must be provided for private property taken 
for public use. In the face of highly contagious or zoonotic diseases, mass destruction is often 
necessary to return a country to the disease free status. Therefore, indemnities will be paid to 
the livestock owners in compensation for the destruction of their animals. The Animal Health 
Protection Act (AHPA) provides guidance on indemnity payments. According to Ott (2006), 
two guiding principles established by AHPA for compensation are “fair market value and 
reduction in payment for any other compensation received.” 
Historically indemnity has been playing an important role in garnering farmer's support 
for disease eradication (Kuchler and Hamm 2000, Olmstead and Rhode 2004). However, it 
may also give farmers a reason to cut back the biosecurity measure (Muhammad and Jones 
2008). Therefore in designing an optimal indemnity payment scheme it is important for the 
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government to take farmers' ex-ante biosecurity choice into account (Jin and McCarl 2006). 
Since biosecurity efforts are typically hard to observe, it is important to give incentive for 
farmers to comply voluntarily (Gramig, Horan,and Wolf 2005, 2009). However, the current 
government indemnification level, based on the animal's fair market value, fails to satisfy 
such an objective (Gramig, Horan and Wolf 2009).  
With this ex-ante moral hazard problem in mind, Gramig, Horan and Wolf (2009) use a 
principal-agent model to address the incentive compatibility issue. A limitation of their paper 
is that the common uncertainties associated with the disease are assumed away. Under such 
simplification, all farms are treated as facing independent risks. This is hardly the case in 
reality. For example, when highly contagious exotic animal diseases such as Foot and Mouth 
Disease (FMD) break out in a region, typically a large number of farms become infected by 
this disease, even if adequate biosecurity measures are taken (Ekboir 1999).  
Common uncertainties exist not only on the production side, but also on the demand side. 
In both cases farmers face interdependent risks. For example, even when very few animals 
are affected by Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), a much less contagious disease 
than FMD, major losses can occur through price impacts. Demand for all products will fall as 
consumers typically find it difficult to distinguish the contaminated food from the normal 
one.  
In the face of common uncertainty, relative performance evaluation (RPE) is introduced 
in agency literature to improve contract efficiency (Hӧlmstrom 1979, Mookherjee 1984 and 
Luporini 2006). Under the RPE, the agents are evaluated on their performance relative to a 
comparison group, rather than an absolute standard. RPE is commonly used in organizations, 
e.g., corporate CEOs are often paid on their performance relative to their competitors (Kren 
2002).  Under a linear compensation model where the random variables affecting their 
outputs are normally distributed and negatively correlated, Hӧlmstrom and Milgrom (1990) 
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found that the optimal compensation to one agent is positively related to the other agents' 
performance. In a general setup and using First Order Approach (FOA), Luporini (2006) 
proved that affiliation of the random variables affecting the agents' outputs is both necessary 
and sufficient for one agent's compensation to be non-increasing in the other agent's output.  
In this paper we will present a principal multi-agent model to address the moral hazard 
issue as well as the interactions among the farmers. Under this setup incentive compatibility 
(IC) is presented in a game context, which is an extension to the single farmer's IC specified 
by Gramig, Horan,and Wolf (2005, 2009) and Hennessy (2007). In this regard our IC 
conditions resemble those in Kobayashi and Melkonyan (Forthcoming) where the focus is on 
strategic interactions between biosecurity measures. The optimal government indemnity 
scheme will be presented in a RPE form. That is, the compensation to a farmer is not only 
contingent on his own disease status, but also on the other farmers’ disease prevalence rate as 
well. We will show the advantage of such scheme over the one proposed by Gramig, 
Horan,and Wolf (2005, 2009). Feasibility for indemnity implementation will also be 
discussed. 
Our paper will also extend the RPE literature on the following issues. First we will prove 
the result of Luporini (2006) without the assumptions of FOA. This proof renders FOA 
specific assumptions, such as convexity of the distribution function (CDF), unnecessary. In 
addition, we will suggest a condition equivalent to the affiliation condition suggested by 
Luporini, to avoid the need to go back and forth between the commonly used setup in agency 
literature and the original setup.
1
Lastly, our numerical solutions of optimal indemnity 
schemes will indicate possible scenarios where use of RPE may be justified to improve 
contract efficiency.  
                                                 
1
 Following Mirrlees (1974), in the agency literature it is common practice to use the joint 
distribution function of the outputs parameterized by the agents' efforts. Result of Luporini 
(2006), however, is presented in the notation of the original setup. 
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This paper will proceed as follows. After presenting the model setup, we will analyze the 
properties of optimal indemnity scheme under both second-best (SB) and first-best (FB) 
situations. We will also identify some special SB situations where the FB indemnity scheme 
is optimal. Following the theoretical results, we will use a numerical example to illustrate the 
method to solve for the optimal indemnity payments. Situations are identified where RPE 
will be most effective.  
Model 
Model Setup  
To model interdependent disease risks, we will present a one-principal, two-agent model 
which resembles the model in Mookherjee (1984). Here the principal stands for the 
government, and the agents stand for two farmers whose livestock face a positive probability 
of contracting a certain contagious disease.  
Let { 0, 1, 2}
i i
B b b i  ∣  denote the possible biosecurity practices for both agents.
2
 The 
unit cost of each agent's biosecurity measure is w . A random variable [0,1]
i
   stands for an 
environmental risk factor that is beyond farmers' control. The disease is more prevalent in the 
area when 
i
  takes a high value. The joint probability density function for 
1
  and 
2
  is 
1 2
( , )g   .  
Assume that all the farms are identical in scale and that the output produced by farmer i  
is ( , ) [ , ]
i i i
q b q q  . Note that we use output here as an indicator of the disease, where low 
farm output is regarded as a result of a high within-herd disease prevalence rate. For 
                                                 
2
 Later on we assume in addition that the rational agent will not choose ˆ
i i
b b , where ˆ
i
b  is the 
optimal biosecurity action specified by the government. Besides threatening the agricultural 
export market, a disease outbreak can have an adverse impact on other sectors. The social 
benefit from biosecurity investment exceeds the farmers' private benefit. Thus farmers' 
optimal level of biosecurity investment will not exceed the social optimal level specified by 
the government. 
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example, the lowest possible output q  stands for the output where all the livestock are 
diseased, while q  denotes the output where no livestock is diseased. The output of farmer i  
depends both on his own biosecurity effort and on the ambient disease prevalence rate such 
that ( , ) / 0
i i i i
q b b    and ( , ) / 0
i i i i
q b     . Without loss of generality, assume the output 
price is 1. 
Indemnity to agent i  is denoted by ( , )
i i j
I q q . Here ( , )
i j
q q  stands for a combination of 
outputs by farmers i  and j , where , 1, 2i j   and i j . Denote farmer i ’s utility function by 
(·)V , where (·) 0V    and (·) 0V   . Therefore farmer i ’s utility is ( ( , ))
i i i j
V q I q q  when 
the combination of outputs by farmers i  and j  is ( , )
i j
q q . Denote the agents’ reservation 
utility as U . Here U  could be understood as the maximum value a farmer can obtain 
without participating in the eradication program. For example, a farmer may obtain a 
discounted sales value by selling the diseased livestock to some illegal traders instead.  
Following Mirrlees (1974), we will set up the optimal contracting problem by 
suppressing 
i
  and consider output levels as random variables parameterized by the 
biosecurity input 
i
b . The joint probability density that the output level 
1 2
( , )q q  is realized 
given the biosecurity input level 
1 2
( , )b b  is 
1 2 1 2
( , ; , )f q q b b , where (·)f  is continuous w.r.t. 
1 2
,q q . The distribution function corresponding to (·)f  is (·)F . Here 
1 2 1 2
( , ; , )F q q b b
 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
( ( , ) ; ( , ) )Prob q b q q b q    .  
Second-best Situation 
The second best (SB) situation stands for the case where farmers' biosecurity inputs are 
their own private information and could not be observed by the government. Take Bovine TB 
as an example. Some relevant biosecurity practices are readily observable, such as having 
livestock tested for Bovine TB and buying animals from an accredited TB-free herd. Many 
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other practices are not observable. For example, restricting contact with other herd and 
restricting on-farm visitors from contact with the herd (Coble 2010). As government 
monitoring is likely to be either impossible or expensive, we need incentive compatibility 
conditions so that farmers have no incentive to deviate from the optimal biosecurity inputs.  
We assume that the government's objective is to find the most efficient indemnity 
scheme, while ensuring farmers have incentives to enroll in the eradication program and to 
take the optimal biosecurity measures. In addition assume that the optimal biosecurity level 
1 2
ˆ ˆ( , )b b  is determined exogenously, e.g., by the most recent scientific breakthroughs and 
epidemiological evidences. The optimal contracting problem (OCP) can be written as:  
 
, 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆmin ( , ) ( , ) ( , ; , )
q q
q q
I q q I q q f q q b b dq dq 1 2I I   
s.t. 
 
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 222
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( , )) ( , ; , )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( , )) ( , ; , )
q q
q q
q q
q q
V q I q q f q q b b dq dq b w U
V q I q q f q q b b dq dq b w U
  
  
 
 
 (1) 
 
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2
2 2 1 2 1 2 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ   ( ( , )) ( , ; , )
ˆ ˆ( ( , )) ( , ; , ) ;   , ;
ˆ ˆ ˆ   ( ( , )) ( , ; , )
ˆ( ( , )) ( , ; ,
q q
q q
q q
q q
q q
q q
q q
q q
V q I q q f q q b b dq dq b w
V q I q q f q q b b dq dq b w b B b b
V q I q q f q q b b dq dq b w
V q I q q f q q b b
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
  2 1 2 2 2 2 2
ˆ) . , .dq dq b w b B b b   
 (2) 
 
Government's objective in OCP is to choose an indemnity payment level to minimize its 
expected indemnity payment, subject to each agent choosing the optimal biosecurity input 
level 
1 2
ˆ ˆ( , )b b . Equation set (1) stands for the participation constraints (PC). The government 
provides indemnity as a financial incentive for farmers to identify and destroy their infected 
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animals, thus accelerating the eradication efforts. Equation set (2) stands for the Nash 
incentive compatibility constraints (NIC) for agent 1 and 2, respectively. Note that under 
NIC no biosecurity effort less than the optimal one will be taken.  
Under optimal indemnity scheme ,
1 2
I I , where 
1 1 2 1 2
{ ( , ), , }I q q q q 
1
I
 
 and 
2 1 2
{ ( , ),I q q
2
I  
1 2
, }q q . NIC ensures that the optimal strategy pair 
1 2
ˆ ˆ( , )b b  constitutes a 
Nash equilibrium (NE). However, NIC does not exclude the possibility of multiple pure 
strategy equilibria, as noted in Ma (1988). By adding some trivial strategies for each agent 
and transforming the static game into a dynamic one, Ma (1988) refines the unwanted 
equilibrium in Mookherjee (1984) under the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For the rest of this 
paper we will assume that a unique NE exists. 
Following the analysis in Grossman and Hart (1983) and Mookherjee (1984), it is 
convenient to transform the constraints into a linear form with regard to the control variables. 
Upon defining ( ( , )) ( , )
i i i j i i j
V q I q q v q q  , it follows that ( , ) ( ( , ))
i i j i i j i
I q q h v q q q  , where 
1
(·) (·)h V

 . Next we can obtain the transformed optimal contracting problem (TOCP):  
 
1 2, 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆmin [ ( ( , )) ( ( , )) ] ( , ; , )
q q
v v
q q
h v q q h v q q q q f q q b b dq dq     
 
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ; , ) ;
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ; , ) ;
q q
q q
q q
q q
v q q f q q b b dq dq b w U
v q q f q q b b dq dq b w U
 
 
 
 
 (3) 
 
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ   ( , ) ( , ; , )
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , , ; ) ; , ;
ˆ ˆ ˆ   ( , ) ( , ; , )
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ; , ) . , .
q q
q q
q q
q q
q q
q q
q q
q q
v q q f q q b b dq dq b w
v q q f q q b b dq dq b w b B b b
v q q f q q b b dq dq b w
v q q f q q b b dq dq b w b B b b

    

    
 
 
 
 
 (4) 
The Lagrangian for the TOCP can be written as:  
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1
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ[ ( ( , )) ( ( , )) ] ( , ; , )
ˆ ˆ ˆ   ( , ) ( , ; , )
ˆ ˆ ˆ   ( , ) ( , ; , )
   ( ) (
q q
q q
q q
q q
q q
q q
q q
q q
b B
h v q q h v q q q q f q q b b dq dq
U v q q f q q b b dq dq b w
U v q q f q q b b dq dq b w
b v q
L




  
 
  
  
 
  
  

  
 
 
  
2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, )[ ( , ; , ) ( , , , )]
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ   ( ) ( , )[ ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )]
q q
q q
b B
q f q q b b f q q b b dq dq b w b w
b v q q f q q b b f q q b b dq dq b w b w

 
  
  
 
   
  
  
 
Following Hӧlmstrom (1979), we can take point-wise optimization with regard to 
( , )
i i j
v q q  and ( )
i i
b  respectively for any 
i
b B  and , [ , ]
i j
q q q q :  
 
 
1
2
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( ( , )) ) ( , ; , ) ( )[ ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )] 0;
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( ( , )) ) ( , ; , ) ( )[ ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )] 0;
b B
b B
h v q q f q q b b b f q q b b f q q b b
h v q q f q q b b b f q q b b f q q b b
 
 


    
    


 (5) 
 
1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , )[ ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )] ( ) 0;  
                                                           if ( ) 0,  then " 0 "  ;
ˆ ˆ( , )[ ( , ; , ) ( , ;
q q
q q
q q
q q
v q q f q q b b f q q b b dq dq b b w
b b B
v q q f q q b b f q q b

   
   

 
  2 1 2 2 2
2 2 2
ˆ ˆ, )] ( ) 0;
                                                         if ( ) 0,  then  ." 0 "  
b dq dq b b w
b b B
  
   
 (6) 
From (5) we further obtain: 
 
1
2
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 1 1 1
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
2 1 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
ˆ( , ; , )
( ( , )) ( )(1 )
ˆ ˆ( , ; , )
ˆ( , ; , )
( ( , )) ( )(1 )
ˆ ˆ( , ; , )
b B
b B
f q q b b
h v q q b
f q q b b
f q q b b
h v q q b
f q q b b
 
 


   
   


 (7) 
Equation set (7) is a standard result in principal agent literature (See e.g. Hӧlmstrom 1979 
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and Mookherjee 1984).
3
 In this paper we will utilize this result to infer the possible structure 
of the government indemnity program. First, we will present Lemma 1 to explain the LHS of 
equation (7).  
Lemma 1: If ( ( , ))
i i j
h v q q  increases in 
i
q  for , 1, 2;i j i j  , then gross return ( , )
i i i j
q I q q  
increases in output
i
q , and vice versa.  
 
Proof. See Appendix C.      □ 
 
Note that gross return ( , )
i i i j
q I q q  increases in output 
i
q . Otherwise the farmers would 
have the incentive to destroy some of their output and obtain a greater utility afterwards. On 
the RHS of equation (7), 
i
  ( 1, 2)i   is the shadow cost of the participation constraint where 
it is clear that 0
i
  . Were 0
i
  , then the government can lower the indemnity payment 
for all possible levels of output with PC and NIC still holding. 
4
The shadow cost of the i -th 
incentive constraint is ( )
i i
b . If ( ) 0,
i i i
b b B    , then NIC poses no cost to the 
government. In that case the OCP in SB case will be simplified to that in FB case, which will 
be discussed in section 2.3.  
Given that farmer j  takes the optimal biosecurity practice ˆ
j
b , the government will 
update its prior on 
i
b  after the observation of 
i
q  and 
j
q . A smaller density ratio on the RHS 
of equation will signal that ˆ
i
b  is more likely. Therefore equation set (7) implies that farmer’s 
utility increases when the optimal biosecurity measure is more likely to be taken. Next we 
                                                 
3
 It's easy to see that (7) can be extended to the multi-agent case. Suppose there are n agents, 
then agent k ’s optimality condition will be ( ( , )) ( )[1
k
k
k k k k k
b B
h v q q b 


     
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) / ( , ; , )]
k k k k k k k k
f q q b b f q q b b
   
, where 
1 1 1
, , , , ,
k k k n
q q q q q
  
  
 
and
1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , ,
k k k n
b b b b b
  
   . 
4
 See Mas-Colell (1995), pp. 485, footnote 8. 
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will demonstrate in Lemma 2 the conditions that render RPE unnecessary.  
Lemma 2: The following two conditions are equivalent: 1) 
1 2 1 2
( , ; , )f q q b b  can be factorized 
into 
1 1 2 2
( ; ) ( ; )m q b n q b ; 2) 
1 2 1 1 2 2
( , ) ( ) ( )g g g    .  
Proof. See Appendix A.      □ 
 
Mookherjee (1984) proved that Lemma 2 conditions are generically necessary and 
sufficient for a contract without considering RPE to be optimal. Lemma 2 conditions imply 
that the probabilities that the two farms contract diseases should be independent of each 
other. The current concepts on animal disease management through zoning or regionalization 
can help us understand the idea of farm level risk independence. As outlined in part 92 of 9 
CFR (2008), zone recognition in the United States requires information such as veterinary 
infrastructure, disease status, vaccination status and degree of separation from adjacent 
regions etc. As an example, in the control of FMD a disease free zone is separated from the 
rest of the country by a buffer zone, or physical or geographical barriers (Fujita 2004). In this 
case, we can regard the farms located in the disease free zone as risk independent from the 
farms outside the zone. To the contrary, if several farms are located in the same zone, then 
the indemnity payment for one farm should be based on other farm's disease status as well. 
Hӧlmstrom (1979) demonstrated that RPE ensures less indemnity payment than that of the 
independent contract, as the output information of the other farmer is an informative signal 
about the environmental risk factor. However, no such information is utilized in the 
independent contract.  
Assuming that the Lemma 2 does not hold, we will check the properties of the optimal 
indemnity scheme. First we introduce assumption 1 to describe the relationship between one 
farmer's output and its own biosecurity level.
5
 
                                                 
5
 This assumption is originally brought up by Luporini (2006) as one of two conditions for 
FOA to be applicable in the principal multi-agent setup. 
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Assumption 1: Partial monotone likelihood ratio property (PMLRP): 
( , ; , ) / ( , ; , )
i j i j i j i j
f q q b b f q q b b
   is non-increasing in 
i
q  for 
i i
b b
 
 , , 1, 2,i j i j  . 
 
Given farmer j ’s output and biosecurity input, assumption 1 means that a higher output 
from farmer i  implies that higher biosecurity measures are more likely to be taken. This 
assumption is reasonable as evidence does suggest that biosecurity measures lead to lower 
disease prevalence rate. For example, changes to swine systems such as ventilation systems 
and hygiene management have reduced the impact of some important health problems. As a 
result, once widespread problems such as sarcoptic mange and swine dysentery are very 
uncommon in modern systems (Davies and Leman 2008). Based on assumption 1, next we 
will show that the optimal indemnity payment to one farm should be contingent on its own 
disease prevalence rate.  
Proposition 1: Under assumption 1, Farmer i ’s gross return ( , )
i i i j
q I q q  is a non-
decreasing function of farm i ’s output level 
i
q . 
Proof. See Appendix A.      □ 
 
As the output price is assumed to be 1, here 
i
q  could be understood as the salvage value 
of the animals. A lower value of 
i
q  implies greater within herd disease prevalence rate, 
thereby farmer i  would obtain a decreased salvage value. The term ( , )
i i i j
q I q q  stands for 
the total value received by farmer i , which is made up of the salvage value and indemnity 
payment. Proposition 1 shows that the total value received by farmer i  should be a non-
increasing function of farm i ’s within herd disease prevalence rate. This result also coincides 
with the conclusion of Gramig, Horan and Wolf (2009) who studied a principal single-agent 
model. AHPA, Subtitle E of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, instead 
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specifies that the total value any farmer receives should equal to the fair market value of 
depopulated animals. Such a specification does not take the prevalence level into 
consideration, thus is not optimal in providing biosecurity incentives. 
Next we will relax Luporini (2006)’s FOA assumptions and study how RPE could be 
utilized in optimal indemnity payment. In addition, we will present an equivalent condition to 
the affiliation condition used in Luporini (2006) in Lemma 3.  
Lemma 3: The following two conditions are equivalent: 1) 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
( , ) ( , )
0;
( , ) ( , )
g g
g g
   
   
   
   
   
2) 
( , ; , )
( , ; , )
i j i j
i j i j
f q q b b
f q q b b


 is non-decreasing in 
j
q  for 
i i
b b
 
 , , 1, 2i j   and i j .  
Proof. See Appendix A.   □ 
 
Condition 1 in Lemma 3 is first proposed by Luporini (2006) to capture the affiliation 
relationship between the environmental shocks received by two farmers. The concept of 
affiliation was introduced by Milgrom and Weber (1982) in auction theory. The idea is that 
one bidder will expect other bidders' estimated values of a good to increase if his own 
estimated value increases. In our context it means that when the environmental shock turns 
out to be favorable for one farmer, then we can also expect a favorable condition for the 
other. Although affiliation is a stronger assumption than positive correlation, the former is 
true in many cases where the latter holds (de Castro 2007). 
Note that condition 2 in Lemma 3 resembles that in Assumption 1. Additionally it is in 
line with the common practice after Mirrlees (1974), which uses the joint distribution 
function of the outcomes parameterized by the actions. The condition means that ceteris 
paribus a higher output 
j
q  signals a lower level of 
i
b . Intuitively the equivalence of the two 
conditions in Lemma 3 is due to the following reason. Ceteris paribus a higher output 
j
q  
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signals a higher realization of 
j
 . By condition 1 we know that the environmental factor for 
farmer i  is likely favorable too. Thus the same level of 
i
q  indicates a lower level of 
i
b .  
Similar to Luporini (2006), Proposition 2 will demonstrate how the optimal indemnity 
received by farmer i  is affected by farmer j ’s output. Luporini applied the FOA under the 
additional CDF assumption, which is not required in the general approach shown in our 
proof.  
Proposition 2: Under condition 2 of lemma 3, Farm i ’s indemnity ( , )
i i j
I q q  is a non-
increasing function of farm j ’s output level 
j
q . 
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, this result follows readily from a combination of 
equation (7), Condition 2 of Lemma 3 and Lemma 1.   □ 
 
Proposition 2 shows that in the optimal RPE scheme, one farmer's indemnity payment is 
a non-increasing function of the other farmer's output, or a non-decreasing function of the 
other farm's disease prevalence rate. By taking the disease status of other farms into 
consideration, the government could curtail its indemnity payments to farmers based on the 
improvement of risk sharing (Hӧlmstrom 1979). This information is not reflected in the 
AHPA specification and is not considered by Gramig, Horan, and Wolf (2009) as common 
uncertainties are assumed away.  
When there are more than two farms in the region, for convenience we could regard the 
other farms as a unit and use the average regional disease prevalence rate. The idea of RPE is 
already incorporated in the indemnity or insurance practices of other industries. For example, 
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) offers the Group Risk Plan (GRP) to producers 
whose farm yields positively correlate with the average county yield (FCIC 2010). GRP 
explicitly mentions that a farmer with a low yield may not even receive a payment when the 
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average county yield is high. Such statement follows directly from a combination of the 
results in Propositions 1 and 2. 
First-best Situation 
The first-best (FB) situation refers to the case where the moral hazard problem does not 
exist. That is, the government could observe the true level of biosecurity inputs by the 
farmers. The model under FB situation resembles the model we studied under SB situation 
except that the NIC conditions now become unnecessary. Therefore in the FB case a 
counterpart for equation (7), which implicitly determines the indemnity scheme becomes: 
 
1 1 2 1
2 1 2 2
( ( , ))
( ( , ))
h v q q
h v q q


 
 
 (8) 
Equation set (8) indicates that 
1 2
( , )
i
v q q  is a constant whatever the realized pair of 
1 2
( , )q q  is. This means that in the FB situation perfect risk sharing is obtained and the 
farmers will have the same utilities across all states. By (3) we can solve the optimal 
indemnity level as *
1 2
ˆ( , ) ( )
i i i
I q q h b w U q    when the optimal biosecurity measure ˆ
i
b  is 
taken. Otherwise the indemnity payment will be arbitrarily small to ensure that farmers will 
not deviate from the optimal actions. Therefore in the FB case the indemnity payment to 
farmer i  will increase when the disease prevalence rate on farm i  increases. It does not 
depend on the prevalence level of the other farms, so RPE is no longer needed. 
Current government indemnification practice implies that the indemnity payment plus 
any salvage value received by farmers should equal the fair market value. However, all the 
consequential losses such as loss from business downtime and loss of consumers and markets 
is not likely to be compensated (Umber, Miller, and Hueston 2010). As these losses could be 
substantial (Grannis and Bruch 2006), thus the current indemnity practice does not guarantee 
perfect risk sharing either.  
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Given the optimal biosecurity level next we will compare the scale of indemnity payment 
in SB with that in FB.  
Proposition 3: To implement the same biosecurity levels, SB expected indemnity payment 
will be no less than that in the FB.  
Proof. See Appendix A.   □ 
 
Proposition 3 is a standard result in the principal agent literature.
6
 In the SB situation, 
there is a conflict between incentive constraints and the farmer's risk-aversion. Thus SB 
expected indemnity payment will be no less than that in FB where incentive constraints do 
not exist. 
Special SB cases where FB indemnity Scheme applies 
This section will demonstrate several special SB cases where FB perfect risk sharing rule 
is supported under SB.  
The first case involves diseases where current biosecurity investments prove to be least 
effective. Such diseases may include exotic or novel diseases. For example, biosecurity 
investments made in swine health management usually lack effectiveness for the viral 
diseases such as PRRS and influenza. Thus there is an emergence of novel animal diseases 
characterized by high virulence in individual species despite vast biosecurity investments 
(Davies and Leman 2008). 
To describe the relationship between biosecurity investments and disease prevalence 
level under our model setup, we have ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) ( , ; , )
i j i j i j i j
f q q b b f q q b b ,
i
b B  . In this case 
the minimum biosecurity level should be taken as it is not effective. By equation (5), we can 
see that ( ( , ))
i i j i
h v q q   . Intuitively, this means that farmers will receive the same payment 
                                                 
6
 See Mas-Colell (1995), pp. 486. 
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whatever the disease prevalence levels are. Thus a perfect risk sharing indemnification rule is 
warranted.  
Secondly, it may be optimal to apply a perfect risk sharing scheme on only a subset of 
farms when farms can be categorized according to their risks. Here a high risk farm stands 
for a farm with a high potential for disease outbreak. Grabkowsky et al. (2006), for example, 
divided poultry farms into different risk classes according to factors such as distance to 
wetlands and distance to adjacent farms. Suppose that there are two farms in an adjacent 
region where disease typically originates from farm 2. Here we can imagine that farm 2 is 
frequented by wild bird carrying virus. Or perhaps farm 2 has an open production system that 
trades with a region where the disease is endemic. Farm 1 maintains a closed system instead. 
According to Grabkowsky et al. (2006), we could categorize farm 1 as a low risk farm and 
farm 2 as a high risk farm.  
Assume that farm 1 will not suffer a loss from disease if farm 2 maintains a disease free 
status. To characterize farm 1's biosecurity effort on its disease prevalence rate, we have 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) ( , ; , ),f q q b b f q q b b b B    in terms of density function. By equation (7), it 
follows that 
1 1 2 1
( ( , ))h v q q   . By lemma 1, we know the gross returns for farmer 1 stay the 
same for all possible 
1 2
,q q . For farm 2, however, assumption 1 applies. According to 
Proposition 1, the unit indemnity payment should decrease when its disease prevalence level 
increases. 
Potential benefit from risk classification of livestock farms has been address by Niemi et 
al. (2009). If the high-risk farms could be identified, then the livestock indemnification 
payments for them will be different. This result suggests a tiered indemnification scheme 
according to farmers' relative risk, with full indemnity for low risk farms and indemnity 
contingent on disease prevalence for high risk farms.  
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Thirdly, FB situation can be resumed when the biosecurity measure is almost always 
effective. For example, suppose for a certain disease vaccination is optimal and all the 
vaccinated animals are immune to the disease during the outbreaks. Thus the animals once 
vaccinated will not contract the disease. In this case, probability mass function is 
ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) 1
i j i j
P q q b b   when 
i
q q  and ˆ ˆ( , ; , ) 0,
i j i j i
P q q b b q q   . If ˆ
i i
b b , then 
ˆ( , ; , ) 0
i j i j
P q q b b   on the possible range of 
i
q .  
Under this situation the government can infer with certainty that the optimal biosecurity 
measure is not taken whenever the herd contracts the disease. This is equivalent to the FB 
situation where the government can observe the true biosecurity inputs by the agents. 
Therefore, farmers who fail to take the optimal biosecurity level will receive no indemnity.  
Lastly, FB situation can be resumed if the government could audit the biosecurity 
practice efforts at a cost. Kunreuther, McNulty, and Kang (2002) suggested the use of third 
party auditing together with insurance instruments to address hidden action issues. The 
National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) is one such example, where a veterinarian will 
conduct an audit each year to verify that the plan participants only purchase birds from NPIP 
stock. In this way, deviations from the optimal practice will be found at a cost. If the audit 
cost is less than the social welfare difference between FB and SB, then it will be beneficial to 
resume the FB situation. A possible implementation method is that farmers pay an audit fee 
in proportion to the quantity of their livestock. During the disease outbreak, all farmers acting 
in accordance with the optimal biosecurity requirements could obtain full indemnity as 
specified in the FB case.  
AN EXAMPLE 
In this section we will provide a simple example where there are only two possible output 
levels, Lq  and 
H
q , and two possible biosecurity practices, Lb  and 
H
b . The numerical results 
we obtain here will shed some insights on the structures of indemnity scheme under different 
20 
 
 
scenarios. 
In the example to be analyzed, we assume that the unit biosecurity investment cost is 
1w   and that the two options available are 1
H
i
b   and 0.3L
i
b  . There are two possible 
output levels 10H
i
q   and 0L
i
q  . Farmers can obtain a reservation utility 1U   when 
choosing not to participate in the eradication program.  
We use a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) function as the utility function, where 
( ) ( )v a ln a  and its inverse function is ( )
v
h v e . Given the biosecurity action b , let ( )p b  
denote the probability that the output level is Hq  and 1 ( )p b  stand for the probability that 
output level is Lq . Assume ( ) 3 / 4
H
p b   and ( ) 1 / 2
L
p b  . Finally, variable 0   denotes 
the correlation between the two farmers' output levels. 
Note that when assigning the above parameter values, we do not have a specific disease 
or region in mind. Our main purpose is to illustrate in general how the indemnity payments to 
different farmers could be solved from the model we specified. Our model and methods will 
serve as a framework where real life data for a specific disease could be applied when they 
become available.  
Problem Setup 
(i) Separate Contract (SC) in SB 
SC refers to the contract between the government and one farmer. The model setup is 
similar to TOCP specified in the “Second-best Situation” section, except that only one 
participation constraint and incentive constraint are required. 
To render the notations simple, we will use ( , )
H L
x x  to denote ( ( ), ( ))
H L
v q v q .  
Suppose the optimal biosecurity level is ˆ
H
b b . The optimal SC can be written as: 
 
,
3 1
min ( ) ( )
4 4
H Lx xH Le q e q  
H Lx x
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s. t. 
 
3 1
1 1
4 4
3 1 1 1
1 0.3
4 4 2 2
H L
H L H L
x x
x x x x
  
    
 
(ii)  Joint Contract (JC) in SB 
JC refers to the contract between the government and two farmers. Before we proceed to 
set up the optimal JC problem, we will derive the probabilities that ( , ), ( , ),
H H H L
q q q q  
( , )
L H
q q  and ( , )
L L
q q  occur in Table 1. Note that Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) also 
presented a similar result, which we found contained an error. The detailed derivation of 
Table 1 and an explanation of the error in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) can be found in 
Appendix B. 
Based on our assumption that ( ) 3 / 4
H
p b   and ( ) 1 / 2
L
p b  , we can calculate the 
bounds on   in Table 2 for different combinations of biosecurity inputs. The detailed 
derivation is shown in Appendix B. Based on Table 2 we will specify the possible values of 
 , which takes the values between 0 and 0.5 at 0.1 increments. Here we will set up the 
optimal JC when 0  . Suppose the optimal biosecurity levels are 
1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )
H H
b b b b . The 
optimal JC when the parameters take different values could be formulized similarly, so we 
will not cover them here.  
From Table 1 we could calculate the discrete joint distribution function for different 
1 2
( , )q q  when 0  , as listed in Table 3. To simplify the notation, let: 
 
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 4
2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 4
( ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )) ( , , , )
( ( , ), ( , ), ( , ), ( , )) ( , , , )
H H H L L H L L
H H H L L H L L
v q q v q q v q q v q q x x x x
v q q v q q v q q v q q y y y y


 
Under this specification the optimal JC could written according to TOCP in section 3: 
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1 1 2 2
3 3 4 4
, 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
9 1
m in ( ) ( )
16 16
3 3
        ( ) ( )
16 16
x y x yH H L L
x y x yH L L H
e e q q e e q q
e e q q e e q q
      
      
X Y
 
s. t. 
 
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
9 1 3 3
1 1
16 16 16 16
9 1 3 3
1 1
16 16 16 16
9 1 3 3 3 1 1 3
1 0.3
16 16 16 16 8 8 8 8
9 1 3 3 3 1 3 1
1 0.3
16 16 16 16 8 8 8 8
x x x x
y y y y
x x x x x x x x
y y y y y y y y
    
    
        
        
 
(iii) Contract in FB 
The FB contract resembles that in part (ii), except that there is no incentive constraint. 
Note that in FB case, there is no need to distinguish between SC and JC. As perfect risk 
sharing is already obtained in FB case, there is no room for Pareto improvement even by JC. 
Solution and Discussion 
Under the optimal contracting problems set up above, we have convex objective 
functions and concave inequality constraints. Thus we can apply the SAS Nonlinear 
Programming (NLP), which is now a convex program with a unique minimum solution.
7
 Or 
we can transform the problem into a concave programming problem. Instead of minimizing 
the convex objective function, we can maximize the negative of the objective function, which 
is concave. For the concave programming problem, the first order conditions alone can lead 
to the optimal solution of the problem. In a two variables setup, figure 1 below displays *x  as 
the unique maximal point in a concave programming program.  
Here we use the SAS/IML (SAS 9.2) nonlinear optimization subroutine NLPNRR, which 
                                                 
7
 SAS/OR 9.22 User's Guide: Mathematical Programming 2010, pp. 868. 
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implements a ridge-stabilized Newton-Raphson method and computes Gradient and Hessian 
using analytic formulas. Values of (·)
i
v  could be obtained directly by solving the 
optimization problem, then the indemnity payments could be calculated using our previous 
definition (·) ( (·))
i i i
I h v q  . Here negative solutions could be understood as a tax imposed 
by government. Due to our symmetric problem setup here we only list government indemnity 
payment to farmer 1 in Table 4, the solution for farmer 2 will be the same. 
Table 4 displays government indemnity payments for different realized disease status 
under the joint contract (JC). As the other farm's disease information will not be utilized in 
the separate contract (SC), correlation between two farms' output level has no effect on the 
optimal indemnity payment under the SC. Therefore the expected indemnity payment is fixed 
at 3.89 in SC, which is equal to the expected indemnity payment in JC when the shocks are 
independent.  
When there is a stronger correlation between shocks in the JC problem, the government is 
expected to pay less indemnity. We can see that the indemnity payment in JC decreases from 
3.89 to 2.15 when the correlation increases from 0 to 0.5. The reason underlying this finding 
is that government can now better utilize the information conveyed by the other farmer's 
output (Hӧlmstrom 1979).Therefore it is cost minimizing for the government to design an 
optimal JC when the two farms' disease status are correlated with each other.  
Table 4 also shows that the government pays the lowest indemnity value in FB case, 
where both SC and JC will incur the same payment as correlation size does not matter. The 
difference in indemnity payment between FB and SB is 2.15 ( 0.11) 2.26    if 0.5   and 
3.89 ( 0.11) 4    if 0  . Thus to resume FB situation by periodical auditing will be more 
justified when the farms' disease prevalence rates are less correlated.  
Given the optimal indemnity scheme in Table 4, farmer 1's utilities at different 
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realizations of disease status are demonstrated in Figure 2. Farmer 2 ’s utilities will be 
depicted similarly given our symmetry assumption. We can see that under the JC, farmer 1 ’s 
utility is a non-decreasing function of his own output (Proposition 1) and a non-increasing 
function of farmer 2’s output (Proposition 2). Moreover, at the point where 0   farmer 1 ’s 
optimal indemnity payment does not depend on that of farmer 2's disease status. Thus SC is 
still optimal (Mookherjee 1984).  
 
Effectiveness of the optimal biosecurity measure 
We will refer the optimal biosecurity measure as more effective if it contributes to a 
lower within farm disease prevalence rate. In our two-output setup, a decreased disease 
prevalence rate is equivalent to increased probability for the high output. Our objective is to 
check how the indemnity payments and utilities received by farmers will change when the 
effectiveness of the optimal biosecurity level varies.  
First we will fix 0.3   and choose different effectiveness indicators for optimal 
biosecurity measure. Here Hb  is assumed to be the optimal biosecurity measure, the 
effectiveness of which can be adjusted by increasing ( )
H
p b  from 0.6 to 0.90 at increments 
of 0.05. Note that value 0.95 cannot be chosen since in that case one of the joint probabilities 
will be negative. However, ( ) 1
H
p b   can always be chosen whatever   is. The detailed 
reasoning is in Appendix B. If the effectiveness is equal to 1 ( ( ) 1
H
p b  ), then the FB risk 
sharing rule is optimal, as we discussed in section 2.4.  
The optimal indemnity scheme under the specified biosecurity effectiveness levels can be 
summarized in table 5. Table 5 indicates that a larger indemnity payment will be incurred if 
the optimal biosecurity measure becomes less effective. This result is quite intuitive in that 
farmers need a larger incentive, or larger utility variability, to adopt less effective biosecurity 
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measures (Figure 3). There will be an increased conflict between incentive constraints and 
farmers' risk aversion. As a result greater indemnity payment will be incurred. From Table 5 
we also observe that for 
1
,
H L
q q q , difference 
1 1 1 1
( , ) ( , )
L H
I q q I q q  decreases when the 
optimal biosecurity measure becomes more effective. FB will be resumed when ( ) 1
H
p b  , 
in that case SC is optimal as we discussed in section 2.3, which means that farmer 1's 
indemnity is independent of the farmer 2's biosecurity effort.  
The above findings indicate that a RPE indemnity scheme will be less justified when 
effectiveness of biosecurity measure is high. This is because farmer's performance will be 
more dependent on his own biosecurity investment rather than on the common environmental 
factors. This result is complementary to the finding that farmer 2's output plays a minor role 
in farmer 1's optimal indemnity payment if the correlation in shocks is small (Hӧlmstrom 
1979, Luporini 2006 and Proposition 2).  
Therefore both increased effectiveness and decreased correlation suggest decreased 
information value of the other farmers' output. If the biosecurity measure is highly effective, 
RPE may not improve the contract efficiency even when the correlation in shocks is high. 
 
Reservation Utility Changes 
Now we will analyze how reservation utility will affect the indemnity payments and 
utilities received by farmers at different realizations of the disease prevalence rate.  
We will increase U  from 0.5 to 1.2 at increments of 0.1, while fixing the other 
parameters as 0.3  , ( ) 0.75
H
p b   and ( ) 0.5
L
p b  . The solutions for optimal gross 
utilities for farmer 1 are shown in figure 4. We can see from figure 4 that the gross utilities 
for different outputs will increase by the same proportion when the reservation utility 
increases. This is because only PCs are altered by the change in reservation utility, which 
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result in level changes on the gross utilities agent receive. No change will occur in utility 
variability while NICs remain the same.  
For example, if farmers could still obtain high profit without disclosing their true disease 
status to some illegal traders, then the government needs to pay more to give farmers 
participation incentives to report the truth and join the eradication program. However, utility 
variability remains the same as the farmers need the same incentive to take the optimal 
biosecurity level. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has studied the optimal design of a government indemnity program taking 
both moral hazard and common uncertainty into account. Our results suggest that besides the 
within-farm disease prevalence, the average disease prevalence rate in the region should be 
incorporated into designing the optimal indemnity payment. The RPE is most justified under 
the following two scenarios. One is the case where the disease prevalence rates among farms 
are highly correlated, the other being that the optimal biosecurity investment is not very 
effective in curtailing the disease. The design of indemnity payment in reality should take 
many other factors into account as well. Such factors may include nature of disease 
(endemic, exotic or novel), farmer's risk category, biosecurity effectiveness and auditing cost, 
etc.  
An important policy implication of the use of RPE is that the government could reduce its 
expenditure in indemnity payment without compromising the farmers' biosecurity incentives. 
Beyond government indemnity program, our payment scheme could shed insights on 
potential livestock insurance designs. As noted by Green, Driscoll, and Bruch (2006), the 
adequacy of data is essential in determining the optimal indemnity payment. Our conceptual 
model suggests that development in data collection could be made in areas regarding disease 
prevalence correlation and biosecurity effectiveness in disease prevention. Experiences from 
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other industries such as the Group Risk Plan offered by FCIC could also be useful when 
designing and implementing the optimal indemnity scheme in practice.  
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APPENDIX A  
Proof of Lemma 1. To prove Lemma 1 is equivalent to show that 
1 2
( ( , )) / 0
i i i
q I q q q     is 
the necessary and sufficient condition for 
1 2
( ( , )) / 0
i i
h v q q q   .  
1 2
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Note: 1(·) (·)h V

  is convex since (·)V  is concave, therefore (·) 0h  .      □ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2. First we have: 
 
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1
1 1 1 2 2 2
( , ; , ) ( ( , ) , ( , ) )
                       ( ( , ), ( , ))
                        ( ( , )= , ( , ))
F q q b b F q b q q b q
F q q b q q b
G q q b q q b
 
 
 
 
  
    (A-1) 
Differentiating (A-1) with regard to 
1
q  and 
2
q  generates: 
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1 1
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2
( , ) ( , )
( , ; , ) ( ( , ), ( , )) ·
q q b q q b
f q q b b g q q b q q b
q q
 
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 
 (A-2) 
It follows immediately from (A-2) that: 
 
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2
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Similar to (A-2), we can write: 
 
1 1
1 11 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
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Next we will prove the equivalence of the two conditions as follows.  
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Note that 1
1 1 1 1
ˆ( , )q q b

  and 1
2 2 2 2
ˆ( , )q q b

 .      □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. When 
i
q  increases, ( , ; , ) / ( , ; , )
i j i j i j i j
f q q b b f q q b b
   is non-
increasing by assumption 1. Thus the RHS of equation (7) is non-decreasing. So we can infer 
that 
1 1 2
( ( , ))h v q q  is non-decreasing. By lemma 1, we know that ( , )
i i i j
q I q q  is a non-
decreasing.      □ 
 
Proof of Lemma 3. 
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Note that in proving the equivalence between (A-3) and (A-4) we have assumed: 
 
1 1
1 1
( , ) ( , );
( , ) ( , ).
i i i i i i i i
j j j j j j j j
q q b q q b
q q b q q b
 
 
     
     
  
  
 (A-6) 
Assumption (A-6) is valid since: 
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In addition, note that the equivalence between (A-4) and (A-5) are established by (A-7). 
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The proofs for (A-7) and (A-8) is as follows: 
First we have 1( , ( , ))
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It follows that: 
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Proof of Proposition 3. 
Denote FB indemnity payment to farmer 1 as 
1 1 2
( , )I q q  and SB indemnity payment to 
farmer 1 as 1
1 1 2
( , )I q q .  
From the above analysis, to achieve biosecurity input 
1
bˆ  in FB case, we have:   
 *
1 1 1 2 1
ˆ( ( , ))V q I q q b w U    (A-9) 
In the SB case, we have:  
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V q I q q f q q b b dq dq b w U     (A-10) 
Combining (A-9) and (A-10) we can obtain: 
 *
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2
ˆ ˆ( ( , )) ( , ; , ) ( ( , ))
q q
q q
V q I q q f q q b b dq dq V q I q q     (A-11) 
As the inverse function of the concave function (·)V  is still concave, we have by Jensen's 
inequality: 
                                                 
8
 Note 
i
q  on the LHS is a single variable, while 
i
q  on the RHS is a function w.r.t. 
i
b  and 
i
 . 
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  (A-12) 
From (A-11) and (A-12), we have: 
 
1 1 *
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2
*
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2
*
1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ      [ ( ( , ))] ( , ; , ) [ ( ( , ))]
ˆ ˆ[ ( , )] ( , ; , ) ( , )
ˆ ˆ[ ( , )] ( , ; , ) [ ( , )] ( , ;
q q
q q
q q
q q
q q
q q
V V q I q q f q q b b dq dq V V q I q q
q I q q f q q b b dq dq q I q q
q I q q f q q b b dq dq q I q q f q q
 
  
   
   
 
 
  1 2 1 2
*
1 1 2 1 1 2
ˆ ˆ, )
[ ( , )] [ ( , )]
q q
q q
b b dq dq
E I q q E I q q 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
Derivation of Table 1 
There are only two possible outcomes ( , )S F . For 1, 2i  , use ( )
i
X   to denote the payoff 
function of the outcomes, where ( )
i
X S m  and ( )
i
X F n . For simplicity, denote 
( ) ( )
i i
Prob S a p a∣  and ( ) 1 ( )
i i
Prob F a p a ∣ . When agent i  takes action 
i
a , Table B1 
describes the joint probability distribution when the correlation between 
1
X  and 
2
X  is  .  
Based on Table B1, we know: 
 
1
2
2 2 1
( )
( )
1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
p a
p a
p a p a p a
 
 
  
 
 
      
 (B-1) 
Thus to obtain Table B1 the only value we need to solve is  . For 1, 2i  : 
 2 2 2
2 2
1 2
( ) ( ) (1 ( ));
( ) ( ) (1 ( ));
( ) ( );
i i i
i i i
E X m p a n p a
E X m p a n p a
E X X m n m n   
  
  
   
 (B-2) 
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2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
   ( ) ( ) [ ( )]
( ) (1 ( )) [ ( ) (1 ( ))]
( ) (1 ( )) [ ( )] (1 ( )) 2 ( )(1 ( ))
[ ( ) ( ) ] [(1 ( )) (1 ( )) ] 2 ( )(1 ( ))
( ) (
i i i
i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
Var X E X E X
m p a n p a m p a n p a
m p a n p a m p a n p a m np a p a
m p a p a n p a p a m np a p a
m n p a

 
     
       
      
 
2
)(1 ( )) 2 ( )(1 ( ))
( ) ( )(1 ( ));
i i i i
i i
p a m np a p a
m n p a p a
  
  
  (B-3)  
And finally: 
 
1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2
1 1 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 2 1
2 2
1 2
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) [ ( ) (1 ( ))][ ( ) (1 ( ))]
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))(1 ( ))
  [ ( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( ))]
( ( ) ( )) [ (1 (
C ov X X E X X E X E X
m n m n m p a n p a m p a n p a
m n m n m p a p a n p a p a
m n p a p a p a p a
m p a p a n p
   
   
 
 
       
       
   
 

  
1 2
1 2 2 1
))(1 ( ))]
  [ ( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( )].
a p a
m n p a p a p a p a 

     
 (B-4) 
From (B-1), we could solve (B-4) by part: 
 
1 2
2 1 1 2
1 2
   (1 ( ))(1 ( ))
1 ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))(1 ( ))
( ) ( )
p a p a
p a p a p a p a
p a p a



  
      
 
 (B-5) 
 
1 2 2 1
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
1 2
    ( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2( ( ) ( ))
p a p a p a p a
p a p a p a p a p a p a p a p a
p a p a
 
 

    
       
  
 (B-6) 
By substituting results of (B-5) and (B-6) into (B-4), we can get: 
 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
( ) ( 2 )( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))C ov X X m n m n p a p a m n p a p a         (B-7) 
It follows from (B-3) and (B-7) that: 
 
1 2
1 2
1 2
2
1 2
2 2
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 1 2 2
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ( ) ( ))
                  
( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( )(1 ( ))
( ) ( )
                  
( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( ))
C ov X X
corr X X
var X var X
m n p a p a
m n p a p a m n p a p a
p a p a
p a p a p a p a




 

   

 
 
 (B-8) 
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From (B-8), we can solve  as:  
 
1 2 1 1 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( ))p a p a p a p a p a p a      (B-9) 
The other variables of Table 1 could be easily solved from (B-1), based on the value of 
 .  
An Error of Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) 
 
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1
1
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( ))
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( ))
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )[ ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( )) ]
(
p a p a a a p a p a p a p a
a a p a p a a a p a p a a a p a p a p a p a
a a p a p a a a p a p a p a p a p a p a
a
     
         
       



 
1 2 2 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( ))
) ( ) ( ) (1 )[ ( ) ( ) ]
2
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )
2
Prob(S, S)     D asgupta and M askin (1987)
p a p a p a p a
a p a p a a a p a p a
p a p a
a a p a p a a a
  
   

    

 
The equality in the third to last step holds if and only if 
1 2
( )(1 ( ))p a p a  
2 1
( )(1 ( ))p a p a  , which is equivalent to 
1 2
( ) ( )p a p a . Thus we can conclude in table 1 of 
Dasgupta and Maskin (1987), probability of outcome (S,S) is generally overestimated, 
similarly is (F, F). However, probability of outcomes (S,F) and (F,S) are generally 
underestimated.  
 
Derivation of Table 2 (Bounds of  ) 
Given the marginal distributions 
1
( )p a , 
2
( )p a  and the correlation coefficient  , we 
should be able to work out the joint distribution in table 1 from equations (B-1) and (B-9). 
However, in order to have the joint distribution well defined, i.e. , , , [0,1]     , generally 
the range of   is no longer [-1,1]. Therefore it is useful to define a tighter bound on   as 
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functions of 
1
( )p a  and 
2
( )p a .  
Given 
1
( )p a  and 
2
( )p a , the joint distribution is well defined if and only if:  
 
1 2 1 2
{0, ( ) ( ) 1} { ( ), ( )}max p a p a min p a p a     (B-10) 
Inequality (B-10) is known as Fréchet-Hoeffding bounds inequality, in recognition of the 
pioneering work in this field by Hoeffding (1940, 1941) and Fréchet (1951). In our case, it is 
obtained by (B-1) and 0 , , , 1     . Again by (B-9), (B-10) holds if and only if the 
following inequalities are satisfied: 
 
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( )) { ( ), ( )}
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( )) {0, ( ) ( ) 1}
p a p a p a p a p a p a min p a p a
p a p a p a p a p a p a max p a p a


   
     
 (B-11) 
It follows that the joint probabilities are well defined if and only if   is chosen in a such 
way that inequality set (B-11) are satisfied. Thus (B-11) implicitly defines the upper and 
lower bounds of  . Note that when ( ) 0
i
p a  or ( ) 1
i
p a  , inequality set (B-11) are satisfied 
for any values of [0,1]  . If ( ) 0
i
p a   and ( ) 1
i
p a  , then we will discuss the bounds of   
as follows.  
Upper bounds of   
(i) If 
1 2
( ) ( )p a p a , then (B-11) becomes: 
 
1 2 1 1 2 2 1
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( )) ( )p a p a p a p a p a p a p a     (B-12) 
We can further solve the bounds of   from (B-12) as:  
 
1 1 2
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 1 2 2
1
2
1 2
2 1
( ) ( ) ( )
( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( ))
( )(1 ( ))
   
( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( ))
( )(1 ( ))
   
( )(1 ( ))
p a p a p a
p a p a p a p a
p a p a
p a p a p a p a
p a p a
p a p a



 


 
 
  
 
 (B-13) 
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(ii)  If 
1 2
( ) ( )p a p a , we can derive the results similarly. The only change is to exchange 
the role of 
1
( )p a  and 
2
( )p a .  
 
1
2
2 1
1 2
( )(1 ( ))
( )(1 ( ))
 
p a p a
p a p a

 
  
 
 (B-14) 
Lower bounds of   
(i)  If 
1 2
( ) ( ) 1 0p a p a   , then the second inequality of (B-11) becomes: 
 
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( ) 1p a p a p a p a p a p a p a p a       (B-15) 
We can further solve (B-15) as: 
 
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 1 2 2
1
2
1 2
1 2
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( ))
(1 ( ))(1 ( ))
   
( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( ))
(1 ( ))(1 ( ))
   
( ) ( )
p a p a p a p a
p a p a p a p a
p a p a
p a p a p a p a
p a p a
p a p a

  

 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 (B-16) 
(ii) If 
1 2
( ) ( ) 1 0p a p a   , then the second inequality of (B-11) becomes: 
 
1 2 1 1 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( )) 0p a p a p a p a p a p a     (B-17) 
We can further solve (B-17) as: 
 
1 2
1 1 2 2
1
2
1 2
1 2
( ) ( )
( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( ))
( ) ( )
  
(1 ( ))(1 ( ))
p a p a
p a p a p a p a
p a p a
p a p a
  
 
 
   
  
 (B-18) 
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Table 2.1: Joint Probability Distribution Computation Formula 
 
H
q  
L
q  
H
q     1( )p b   
L
q  2( )p b   2 11 ( ) ( )p b p b     
 
Note:
 1 2 1 1 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( )(1 ( ))p b p b p b p b p b p b     . 
 
Table 2.2: Bounds on   
 
H
b  
L
b  
H
b   1 / 3,1  1 / 3 , 1 / 3
 
 
 
L
b  
1 / 3 , 1 / 3 
 
  1,1  
 
 
Table 2.3: Discrete Joint Probability Distribution for 
1 2
( , )q q when 0  . 
 
( , )
H H
q q  ( , )
H L
q q  ( , )
L H
q q  ( , )
L L
q q  
( , )
H H
b b  9/16 3/16 3/16 1/16 
( , )
H L
b b  3/8 3/8 1/8 1/8 
( , )
L H
b b  3/8 1/8 3/8 1/8 
( , )
L L
b b  1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 
 
Table 2.4: JC Indemnity Payments Varying with Correlations 
correlation   1 ( , )
H H
I q q   
1
( , )
H L
I q q   
1
( , )
L H
I q q   
1
( , )
L L
I q q   Mean  
0 4.88 4.88 0.9 0.9 3.89 
0.1 4.3 4.98 0.55 3.36 3.71 
0.2 3.49 4.81 0.43 4.99 3.38 
0.3 2.65 4.54 0.36 6.03 3 
0.4 1.77 4.16 0.3 6.94 2.59 
0.5 1 3.84 0.26 7.15 2.15 
FB  -2.61 -2.61 7.39 7.39 -0.11 
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Table 2.5: JC Indemnity Payments Varying with Biosecurity Effectiveness  
( )
H
p b  1 ( , )
H H
I q q  
1
( , )
H L
I q q  
1
( , )
L H
I q q  
1
( , )
L L
I q q  Mean 
0.6 48.47 61.93 0 20.49 36.1 
0.65 15.27 20.37 0.03 9.66 12.58 
0.7 6.46 9.34 0.15 6.97 6.03 
0.75 2.65 4.54 0.36 6.03 3 
0.8 0.58 1.89 0.62 5.74 1.18 
0.85 -0.7 0.22 0.89 5.76 -0.09 
0.9 -1.56 -0.93 1.17 5.98 -1.07 
 
Table 2.B1: Joint Probability Distribution 
1
2
X
X
 
S F 
 S     1( )p a  
F     11 ( )p a  
 
2
( )p a  
2
1 ( )p a  
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x₁
f(x) is a concave function and
increases in this direction
If g(x) is a concave function,
then the domain of x {x: g(x)≥X} is a convex set. 
{x: g(x)≥X} 
x₂
x*
 
Figure 2.1: Uniqueness of Solution 
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Figure 2.2: Utility Variability under Different Correlation Levels 
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Figure 2.3: Utility Variability under Different Biosecurity Effectiveness Levels 
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Figure 2.4: Utility Variability under Different Reservation Utilities 
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Chapter 3: Where are the Food Animal Veterinarian Shortage Areas 
Anyway? 
 
A paper published in the Preventive Veterinary Medicine 
 
Tong Wang
9
, David A. Hennessy
10
, Annette M. O’Connor 
ABSTRACT 
In 2010 the United States implemented the Veterinary Medicine Loan Repayment 
Program (VMLRP) to address perceived regional shortages in certain veterinary occupations, 
including food animal practice. With county level as the unit of analysis, this paper describes 
a pair of models to evaluate factors associated with being designated a private practice 
shortage area in 2010. One model is used to explain food animal veterinarian location 
choices so as to provide an objective evaluation of comparative shortage. The other model 
seeks to explain the counties chosen as shortage areas. Model results are then used to 
evaluate the program. On the whole the program appears to perform quite well. For several 
states, however, VMLRP shortage designations are inconsistent with the food animal 
veterinarian location model. Comparative shortage is generally more severe in states that 
have no VMLRP designated private practice shortage counties than in states that do. 
INTRODUCTION 
As of 2011, American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) state legislative 
resources at http://www.avma.org/advocacy/state/loan_repayment_programs/default.asp 
report twenty U.S. state veterinary loan programs. All but one of these programs specifically 
target farm animal, large animal or rural practices.  
Pursuant to the National Veterinary Medical Service Act of 2003, the Veterinary 
Medicine Loan Repayment Program (VMLRP) became law as U.S. Code Title 7, Section 
3151a. The program was implemented at the federal level in 2010. For qualified veterinarians 
                                                 
9
 Primary researcher and author. 
10
 Author for correspondence. 
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who agree to serve in certain high-priority veterinary shortage areas for a period of three 
years, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) National Institute of Food and 
Agriculture (NIFA) will repay a maximum of $25,000 of student loans per year.  
As amended under Section 7105 of the 2008 Farm Bill, when implementing the VMLRP 
the Secretary for Agriculture may consider “(1) geographical areas that the Secretary 
determines have a shortage of veterinarians”; and “(2) areas of veterinary practice that the 
Secretary determines have a shortage of veterinarians, such as food animal medicine, public 
health, epidemiology, and food safety” when identifying ‘veterinarian shortage situations.’ In 
addition, “In administering the program, the Secretary shall give priority to agreements with 
veterinarians for the practice of food animal medicine in veterinarian shortage situations.”  
Under the VMLRP, private veterinary shortage areas are determined according to the 
following steps: 1) “NIFA will release a Federal Register (FR) notice soliciting nominations 
for veterinary shortage situations from all State Animal Health Officials”; 2) “State Animal 
Health Officers will prepare nominations corresponding to the highest priority veterinary 
shortage situations within their entities and then submit completed nomination forms by 
email to NIFA”; 3) “A review panel composed of Federal and State animal health experts 
will be convened by NIFA to evaluate the submitted nomination packages.” Then “Final 
decisions regarding recommendation status will be made by the NIFA Program Manager, on 
behalf of the Secretary of Agriculture. Designated shortage situations will be made accessible 
to the public in list and/or map form.” See 
http://www.nifa.usda.gov/nea/animals/in_focus/vmlrp_11/vmlrp_shortage_situation_usmap.h
tml (last visited 8/18/2011).  
The issue of whether the United States has a food animal veterinarian (FAV) shortage has 
been addressed previously, with diverging conclusions. Some argue that there is an excess 
supply (Getz, 1997; Brown and Silverman, 1999). Others suggest that a shortage exists and 
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will persist through the near future (Prince et al., 2006; Narver, 2007). Our inquiry does not 
seek to establish whether the United States has an absolute shortage in the sector, but rather 
where comparative shortages are and how effective the 2010 VMLRP implementation was in 
targeting them.  
NIFA does publish evaluation criteria and a scoring algorithm for the VMLRP, see 
http://www.nifa.usda.gov/nea/animals/in_focus/an_health_if_vmlrp_nomination_and_design
ation_of_veterinary_shortage_situations.html#review (visited 8/18/2011). But the case made 
for each nominated area will inevitably be unique and no specific quantifiable data were 
required of all nominations. An obvious question then is: What basis did NIFA use in the 
process? The primary objective of our study is to assess the extent of agreement between the 
NIFA nominated areas and other measures of FAV coverage.  
Our approach to meeting this objective is to test the main working hypothesis that there is 
an association between regions that have a comparatively low FAV presence given the 
number of animals present and regions designated as shortage areas under the VMLRP. We 
do so by building two models where one seeks to identify factors that determine FAV 
presence in a county and the other seeks to explain designation status under the VMLRP in 
2010. We will then assess whether our estimate of shortage, upon accounting for FAV 
determining factors, is consistent with VMLRP designation.  
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Data collection and management 
For the analysis the unit of concern was the county in the United States’ 48 contiguous 
states. Alaska, Hawaii and unincorporated territories were excluded in large part because 
their extreme geographic features would distort findings. For all 3,120 counties or 
equivalents the following data were collected.  
Data on whether a county was designated a private veterinary practice shortage situation 
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were obtained at NIFA Web site 
http://www.nifa.usda.gov/nea/animals/in_focus/vmlrp/vmlrp_shortage_situation_usmap.html 
(visited 8/18/2011). Ten of the 48 states do not have any designated shortage counties, either 
because “no shortage situation nominations were submitted,” or “nominations were 
submitted, but the external review panel did not recommend them for official designation.” 
These are Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, 
Tennessee, Washington and Wyoming (Figure 1). NIFA staff have communicated to us (July 
10, 2010) that 181 of the 249 nominations received were recommended. Further details on 
the rejected nominations were considered confidential, and were not available. 
The number of FAVs in a county was obtained from the AVMA website 
http://www.avma.org/fsvm/maps/default.asp (visited 8/18/2011), which uses data extracted 
from the AVMA membership database. These data are compiled by the AVMA from 
member and non-member information. An e-mail received from the AVMA (3/11/2011) 
clarifies that veterinary students are provided with a year’s membership upon graduation, and 
employment classification data are collected at that time. Thereafter, members can update 
information on their employment classification while those who do not renew membership 
are assumed to continue their prior employment. For the year 2010, AVMA records identify 
95,430 positions held by U.S. veterinarians. Of these about 18% have unknown employment 
while about 8% are in food animal predominant or exclusive private clinical practice.  
For each county, livestock species numbers were obtained from the 2007 USDA Census 
of Agriculture. Data for livestock were all cattle (labeled cattle), all hogs (hogs), all sheep 
(sheep) and all horses (horses). Horses were included as FAVs may care for them, especially 
in shortage counties where specialist equine veterinarians are unlikely to locate.  
Consistent and reliable data were not available on pet populations at the county level of 
analysis. Therefore demographic variables were used to proxy for possible demands on 
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veterinarian time from serving pets in the county. These variables were the county’s human 
population in 2000 and average per capita income in 1999, where census forms ask about 
income in the preceding year. These data were extracted from U.S. Census Bureau, decennial 
census 2000. Population and income should be important factors in determining the number 
of pets in a county and the population’s willingness to pay for veterinary services.  
A rurality index was also obtained for each county. The rurality index used was designed 
by the Purdue University's Center for Regional Development and Indiana University's 
Indiana Business Research Center (http://www.ibrc.indiana.edu/innovation/maps.html, 
visited 1/6/10). The index is based on four dimensions: population, population density, extent 
of urbanized (built-up) area and distance to the nearest metro area (Waldolf, 2006). A rurality 
index was included in the model to accommodate several possible issues. These include i) a 
preference for a rural lifestyle, which may be associated with ownership of livestock for 
reasons other than food production; ii) the effect of rurality on spousal career constraints; iii) 
the relationship between rurality and the business costs of serving food animal premises. 
Because of these multiple, and likely opposing, effects and because true shortages are likely 
to be correlated with rurality, we will interpret inferences concerning the variable with 
caution.  
County land area was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, census 2000. The rationale 
for including area as an explanatory variable was that travel time matters in food animal 
practice. Given fixed food animal stocks, a larger county area would require more travel to 
provide the same service. The FAV (directly) and/or client (through service charges) would 
have to absorb travel costs. If FAVs absorb these costs then net income falls and alternative 
business locations may be sought. If clients absorb these costs then clients have stronger 
incentives to reduce FAV use. So, while time required to serve a given animal stock 
increases with county area, the effect on FAV presence is less clear.  
51 
 
 
Distance to veterinary college was obtained for each county. Figure 1 presents veterinary 
college locations. Distance is calculated by CDXZipStream software, see 
http://www.cdxtech.com/CDXZipStream/Overview.aspx (visited 6/7/2010). This software 
calculated the distance between each county and each of the 27 veterinary colleges using zip 
codes information, and chose the minimum distance. A county generally has a large number 
of zip codes. For simplicity we use the county’s first zip code as listed by CDXZipStream 
software. All zip codes in the same county generate very similar minimum distances to a 
veterinarian school. This minimum distance variable was included in the analysis because 
practitioners may wish to avail of college services. Consequently, counties around schools 
may have more self-identifying FAVs than market forces might otherwise predict. In 
addition, the graduate or spouse may have established personal or professional roots while 
attending college. 
We also sought to capture any distinctive effects associated with counties in which a 
veterinary college is located. We did so by use of a veterinary college dummy (college), 
assigned value 1 if a veterinary college is located in the county and value 0 otherwise. The 
effects at issue may include the aforementioned inertia and career opportunities that can arise 
for FAVs from being near a major teaching and clinical facility. Table 1 provides descriptive 
statistics for all the county level variables.  
Models 
The approach used to identify FAV location and shortage areas was to model the county 
level FAV count based on livestock and human populations, distance to a veterinary college, 
income, area and rurality. The modeling approach adapted Getz’s (1997) ordinary least 
squares analysis on early 1990s state-level data by using discrete count regression methods 
on county-level data. The outcome for the model was the count of FAVs in a county. 
The starting point for our FAV Count model is 
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(1) 
where 
i
  is the estimated mean FAV count and 
i
  is a random error term. Subscript i 
denotes the county identifier. A nominal small number, 0.0001, was added to each of the 
variables to be logged to avoid the undefined value ln(0). Equation (1), through specifying 
ln( )
i
  rather than 
i
 , ensures that the estimated mean FAV count is always nonnegative. 
Species numbers have been log transformed so that proportional changes in species 
numbers match proportional changes in FAV count. In addition, the log transformation 
allows us to interpret parameters 
i
 , {1, ... , 5}i  , as percent of veterinary time allocated to 
the respective species. That is, with derivative (mean FAV) / cattle   as the FAV time 
required by one bovine then 
1
cattle ( mean FAV / cattle) / [mean FAV ]    . When 
building the model all the explanatory variables were first included, and removed 
sequentially whenever a variable’s p value exceeded 0.1. We also assessed the model’s 
explanatory power and fit with and without the rural index as accounting for it may possibly 
account for any FAV shortage.  
In the Count model, and also the Designation model to follow, all available explanatory 
variables were included and then removed sequentially whenever a variable’s Wald test p 
value was greater than 0.1. To measure the fraction of total variability that can be 
explained by our Count model, we computed the pseudo-  statistic, 2
0 0
( ) /R  

   , 
see, e.g., Han et al. (2009) for another application. Here 
0
  is the overdispersion 
parameter under the null (intercept-only) model and   is the overdispersion 
parameter under our selected model. The 2R

 statistic would have value 1 were the 
explanatory variables perfectly specified, as then 0 . On the other hand, the statistic 
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would have value 0 were the included variables to have no explanatory power and 
0
  . 
We then used the model residuals to develop an alternative definition of a shortage 
county. Residuals were calculated as ˆresid
i i i
v v  , where 
i
v  is the ith county observed 
number of FAVs and ˆ
i
v  is the corresponding predicted value, according to (1). A negative 
residual for the ith county means that fewer veterinarians are observed in the county than the 
model predicts. This can be interpreted in two ways. The model may be severely mis-
specified or there are fewer FAVs in the county than should be the case given information on 
FAV determinants. Conditional on acceptable specification, when a state has a larger share of 
counties with negative residuals than the national average then there is evidence that the 
state’s shortage situation is more severe than the national average. Our hypothesis is that 
when a state’s percentage of negative residual counties increases then that state faces a more 
severe FAV shortage problem. We provide a residual analysis by state in order to shed light 
on where FAV coverage is lightest. 
We refer to the second model as the Designation choice model. It is a logistic regression 
model. The response variable takes only two values; 1 whenever the county was shortage 
designated under the 2010 VMLRP assignments and 0 otherwise. Our tentative Designation 
choice model is 
0 1 2 3 4
7 8 9 10 11
5 6
ln FA V cattle sheep hogs horses population
1
distance college incom e area ruralit ,y
i
i i i i i i
i
i i i ii i
s
s
 
       
 
    
      
    
 (2) 
where 
i
  represents the random error term. Here 
i
s  is the estimated probability that the ith 
county is designated as short private veterinarians. We use the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-
of-fit test (p. 360 in Dohoo et al., 2003) to test the fit of our finalized designation model. We 
also calculated the area under ROC curve (AUC) as an indicator of a logistic model’s 
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discriminatory power (p. 362 in Dohoo et al., 2003). The AUC statistic is bounded between 0 
and 1 with 0.5 being no better than random and 1 representing perfect discriminatory power. 
Finally we tested whether the 2010 VMLRP designated shortage areas conform with our 
alternative definition of veterinary shortage areas. We do this by inquiring into how the 
residual from the Count model, which we take as indicating comparative shortage counties, 
was associated with VMLRP county designation. The modifications to the Designation 
model take the following two forms: 
0 1
ln resid ,
1
i
i
i
s
s
 
  
 
   (3A) 
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 
       
 
    
      
    
 (3B) 
Here resid
i
 in (3B) replaces FAV
i
 in (2) as the residual was obtained through a modeling 
of FAV. Regression (3A) seeks to establish whether resid
i
 is effective by itself in explaining 
county shortage designation. Regression (3B) asks whether other variables carry additional 
explanatory power, and so seeks to identify finer detail on what drove designation decisions.  
 
RESULTS 
Model validity and selection 
Count model 
We initially used a Poisson regression model but detected over-dispersion and so adopted 
the negative binomial regression model to accommodate over-dispersion. The likelihood 
ratio statistic to check for over-dispersion (p. 400 in Dohoo et al., 2003) gave LR statistic= -
2( LL(Poisson) – LL(negative binomial)) = 576.88. Here LL(model) is the model’s log 
likelihood statistic. The null hypothesis was rejected at significance level 0.001, and so we 
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chose the negative binomial model over the Poisson model.  
For the Count model the area variable was excluded as it was not statistically significant 
at the 10% level. The final model was: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) lnln( () cattle sheep hogs horses p )opulation
distance college incoln( )me rural ty .i
i i i i i i
i ii i i
      
   
     
   
(1’) 
As previously discussed, rurality can have multiple effects on the number of FAVs in a 
county. Given the intent of the loan program, including it may explain away the shortage. For 
this reason we also consider the Count model without rurality and refer to it as (1’’). For 
Count model (1’) we have 2 0.754R

 . Residuals from estimation (1’) will be used to assess 
the appropriateness of 2010 VMLRP designation choices. 
 
Designation model 
Six variables were removed from the model: sheep, horses, population, college, income 
and area. The finalized Designation model was:  
0 1 2 3 4 5
ln FAV cattle hogs distance rurality
1
.
i
i i i ii i
i
s
s
     
 
       
 
 (2’) 
Estimation (2’) will be used to understand the designation choices. The result of the Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit was not significant (Chi-square=12.03, DF=8, p-value=0.15). The 
model’s AUC equals 0.71.  
 
Count residual as explanation of Designation 
Using the Wald test, we found that the variable “resid” should be included in the test 
model (3A) since it is significant at the 0.1 level. However, the Hosmer-Lemeshow 
goodness-of-fit test (Chi-square=17.5, DF=8, p-value=0.03) indicated poor model fit. We 
applied the Wald test as the model selection criterion for (3B) and removed seven variables 
56 
 
 
from the model, namely sheep, hogs, horses, population, college, income and area. The 
finalized model (3B) was:  
0 2 41 3
ln resid cattle distance rurality
1
,
i
i i i i
i
i
s
s
     
 
    



 (3B’) 
The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test result was not significant (Chi-square=6.17, 
DF=8, p-value=0.63) with AUC=0.705. 
 
Model estimates and interpretation 
The estimated Count models, with and without the rurality regressor, are provided in 
table 2. Estimates are robust to removing rurality. The only coefficient that changes 
significantly is that for population. This is not surprising as the rurality index includes a 
population component. 
The coefficient estimates are 0.394 for cattle, 0.09 for sheep, 0.047 for hogs and 0.055 for 
horses. So, upon holding other model variables constant, a one percent increase in cattle 
population would increase expected veterinarian count by about 0.39%. That is, about 40% 
of FAV time is allocated to bovines. While the sheep coefficient is surprisingly large, the 
others appear to be reasonable and all are significant at the 10% level.  
The sum of animal species coefficients equals about 0.59 while the human population 
coefficient is approximately 0.3. If time commitment to companion animals scales with 
human population then about 30% of a FAV’s time is allocated to companion animals. Thus 
about 90% of FAV time has been accounted for. So the estimates are reasonable under this 
criterion.  
The ln(income) coefficient was just above 1 so FAV time allocation scales in rough 
proportion to income. Very little of this income response is likely to be allocated to food 
animals. According to http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/RuralAtlas/atlas.htm#map (visited 
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7/30/2011), four of 3,141 counties recorded had ≥ 50%, 34 had ≥ 33.3% and 112 had ≥ 25% 
employment in agriculture over 2005-2009. This suggests that income responses are likely to 
be concentrated in a practice’s companion animal component (including horses). Concerning 
other factors, rurality and having a veterinary college were positively associated with a 
county’s FAV count. Increased distance to a veterinary college was associated with a 
decrease in the predicted number of veterinarians.  
The estimated logistic regression coefficients in the county designation model are given 
in table 3. From the Estimate column, a unit increase in FAV count decreases the log odds of 
being designated as a shortage county by 0.063. Interpretation is easier when the coefficients 
are exponentiated, as shown in the point estimate column. A unit increase in FAV count 
decreases the odds ratio of being listed as a shortage county by factor 0.939, or 0.063e
 . This 
means that, ceteris paribus, when the FAV count increase from 0 to 2 then the odds of being 
shortage designated decreases by factor 2(0.939) 0.882 . When cattle count increases by 
one unit (i.e., 10,000 cattle), then the odds ratio for being listed increases by factor 1.055.  
As distance from the nearest veterinary college increased by one mile, the odds ratio for 
being a designated county increased to 1.005. So, ceteris paribus, when the distance to the 
closest veterinarian school increase by 100 miles, the odds ratio to be listed increased by 
factor 100(1.005) 1.647  When rurality increases by one unit (i.e., from most urban to most 
rural), the odds ratio for being designated increases by the factor 5.836. This suggests that 
rurality has played a key role in deciding whether a county is listed as a veterinarian shortage 
county. 
The estimated logistic regression coefficients in the residual only Designation model, 
(3A), and residual added Designation model, (3B), are given in table 4. In each case the sign 
on the Count model residual is as expected, i.e., whenever a county is less likely to be a 
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shortage area according to our Count model then the odds that it is designated as a shortage 
county by the VMLRP decreases. This result confirms that in general the 2010 VMLRP 
performs well according to our Count model criterion.  
 
Comparing state-level shortage situations with national average 
To obtain a sense of which states may have a more ‘dire’ veterinarian shortage situation 
when compared to the national average, we provide in table 5 the percentage of counties with 
negative residuals arising from the Count model. The average across all 38 states is 57.9% 
and the standard deviation is 15.9%. Five states (Idaho, Iowa, Maine, New Hampshire, 
Wisconsin) have no more than 42% of counties with negative residuals, i.e., one standard 
deviation below the national average. The states are mapped in figure 2. Of these, Maine and 
New Hampshire do not provide even an undergraduate program, but are small states 
proximate to colleges in Massachusetts and New York states.  
Six states have at least 73.9% of counties with negative residuals, i.e., one standard 
deviation above the national average. These are mapped in figure 2. Two, North Carolina and 
Virginia, have veterinary colleges. The other four, Delaware, Rhode Island, South Carolina 
and West Virginia, do not provide an undergraduate program but are comparatively small 
states. If one were to discern a pattern here, it might be that the Northern tier of the Atlantic 
South is least well-served and the MidWest may be quite well-served. Kansas (56.2%), 
Montana (51.8%), Nebraska (48.4%), North Dakota (56.6%), Oregon (47.2%) and South 
Dakota (53%) have below average (57.9%) shortage levels, according to our definition.  
Table 6 gives a sense of what the shortage situation might be for those states that don’t 
have a designated private practice shortage area. Our model suggests that one of the ten states 
that did not receive VMLRP funding in 2010 did not have a comparative shortage issue. This 
is Connecticut, where 25% of counties have Count model negative residuals. Alabama, New 
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Jersey and Tennessee clearly register as having significant comparative shortage situations. 
So our model suggests that any shortage problem is generally more severe for those states 
that do not have any VMLRP designated private practice shortage counties than for those that 
do.  
DISCUSSION 
Some notes on model selection 
In the Designation model we find that six explanatory variables are not significant at the 
10% level. These are sheep, horses, population, college, income and area. Sheep is a low 
valued livestock of limited presence in the United States while few view horses as food 
animals. Not surprisingly, the model infers that these species were not factor in county 
designation. Omission of college is not surprising as these 21 counties are likely to compete 
for funds under the separate VMLRP public practice category. We may think of income and 
population as control variables for the possibility that serving pets is a significant component 
of a practice. The veterinarians under scrutiny self-designated as serving primarily food 
animals, although the Count regression suggests that 30% of their time was allocated to 
companion animals. Given Section 7105 of the 2008 Farm Bill, insignificance of the income 
and population variables (as proxies for companion animals) was expected, and perhaps 
reassuring from the perspective of effective policy implementation.  
Area is significant in neither Count nor Designation models. Based on our discussion in 
section 2.1, the area variable has two opposing effects on the number of FAVs. Other 
conditions equal, a large area means an increased gross demand for FAV service time, as 
travel time goes up. But the price for FAV service per animal is likely to increase in order to 
recoup travel costs, leading to decreased private demand for FAVs. The estimated Count 
model suggests that these effects offset. By contrast with FAV time available, actual services 
rendered are likely to decline with an increase in county area because more time is devoted to 
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travel. So it is somewhat surprising that area does not enter the Designation model.  
Given the number of FAVs in a county, the significance of both cattle and hogs in the 
Designation regression is reassuring. Foot and Mouth disease is arguably the exotic disease 
of most concern to the United States (Monke, 2007). That both distance to a veterinary 
college and rurality also emerge as factors in determining county designation is also 
reassuring. They provide evidence that features motivating the VMLRP legislation did play a 
role during 2010 shortage designations.  
The residual included versions of the Designation model, i.e., (3A) and (3B), infer that 
our measure of shortage works well as a factor in explaining designation. In the residual 
included Designation model other factors do retain statistical explanatory power beyond their 
role in residual determination. Cattle, distance and rurality measures increased likelihood of 
designation even having accounted for shortage, as we measure it. This suggests that the 
designation process has sought to distinguish between different types of shortages. 
Additional weight has been placed on factors, such as cattle numbers, along which many 
argue coverage vulnerabilities are greatest.  
On the whole, this comparison between results of the Count and Designation models 
suggests to us that the process of designating shortage counties has performed reasonably 
well.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has done three things. It has studied what determines the number of FAVs in a 
county and has pointed toward where shortages are likely to be. It has inquired into the 
factors that affected a county’s designation as private practice shortage area under the 
VMLRP in 2010. And it has sought to establish whether counties we infer to be short 
veterinarians were indeed chosen under the program.  
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Factors determining FAV location include the populations of food animals and humans, 
proximity to veterinary college, average per capita income, and degree of rurality. Using 
shortfall relative to predicted FAV count as our measure of shortage, our analysis suggests 
that shortages are most severe in the South-Atlantic region, and more specifically in the 
Virginias and Carolinas. As to determinants of shortage designation, overall we found that a 
designated shortage area is typically a county that is characterized by few FAVs but many 
cattle and hogs, is rural and is far from a veterinary college. We also show that our measure 
of shortage has statistical power in explaining county designation under the 2010 VMLRP, 
providing support for the claim that VMLRP designation choices were consistent with 
declared program goals. This is true even after including such control variables as rurality 
and proximity to a Veterinary College, so the finding is quite strong. 
An interesting wrinkle to the analysis is that three of ten VMLRP excluded states had 
what might be referred to as severe comparative shortage situations. Two are in the interior 
south. Perhaps infrastructural weaknesses in these states might lead to both comparative 
shortages and also limit their capacities to present their case for more public resources? 
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Table 3.1: County descriptive statistics
a
 
Variable Year Mean Std. Dev. Min.-Max. 
Shortage {0,1}  2010 0.210 0.408 0-1 
Food animal veterinarians 2008 2.804 3.676 0-49 
Cattle (
4
10 ) 2007 3.134 4.876 0-107.2 
Sheep (
4
10 ) 2007 0.189 0.690 0-19.0 
Hogs (
4
10 ) 2007 2.208 8.871 0-228.5 
Horses (
4
10 ) 2007 0.131 0.150 0-3.113 
(Human) Population (
3
10 ) 2000 89.5 292.5 0.07-9519 
Distance (miles) ----- 140.95 94.34 0-601.9 
Veterinary College {0,1}  2010 0.009 0.093 0-1 
Income (
3
$10 ) 1999 17.13 3.916 4.96/44.30 
Area (Square miles) 2000 967.22 1314.44 23.0-20053 
Rurality [0,1]  2000 0.500 0.177 0-1 
 
a Data sources are explained in the text. 
 
Table 3.2: Count model parameter estimates 
 With rurality Without rurality 
Variable Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept -3.146 <0.0001 -2.544 <0.0001 
ln(cattle) 0.394 <0.0001 0.392 <0.0001 
ln(sheep) 0.090 <0.0001 0.091 <0.0001 
ln(hogs) 0.047 <0.0001 0.047 <0.0001 
ln(horses) 0.055 0.0342 0.068 0.0078 
ln(population) 0.325 <0.0001 0.255 <0.0001 
distance -0.001 0.0004 -0.001 0.0006 
college 0.485 0.0002 0.466 0.0001 
ln(income) 1.041 <0.0001 1.025 <0.0001 
rurality  0.585 0.01 ----- ----- 
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Table 3.3: Designation model parameter estimates 
Effect Estimate Pr>ChiSq 
Point 
Estimate 
95% Wald 
Confidence Limits 
intercept -3.247 <0.0001 – – 
FAV -0.063 0.0008 0.939 0.905-0.974 
cattle 0.054 <0.0001 1.055 1.034-1.078 
hogs 0.009 0.0655 1.009 0.999-1.018 
distance 0.005 <0.0001 1.005 1.004-1.006 
rurality 1.764 <0.0001 5.836 3.193-10.673 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Designation model parameter estimates, Count model residual included 
 
 
Effect Estimate Pr>ChiSq 
Point 
Estimate 
95% Wald  
Confidence Limits 
Model (3A), 
residual only 
intercept -1.308 <0.0001 – – 
residual -0.031 0.0551 0.969 0.939-1.001 
Model (3B), 
residual 
added 
intercept -2.801 <0.0001 – – 
residual -0.050 0.0067 0.952 0.918-0.986 
cattle 0.036 <0.0001 1.036 1.018-1.054 
distance 0.005 <0.0001 1.005 1.004-1.006 
rurality 1.971 <0.0001 7.178 3.883-13.271 
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Table 3.5: Comparison of state-level shortage situations with national average 
  # counties Vet College # Residuals 0  % residuals 0  
Arizona  15 No 10 66.7 
Arkansas 75 No 54 72 
California 58 Yes 37 63.8 
Colorado  64 Yes 31 48.4 
Delaware 3 No 3 100 
Florida 66 Yes 48 72.7 
Idaho 44 No 16 36.4 
Illinois 102 Yes 59 57.8 
Indiana 92 Yes 56 60.9 
Iowa 99 Yes 39 39.4 
Kansas 105 Yes 59 56.2 
Kentucky 120 No 80 66.7 
Louisiana 64 Yes 36 56.3 
Maine 16 No 5 31.3 
Maryland 23 Yes 11 47.8 
Michigan 83 Yes 61 73.5 
Minnesota 87 Yes 43 49.4 
Missouri 114 Yes 67 58.8 
Montana 56 No 29 51.8 
Nebraska 93 No 45 48.4 
New Hamp. 10 No 2 20 
New Mexico 32 No 17 53.1 
New York 62 Yes 30 48.4 
N. Carolina 100 Yes 74 74 
N. Dakota 53 No 30 56.6 
Ohio 88 Yes 47 53.4 
Oklahoma 77 Yes 41 53.2 
Oregon 36 Yes 17 47.2 
Pennsylvania 67 Yes 38 56.7 
Rhode Island 5 No 4 80 
S. Carolina 46 No 37 80.4 
S. Dakota 66 No 35 53.0 
Texas 254 Yes 164 64.6 
Utah 29 No 21 72.4 
Vermont 14 No 6 42.9 
Virginia 98 Yes 73 74.5 
W. Virginia 55 No 44 80 
Wisconsin 72 Yes 24 33.3 
United States 2544 21 Yes, 17 No 1493  
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Table 3.6: Shortage situations in the ten states omitted from the 2010 VMLRP 
 # counties Vet College # Residuals 0  Percent that are 0  
Alabama  67 Yes 56 83.6 
Connecticut 8 No 2 25 
Georgia 159 Yes 91 57.2 
Massachusetts  14 Yes 8 57.1 
Mississippi 82 Yes 46 56.1 
Nevada 17 No 11 64.7 
New Jersey 21 No 16 76.2 
Tennessee 95 Yes 72 75.8 
Washington 39 Yes 19 48.7 
Wyoming 23 No 14 60.9 
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Figure 3.1: Veterinary medicine schools and colleges, and VMLRP participating states in Lower 48
  
 
6
8
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Comparative severity of Food Animal Veterinarian shortage situations by state (2010 VMLRP participants)
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Chapter 4: Modeling Interdependent Participation Incentives: Dynamics 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper models producers’ interdependent incentives to participate in a voluntary 
livestock disease control program. Under strategic complementarity among participation 
decisions, after a slow start momentum can build such that the market premium for 
participation and the participation rate increase sequentially. Nonparticipation, partial 
participation and full participation can all be Nash equilibria while participation cost 
heterogeneity will dispose the outcome toward incomplete participation. We find plausible 
conditions under which temporary government subsidies to the least cost effective producers 
could cause tipping toward full participation to occur. Applying parameters from the 
literature on Johnes’ disease, we illustrate factors that may affect participation incentives. 
These include unit livestock value, perceived disease prevalence rate, consequences to 
human health, cost heterogeneity, as well as program effectiveness.  
INTRODUCTION 
Mandatory eradication programs have been a focus of the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) for more than a century. For example, the campaign to eradicate the 
bovine tuberculosis (TB) between 1917 and 1940 was a huge success and prevented at least 
25,000 human TB deaths annually (Olmstead and Rhode 2004). While mandatory programs 
can be effective in bringing highly contagious diseases under control, staunch resistance to 
such mandates are common (Olmstead and Rhode 2007; Anderson 2010). As a result, 
voluntary control and certification programs have been suggested for some diseases that are 
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not serious enough to warrant eradication. Examples include the Voluntary Trichinae 
Certification Program, the Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) Voluntary Herd Certification 
Program and the Voluntary Bovine Johne’s Disease Control Program. Voluntary programs 
generally develop program standards as well as detail requirements for program certification 
and for certifying participants that meet program standards. The reward for being labeled as 
disease-free under a program is a market-determined premium. For Johne’s disease, survey 
results show that premiums exist for producers who participate in voluntary certification 
programs (Kovich, Wells and Friendshuh 2006; Benjamin et al. 2009).  
The success of a voluntary program hinges on producer participation (CDCJD, 2003). 
Therefore a natural question to ask is whether a voluntary livestock disease control program 
provides producers with sufficient incentive to participate. Such a question has been 
addressed extensively in the environmental literature (Khanna 2001). At the individual firm 
level, it is generally assumed that voluntary programs involve lower implementation costs 
(Segerson and Miceli 1998; Schmelzer 1999); and that government subsidies provide firms 
with incentives to participate (Stranlund 1995; Wu and Babcock 1999). Participation 
incentives at an industry level has also been studied (Segerson and Miceli 1998; Dawson and 
Segerson 2008; Millock and Salanie 2000). When multiple firms are involved and the 
government’s aim is to reach a certain aggregated abatement level, some firms may have 
incentives to free ride as the required abatement level can be reached when the other firms 
participate. We can view the firms’ abatement decisions as strategic substitutes according to 
Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985). There is also an emerging literature on 
voluntary food safety programs where the incentive to participate is only analyzed at the 
individual firm level. The producer’s incentive to join the voluntary program could come 
from the looming threat of a mandatory program (Segerson 1999; Fares and Rouviere 2010) 
or from government subsidies (Cho and Hooker 2007). 
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Extant analyses of voluntary programs tend to omit the interrelated nature of participation 
incentives. Even among studies that do consider firm interactions, interdependence in 
participation incentives is only studied in a static framework. In reality, however, almost all 
voluntary programs span multiple years, with participation rates evolving from year to year. 
Therefore, to evaluate firm participation incentives it is important to consider dynamic 
interactions among participant choices. This paper provides a pilot work on the issue. We 
provide a dynamic model in the context of a voluntary livestock disease control program. 
However, as we assume that the motivation for improving and testing animal health comes 
from the concern over human health, our model can also apply to participation incentives in a 
voluntary food safety program.  
Critical to model mechanics is the dynamic evolution of the price premium for proven 
disease-free product. Our goal is to analyze producers’ incentives to participate in a disease 
control program that involves a disease status test, and subsequent incentives to release that 
information in order to acquire any available market premium at that time. As such our paper 
is closely connected with the quality disclosure literature. With two strict assumptions that i) 
that disclosure is costless and ii) producers have full information about their quality, earlier 
models in this literature found that every producer will disclose except the one with the 
lowest possible quality type (Grossman and Hart 1980; Grossman 1981; Milgrom 1981). The 
market solves the information problem through unraveling, in a manner that is exactly the 
reverse of that encountered in Akerlof’s (197)) lemons problem (Viscusi 1978).  
When assumption i) is relaxed, models by Jovanovic (1982), and Levin, Peck and Ye 
(2005) have found that only high-quality types would engage in disclosure. Alternatively, 
Matthews and Postlewaite (1985), Farrell (1986) and Shavell (1994) relaxed assumption ii) 
and assumed instead that sellers originally do not have information on their products’ quality. 
Sellers could incur a test cost to obtain information on product quality, where it is costless to 
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disclose such information once it is acquired. They show that whenever disclosure is 
voluntary, then the sellers of the low cost type would acquire such information and disclose it 
if it is favorable. A mandatory disclosure rule in this case would decrease the sellers’ 
incentive to acquire the quality information in the first place.  
Our model is based on Shavell (1994), where producers need to make two choices, 
whether to participate in the program to obtain quality information and possibly improve 
their quality, and then, if obtained, whether to disclose such information. Whereas Shavell 
assumed that participation is voluntary while disclosure could be either voluntary or 
mandatory, in this paper we use mandatory participation as a benchmark for comparison 
while disclosure is always voluntary. We extend Shavell’s model to a dynamic setup, where 
we show that the participation premium hinges on the participation rate over time. This 
allows us to prove that producer decisions are strategic complements. Therefore even if only 
very few producers have the incentive to participate initially, they might in turn provide the 
remaining producers with sufficient incentive to participate. This phenomenon is referred to 
as tipping. The reasoning here resembles that in Dixit (2003), who shows how a small group 
of enthusiasts could initiate a process which will later induce everybody else to join a club. 
This observation is important in that it provides insights on how animal disease program 
managers can engineer more efficient equilibria through selective subsidies.  
Originated by Schelling (1978), the idea of tipping is generalized by Gladwell (2000) to a 
wide range of problems. From a game theory perspective, tipping is extensively studied in a 
general interdependent risk setup called interdependent security (IDS) problems (Heal and 
Kunreuther 2005, 2007). Nyborg, Howarth and Brekke’s (2006) work is another application 
of the idea of tipping in the market for green good consumption. Tipping will occur when 
there are two or more equilibria and the system displays sufficient increasing difference 
(Heal and Kunreuther 2006, 2010). In the present paper, increasing differences arise because 
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when more firms participate then the change in payoff to a firm upon participating will 
increase, i.e., the premium from participation will increase. 
The premium increase arises from the declining health status of the non-disclosing herd, 
which is made up of i) participated producers who prefer not to reveal the disease status, and 
also ii) non-participating producers. Every period, the average disease-free rate among non-
disclosing herds is Bayesian updated and it decreases when more producers participate. As a 
result, momentum will build where three events, namely the decrease in the average disease-
free rate among non-disclosing herds, the increase in participation premium and the increase 
in participation rate, occur repeatedly over time. Note that our theory of disease control is 
based on market price premium dynamics due to rational producer responses to incentives. 
Besides tipping and strategic complementarity issues, our paper also addresses any roles for 
mandates and targeted subsidy policies as well as implications of cost heterogeneity. 
The paper’s layout is as follows. After presenting examples of voluntary and mandatory 
programs, we study how producers’ participation decisions are related to each other in a 
voluntary program setup. To provide a comparison, we will further investigate the alternative 
mandatory program and define three possible equilibria. To illustrate our model findings, a 
simulation analysis on a voluntary Johne’s disease herd status program (VJDHSP) will be 
carried out where the parameters are obtained from current Johne’s literature.  
EXAMPLES OF VOLUNTARY/MANDATORY PROGRAMS 
In this section we will summarize several historical or current animal disease control 
programs, for which either a voluntary or mandatory participation is required at different 
points of the program implementation. Although not related to a particular animal disease, 
the national animal ID system (NAIS) is included to illustrate the dynamic cost and benefit 
analyses of livestock owners. Leafy greens marketing agreement (LGMA) is covered here 
since it intends to eliminate the food contamination issue on the leafy greens, which is similar 
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to the objective of a disease control program that targets the livestock.  
 
Voluntary Johne’s Disease Herd Status Program (VJDHSP) 
Johne’s disease (JD) has a long period of incubation and clinical signs are rarely seen 
before two years of age. It is highly prevalent in the United States. According to the National 
Animal Health Monitoring System (NAHMS) dairy survey study of 2007, 68.1% of U.S. 
dairy herds were infected with the causative bacterium, Mycobacterium paratuberculosis 
(Mptb) (USDA 2008). Although the weight of evidence presently suggests no direct link 
between JD and Crohn’s disease in humans, there is less agreement about what role it may 
play (Friswell, Campbell and Rhodes 2010). Due to agricultural production losses and 
zoonotic concerns, Johne’s disease is has been prioritized for control in the United States 
(CDCJD, 2003). VJDHSP was developed in the United States in an effort to certify herds 
that are free of paratuberculosis. Three key components of the program are i) education, ii) 
management, and iii) herd testing and classification. The objective of herd testing and 
classification is to recognize producers in the program publicly if they so desire.  
Many states have established, or are currently establishing, programs similar to the 
national VJDHSP (USDA 2010a). Minnesota’s program (MNJDCP) is one of the most 
successful state JD control programs. Starting from less than 0.9% in 1999, the dairy herds 
participation rate in the MNJDCP had increased to 30.8% by the end of 2006. Meanwhile the 
Minnesota beef herd participation rate increased from less than 0.1% to 2.1%. There has been 
steady growth in program participation, especially after federal funding was initiated in 2003. 
Larger herds were more likely to participate than smaller herds. During 2005-’06, 52.9% of 
Minnesota dairy herds with ≥ 500 cows participated, in contrast with a 9.9% participation 
rate among herds with < 50 cows (Wells, Hartmann and Anderson 2008). 
Benefits from participation include increased productivity, premiums from replacement 
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cattle and increased marketing opportunities (Kovich, Wells, and Friendshuh 2006; Benjamin 
et al. 2009). Concern over consumer health is another key factor to consider when producers 
make participation decisions. As one of the program purposes is to provide a source of low-
infection risk replacement cows (Kovich, Wells, and Friendshuh 2006), the industry would 
be well-prepared in the event that the proposed link between Johne’s disease in cattle and 
Crohn’s disease were confirmed. 
 
Bovine Tuberculosis (BTB) Eradication Program 
In 1917, U.S. Congress passed a $1 million appropriations bill initiating the State-Federal 
Cooperative Bovine Tuberculosis Eradication Program (Meyers 1940). This voluntary 
program authorized payment of indemnities. The program generally started from counties 
where a majority of dairymen consented to participate. Later on, states often made testing 
compulsory and required the slaughter of reactors (Olmstead and Rhode 2007). The reactor 
rate was about 4.9 percent at the start of this program. By 1940, the reactor rate had dropped 
to 0.46 percent and all jurisdictions in the United States were actively seeking to eradicate 
BTB (Meyers 1940). Despite eventual widespread cooperation, initial eradication efforts 
encountered opposition at every step. Although financial loss was likely the primary concern, 
stated points of opposition included questioning the underlying science, the program’s 
implementation and incidence of cost. Indeed during the ‘Cow War’ of 1931 Iowa’s 
Governor felt compelled to call up the State National Guard to maintain order along country 
roads and to protect veterinarians engaging in program activities (Sage 1983). Perceived 
economic interests of the participants were likely the first and foremost reason for the 
protesters.  
Texas fever 
Texas tick fever, caused by blood parasites Babesia bovis and Babesia bigemina, was a 
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major threat to the U.S. cattle industry from the Antebellum until the end of World War I. 
Efforts to eradicate tick carriers started as early as 1898, where initially participation had 
been voluntary. However, researchers soon realized that the eradication efforts would not be 
successful unless all cattle in a given area were treated and so mandatory participation was 
implemented. Active resistance emerged and most resistance to the programs came from 
small-scale farmers.  
Resistance was intense among small-scale operators where compliance costs were 
greatest, leading to at least one 1922 murder in Arkansas (Hope 2005, pp. 10-12). Strom 
(2000) noted, however, that small farmer’s “violent opposition to this program was founded 
in sound economic reasoning.” When larger ranchers began to see the benefit of eradication 
as re-infection became less common, prospects for controlling residual infected areas 
increased. More areas were removed from federal quarantine and the return on treated 
animals increased. That is, a virtuous cycle of events led to a better equilibrium for those who 
could bear eradication costs. Eventually the eradication programs prevailed and by 1933 
Texas fever was no longer a major problem for the cattle industry (USDA 1933). 
 
The National Animal ID System (NAIS) 
NAIS is a U.S. government initiative to establish a nationwide farm-level animal ID 
system in the event of a disease outbreak to trace an animal disease to its source. The U.S. 
Animal Identification Plan (USAIP) was initially intended to be mandatory. In 2006, 
however, NAIS participation was made voluntary in the face of stiff opposition to 
compulsion. Only approximately 35% of U.S. livestock premises had been registered. 
Participation rates in the premises registration step have been very high for poultry (95%), 
sheep (95%), high for swine (80%), but only 18% for cattle (Schnepf 2009).  
Heterogeneity in participation costs could explain the dramatic differences in 
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participation rate. According to NAIS (2009), the average per animal cost was $1.39 per 
sheep, $0.059 per swine, $0.0007 per broiler, $0.002 per turkey, and $0.0195 per layer. In 
contrast, the cost was $5.97 per bovine. The swine and poultry industries have a much lower 
cost because animal tracing requirements for these species involve no individual 
identification devices. Typically unit participation costs decrease with herd size; see, e.g., 
tables 2 and 3 of NAIS (2009).  
The benefit from NAIS implementation increases as participation levels increase. 
According to simulation results in (NAIS Benefit-Cost Research Team 2009), “producer 
monetary losses for an animal identification and tracking program with a 90 percent 
participation rate would be $4.5 billion less than a program with a 30 percent participation 
rate.” For bovines, this program was largely unsuccessful, due partly to failure by the U.S. 
Dept. of Agriculture to communicate program benefits to livestock producers (Anderson 
2010). 
 
Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement (LGMA) 
In 2007, LGMA was established in California in response to the September 2006 E. coli 
outbreak attributed to contaminated spinach. The agreement would require producers and 
handlers to implement the best industry practices.  
The LGMA is a success example of the voluntary programs as it achieved almost full 
participation only two years after the enactment of this industry initiative. As reported by the 
LGMA website (www.caleafygreens.ca.gov), “Over 100 handlers, representing 
approximately 99% of the volume of California leafy greens, are LGMA members”.  
According to California Department of Food Safety and Agriculture (CDFA) website 
(www.cdfa.ca.gov/agvision/docs/Food_Safety.pdf), the benefit of LGMA participation 
includes expanded market access, reduced likelihood of food safety incidents and regaining 
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consumers’ confidence in the event of a food safety incident. On the cost side, large fixed 
costs lead to significant economies of scale (Hardesty and Kusunose 2009).  
VOLUNTARY PROGRAM 
In a voluntary program, a producer makes his own decision on whether to participate 
based on the benefits and costs of program participation. These benefits and costs evolve 
during the course of the program, and it is necessary to explicitly model the evolution of 
incentives.  
Model Scheme 
Similar to Shavell (1994), we commence with a model of information acquisition and 
disclosure. In our context, information is referred to as knowledge on a herd’s disease-free 
rate, which is defined as the number of disease-free animals divided by the total number of 
animals in the herd. In this paper we will analyze a situation where neither producers nor 
buyers know the precise quality of their goods (Shavell 1994; Matthews and Postlewaite 
1985). A third party provides tests as a part of the voluntary program to reveal the disease 
status to producers. 
A herd’s disease-free rate is denoted by a variable [ 1]r r ,  with probability distribution 
function ( )F r . While ( )F r  is common knowledge among all producers, a herd’s particular 
disease-free rate remains unknown prior to program participation.
13
 Participation cost is 
denoted by [ ]c c ,c with probability distribution function ( )G c . Each producer is only 
aware of his own participation cost. In Assumption 1, we will define the relationship between 
the participation cost and disease-free rate.  
Assumption 1: Assume that the participation cost is independent of the herd’s disease-free 
                                                 
13
 The current literature on animal disease generally assumes an asymmetric information 
structure, i.e., only producers have full information about their herd’s disease status (Gramig, 
Horan, and Wolf 2009; Sheriff and Osgood 2010). This assumption might be valid for some 
acute animal diseases. However, producer knowledge about some chronic diseases can be 
very limited due to its long incubation period. 
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rate. 
 
Assumption 1 is supported by observations in Pillars et al. (2009), who conducted a 5-
year longitudinal study of six Michigan dairy herds infected with Johne’s disease.14 The data 
collected in their paper shows no pattern of correlation between disease prevalence rate and 
participation cost. 
The model scheme is as follows. In period t , producers decide whether to participate 
based on the expected price premium realized in the previous period, 
1t
I

. Assume that 
producers participate if their expected price premium 
1t
I

 is no less than the cost. Proportion 
1
( )
t t -
G I   of producers will participate. After obtaining the test result, a participant will 
disclose whenever it exceeds the average disease-free rate among silent producers in the 
previous period, 
1
S
t
r

. The silent producers are comprised of two groups: producers 1) who 
choose not to participate in the program; and 2) who participate in the program but prefer not 
to disclose any information. Here we assume that buyers cannot distinguish between the two 
groups. We also assume that there are many producers in the market and a single producer's 
participation decision cannot affect the participation rate in the market.  
Based on the participation and disclosure rates, a new average disease status among silent 
producers in period t will be determined as 
S
t
r . In return, a new price premium from 
participation will be solved as 
t
I . We will elaborate on the determination of 
t
I  and 
S
t
r  later. 
Note that except for the specified probability distributions on disease-free rate and 
participation cost, all other variables in the model scheme are endogenous. The process 
                                                 
14
 For example, from their table 3 we can see that herd 4 has the highest average 
implementation cost across the 5-year period, $65.02, while table 2 shows that herd 4 has a 
relatively low disease prevalence rate, ranging from 4% to 12% with average 8%. Herd 2, to 
the contrary, has a much lower average implementation cost during the same period, $31.73, 
while its disease rate ranges from 5% to 44% with an average of 19.6%. 
80 
 
 
 
continues indefinitely through time. A scheme of the model to be studied is displayed in 
Figure 1. The price premium from participation will also depend on the information 
conveyed by the test results. We assume that the test reveals the exact disease-free rate to the 
participating producers.
15
 
Determination of Participation Premium 
In period t  testing reveals the exact disease-free rate, 
t
r , to the producer. The expected 
unit animal value for the herd with disease-free rate 
t
r  is ( )1
t t
V -r r V . Here V  denotes the 
value of a healthy animal and V  stands for the value of a diseased animal, where 1   
could vary by disease and is an indicator of the perceived consequences caused by the 
disease. If buyers perceive no harm in the disease, then 1  . However,   would take 
negative values whenever the disease causes serious human health problems. This means that 
the producer may suffer large losses from a small percentage of diseased animals, either from 
compensation to consumers or from a trade embargo. The average disease-free rate among 
silent producers is S
t
r . How equilibrium S
t
r  is determined will be discussed shortly.  
As non-participants belong to the group of silent producers, the unit livestock price of a 
non-participating herd is 
1
(1 )
t
S S
t t
p V -r r V  . A participant will reveal 
t
r  whenever it is 
greater than S
t
r  and will remain silent otherwise. Thus the unit realized price of a 
participating herd takes the following form:  
 
2
(1 ) , whenever  
(1 ) , wheneve
;
.r  
S S S
t t t
S
t
t
t
t t t
r rV V r
p
rV r V r
r
r


   
 
  
 (1) 
                                                 
15
 A second scenario, referred to as the coarse grading case, is studied in supplemental 
materials. It seeks to better replicate the threshold rates classifications in actual programs. 
For example, in VJDHSP, cattle herds in the initial year of testing will be placed in 
classification levels 1 to 3. After the second, third and fourth year of testing with no positive 
test results, cattle herds can be upgraded into level 4, level 5 and level 6 respectively (USDA 
2010a). 
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The realized premium from participation is calculated as:  
 
2 1
0, whenever  ;
(1 ) ( ), whenever .
S
t t
t t S S
t t t t
r r
p p
V r r r r
 
  
  
   (2) 
The ex-ante expected price premium from participating in the program is: 
 
1
( , , ) (1 ) ( ) ( ).
S
t
S S
t t t t
r
I r V V r r dF r     (3) 
Proposition 1: The expected premium from participation will increase whenever one of the 
following holds: i) Society becomes more aware of the disease, / 0
t
I    ; ii) the value of 
an animal increases, / 0
t
I V   , or iii) the average disease-free rate among silent producers 
decreases, / 0
S
t
I r   . 
Proof: The inferences follow from 
1
( , , ) / ( ) ( ) 0
S
t
S S
t t
r
t t
r rI V V r dF r      , 
1
( , , ) / (1 ) ( ) ( ) 0
S
t
t t
S S
t t
r
I V V r dF rr r        and ( , , ) /
S S
tt t
I Vr r    
( 1) [1 ( )] 0
S
t
V F r    .     
 
Item i) in Proposition 1 makes the intuitive assertion that whenever the disease is 
perceived to be of greater harm, then participating producers can expect a higher price 
premium. From item ii) we learn that producers will have stronger incentives to participate 
whenever the unit livestock value increases. Therefore compared to dairy cow producers, 
beef cow producers have weaker incentives to participate, as illustrated by the different 
participation rates of dairy and beef herds in the MNJDCP. Finally, item iii) conveys that the 
premium from participation will increase whenever the average disease-free rate among non-
disclosing herds decreases. Intuitively, as the perceived mean quality in the unknown pool 
declines, buyers are willing to pay more to obtain livestock with a confirmed high disease-
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free rate. 
 
Market Equilibrium  
The program starts in period 0. Initially 
0
  0 as no producer is part of the program. The 
average disease status of silent producers is the unconditional mean of r , i.e., 
0
( )
S
r E r 
1
( )
r
rdF r . By eqn. (3), the price premium in period 0 is: 
 
0
1
0 0 0
( ) ( ) ( ),
S
S S
r
I I r r r dF r    (4)  
where (1 )V   . To render more concise expressions we will use   for the rest of the 
text. According to the model scheme in Figure 1, in period 1 producers with participation 
costs no more than 
0
I  will participate. Thus the overall participation rate is 
1 0 0
( ) ( ( ))
S
G I G I r   . Among participants, those who obtain a disease-free rate less than 
0
r  
will not disclose any information on their disease status. This group has mass measure 
1 0
( )
S
F r  with the average disease-free rate 
0
( )
S
E r r r∣ . In addition, all non-participants 
cannot disclose their disease-free rates without being tested. They have mass measure 
1
1   
with the average disease-free rate ( )E r . Now the average disease-free rate among silent 
producers is Bayesian updated in period 1 as:  
 
1 0 1
1
0
1
1
1
1
101
( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )    w henever  1;
,                                                         w henever  1;
( )
( ) .
( ) 1
S
S
S
S
r
r
E r r E r
r
r
F
F
r
    


 
 
    
 


 

∣
 (5) 
The denominator in the expression for 
1
( )   represents the proportion of all silent 
producers, while the numerator represents the proportion of participants who choose not to 
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disclose the result. After solving for 
1
S
r  by way of (5), we can calculate the expected 
premium in period 1 as 
1
( )
S
I r  by (4). Note that 
1
S
r r  when 
1
1  . This is because after all 
the producers obtain their disease status information, producers with a disease-free rate 
higher than the average will choose to disclose. The average disease-free rate among non-
disclosers will continue to decrease until it reaches r . Eventually all participants will 
disclose (Grossman and Hart 1980).  
The process repeats in each period t , 1t  . Equilibrium will be reached at time t  
whenever *
1t t
  

   and *
1
S S
t t
r r r

  . Similar to (5), the equilibrium condition is 
characterized by: 
 
* * * *
*
*
* *
* * *
* * *
( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( )    w henever   1;
                                                         w henever   1;
( )
( ) ; ( ( )).
( ) 1
E r r r E r
r
r
F r
G I r
F r
    


  
 
    
 

 
 
∣
 (6) 
When * 1  , then of course 
*
r r . In this case the full-participation (FP) equilibrium is 
reached and the pool of silent producers will disappear. If * 0  , then *( ) 0r   and 
*
( )r E r . This characterizes the non-participation (NP) equilibrium. Lastly a partial-
participation (PP) equilibrium is defined whenever * (0,1)  , which generates *( ) (0,1)r   
and * ( , ( ))r r E r .  
The equilibrium condition in (6) was previously defined in Shavell (1994). However, 
Shavell did not recognize the need to redefine *r  at * 1  . In addition, our paper 
demonstrates dynamically how the equilibrium could be reached, a feature not captured in 
Shavell (1994). An understanding of the underlying dynamics is critical because, as we will 
show, the complementary nature of participation decisions allows for multiple equilibria 
where tweaking the decision environment through policy interventions can tip equilibrium 
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participation from very low to very high.  
Presently, for the sake of illustrating the nature of equilibrium and the potential for policy 
interventions we focus on static Nash equilibrium solutions. In Figure 2, the horizontal and 
vertical axes stand for possible values of c  and c , which denote the producers’ lowest and 
the highest participation costs respectively. As c c , the regions below the 45 degree line in 
Figure 2 are not feasible. The area above the diagonal line is divided into six regions. Two 
thresholds used in this division are ( ( ))I E r  and ( )I r , which stand for the premium at NP 
and FP equilibria. Note that 
min
( ( ))I I E r  and 
max
( )I I r , as implied by equation (5) and 
Proposition 1. 
According to producer participation incentives, we will introduce these six regions in two 
categories. The first category consists of Regions R2, R3, R5 and R6, where without subsidy 
all the producers will inevitably make the same participation decisions. For R2, R3 and R5 
we have 
min
I c c  , thus NP is an equilibrium. In contrast, region R6 with 
min
c c I   
only displays the FP equilibrium. The second category covers only R1 and R4, where with no 
subsidy participation decisions are not clear.  
Of the six regions, we are particularly interested in region R4 and R5, where we have 
respectively 
min max
c I c I    and region R5 with 
min max
I c c I   . In these two regions if 
government entices (perhaps by cheap talk) a sufficiently large subset of producers to 
participate first, then FP could be maintained without any subsidy. Moving from the former 
to the latter equilibrium, whether through some market event or through economic 
engineering, is referred to as tipping. Here we assume that the NP and PP equilibria are 
viewed by the government as undesirable equilibria when compared to the FP equilibrium.  
A last note on Figure 2 is that it also illustrates the effect of cost heterogeneity on 
equilibrium participation status. All points on the 45 degree line represent the case where 
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minimum cost equals to the maximum cost. In other words, on this line participation costs 
are homogenous among producers. In this case the equilibrium could be either FP or NP. By 
contrast, points further away from the 45 degree line denote cases where participation costs 
are more heterogeneous. Among the six regions, R1 has the most heterogeneous cost 
structure. In this region a proportion of lowest cost producers will always participate. 
However, FP cannot be reached unless the government consistently provides subsidies to the 
highest cost producers.  
Take the cattle sector in the NAIS program for example. Due to its high average 
participation cost and cost heterogeneity (NAIS 2009), its cost structure is mostly likely 
located in either R1 or R2. Therefore FP is unlikely to be reached without a government 
subsidy. In contrast, poultry and sheep sectors in NAIS program have much lower 
participation costs together with nearly full participation rates, so we are almost certain that 
cost structures for those two sectors are located in R6. 
As participation cost scale economies exists, cost heterogeneity is most likely to exist in 
industries where large and small firms co-exist. In this case large producers tend to join the 
program first, while small producers will most likely find it unprofitable to join the program 
without government subsidies. For example, more than half of Minnesota dairy herds with ≥ 
500 cows participated in MNJDCP, in contrast with a participation rate of less than 10% 
among herds with less than 50 cows (Wells, Hartmann and Anderson 2008). 
Next, in Proposition 2 we will show that at least two equilibria can exist in R5. For region 
R4 a similar proof can be readily developed.  
Proposition 2: Under a voluntary program, when ( ( ))I E r c ( )c I r   then at least two 
equilibria exist. These are NP and FP.  
Proof: If no producer participates, then ( )r E r . The expected premium from participation 
is ( ( ))I E r . As ( ( ))I E r c , nobody participates. Therefore * *( , ) ( ( ), 0)r E r   is one 
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equilibrium. If all producers participate, then r r . The expected premium from 
participation is ( )I r . As ( )c I r , all producers will participate. Thus * *( , ) ( ,1)r r   is 
another equilibrium.     
 
Note that Proposition 2 only shows the two guaranteed equilibria. However, whenever FP 
and NP are two guaranteed equilibrium, a PP equilibrium may also be possible depending on 
the exact cost structure of all producers. This point will be further illustrated in Example 1 
below. Example 1 provides a numerical example showing an instance where tipping occurs 
in region R5 after the government motivates a subset of producers to participate.  
Example 1 (Tipping): There are four types of producers that differ by their participation 
costs 1 2 3 4( , , , )c c c c (5.5, 5.7, 6.7,8) .
16
 Assume that N  producers exist for each cost type. 
Prior to participation, the disease-free rate of any herd satisfies a uniform distribution on 
[0.90, 1]. The unit livestock value is 500V  , and 1 0.8  .  
First we will check the values of 
min
( ( ))I I E r  and 
max
( )I I r : 
1 1
min max
0.95 0.90
0.95 0.90
500 * 0.8 5; 500 * 0.8 20.
1 0.90 1 0.90
r r
I dr I dr
 
   
 
   
Thus 
min max
I c c I   . By Proposition 2, both NP and FP are equilibria. Next we will 
illustrate how the NP equilibrium can be tipped to the FP equilibrium.  
Period 0: We know that 
0
( ) 0.95
S
r E r   so that the NP equilibrium will be reached 
without government intervention.  
Period 1: Suppose now that in period 1 the government provides subsidy 0.5s   to 
producers of all cost types contingent on their participation. For type 1 producers the new 
cost will be reduced to 5. Thus 25 percent (as / 4 0.25N N  ) of producers will participate in 
                                                 
16
 Note that superscript denotes the cost type, while subscript denotes the time period. 
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period 1. Among participants, fraction (0.95 0.90) / (1 0.90) 0.5    of producers do not 
disclose. Therefore 
1
( ) (0.25 * 0.5)(0.25 * 0.5 0.75)    0.1429 . In period 1, the average 
disease status of silent producers is: 
1 1 0 1
( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) 0.1429 * ( 0.95)
S S
r E r r r E r E r r        ∣ ∣  
(1 0.1429) * 0.95 0.9464    and the expected premium in period 1 is determined as: 
 
1
1
1
1 1
( ) 400 5.75.
1 0.90
S
S
S
r
r r
I I r dr

  

  
Period 2: In this period producers of cost type 1 and 2 will participate without subsidy 
because 1 2
1
,m ax[ ]c c I . Among participants, share (0.9464 0.90) / (1 0.90) 0.464    will 
choose not to disclose their disease status. Thus 
2
( ) 0.5 * 0.464 / (0.5 * 0.464 0.5)     
0.3169 . In period 2, the average disease status among silent producers is 
2
S
r 
 
2 1 2
( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) 0.3169 * ( 0.9464) (1 0.3169) * 0.95 0.9415
S
E r r r E r E r r          ∣ ∣
, and the expected premium in period 2 is determined as: 
 
2
1
2
2 2
( ) 400 6.84.
1 0.90
S
S
S
r
r r
I I r dr

  

  
Period 3: Given 
2
I , cost types 1, 2 and 3 producers will participate without subsidy. 
Among participants, 41.5% will choose not to disclose their disease status. Thus 
3
( )   0.75 * 0.415 / (0.75 * 0.415 0.25) 0.5546  . In period 3, the average disease status 
among silent producers is 
3 3 2 3
( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) 0.5546 * ( 0.9415)
S S
r E r r r E r E r r         ∣ ∣
 
(1 0.5546) * 0.95 0.9338   and the expected premium in period 3 is determined as: 
 
3
1
3
3 3
( ) 400 8.76.
1 0.90
S
S
S
r
r r
I I r dr

  

  
Period 4: Given the value of 
3
I  all producers will participate without subsidy. In turn all 
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producers will disclose, so 
4
0.90
S
r r   and 
4
( ) 20
S
I r  . Therefore in period 5 and 
thereafter, all producers will participate. The FP equilibrium * *( , ) (1, 0.90)r   is reached.  
 
As an additional note on Proposition 2’s conclusion, suppose instead that the type 2 cost 
producers exceeds 5.75 in the example. Then, as 
1
5.75I  , the tipping process will stall and 
only PP will be reached unless the government also provides a sufficient subsidy to types 
other than type 1. Therefore the PP equilibrium is also possible for region R5. 
Following Definition 2 in Heal and Kunreuther (2007), type 1 producers in Example 1 
form a critical coalition. This is because if producers of cost type 1 participate, then the NP 
equilibrium will switch to the FP equilibrium. In our example, by taking advantage of this 
critical coalition, government only provides a total subsidy payment of 0.5N. Without 
recognizing the existence of this group, and so providing subsidies to all to bring net costs 
down to 5, the government would pay a total subsidy of 0.5 0.7 1.7 3N N N N   5.9N . 
An even more costly case is where all producers are provided the marginal subsidy required 
to elicit participation by type 4. Then cost is 12N, a 24-fold increase over the tipping 
solution. 
To find out how producers welfare changes over time, we can compute 
1
/
t
S
t
p r   and 
2
( ) /
t
S
t
E p r   as 
 
1
2 1
(1 ) 0;
( ) ( )
(1 ) ( 1) [1 ( )] (1 ) ( )
 
0 .
S
t
S
S St
S S S
t
t
t t
t t
p
V
E p p I
V V F V
r
r
r
r
F r
r r

  

 

  
        



 
 (7) 
Therefore if the disease-free rate for a non-disclosing herd decreases, i.e., when the 
participation rate increases, both non-participating and participating herds will experience a 
decrease in expected price. This suggests that as more producers participate, the advantage to 
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participation will erode; while non-participants will be in a comparatively more 
disadvantageous position.  
When nobody participates then the price received by a non-participating herd is 
1
0
( ( ))p E r , 
which is greater than that at the equilibrium, 
1 *
( )
t
p r . At the equilibrium the expected price 
for a participating herd is 
2 *
( ( ))
t
E p r . If the herd has a participation cost *( )
t
c I r  
2 * 1 *
( ( )) ( )
t t
E p r p r   then the herd will participate in equilibrium. However, we could have 
2 * 1
0
( ( )) ( ( ))
t
E p r c p E r  , see Example 2 below. This shows that the firm actually becomes 
worse off when participating in the program, when compared to its welfare where the 
program does not exist.  
Example 2: Assume that all the parameters given in Example 1 apply. We could have 
2 1
0
( )
t
E p c p  , where 4t  . Initially the non-participating herd has a unit value at 
1
0
p   
( ) 480E r V    and 
2 1
0 0 0
( ) ( ( )) 485E p I E r p    while at the FP equilibrium ( 4t  ), 
1
360
t
p r V     and 
2 1
( ) ( ) 480.
t t t
E p I r p    Clearly 
2 1
0
( )
t
E p c p   for any 0c  .
17
 
 
As shown in Example 1, in each period producers make decisions by comparing the 
current premium with their participation costs. In the long run they could be trapped into 
making a decision they do not like, as illustrated in Example 2. In this case we encounter the 
phenomenon studied by Dixit (2003), in which some (and perhaps most) voluntary 
participants are eventually “trapped” in a program that they do not like.  
                                                 
17
 It should be noted that, more generally, 
1 2
( ) ( ( ))
e
t t
p r E p r . To ascertain this, on the one 
hand we know that 
1
( ) (1 )
e e e
t
p r r V r V    while on the other hand 
2 1
( ( ( ) )) ( )
t t t
E p r p r I r 
 
1
(1 ( ) ( )) (1 )
r
e e
rV r V r r dF r r V r V         . 
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The underlying reason for tipping in Example 1 is the strategic complementarity property 
of the producers’ participation decisions, or “increasing difference” (Heal and Kunreuther 
2006, 2010). Following the definition in Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), we 
define the producers’ participation decisions as strategic complements if one producer’s 
marginal payoff from participating increases whenever the participation rate increases. In a 
game theory context, this means that the marginal returns to participating rise when more 
producers participate. Such a game is referred to as a supermodular game (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1990). 
Here the expected marginal payoff from participating at time t  is 
t
I . Therefore, the 
strategic complementarity property holds if whenever 0 1
t t
     , then ( ( ))S
t t t
I r    
( ( ))
S
t t t
I r   . Next we will investigate whether this property is satisfied in the general model 
setup. This leads to our paper’s main result; the strategic complementarity among producer 
decisions. In order to arrive there we will prove a lemma to show that the participation rate 
will increase whenever the previous period’s premium increases. 
Lemma 1: Suppose that the expected price premium in period 1t   is greater than that in 
period t . Then the participation rate in period 2t   will be greater than that in period 1t  . 
That is, if 
t t
I I  , then 
1 1
( ) ( )
t t t t
I I 
 
  .  
Proof: This result follows immediately from relation 
1
( )
t t
G I

 , where cost distribution 
function (·)G  is non-decreasing.     
 
Next we will establish a proof for strategic complementarity, i.e., that the premium will 
increase when the participation rate in the same period increases.  
Proposition 3: Producer participation decisions at any time period t  are strategic 
complements. That is, whenever 0 1
t t
      then ( ) ( )S S
t t t t
r r    and 
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( ( )) ( ( ))
S S
t t t t t t
I r I r   . 
Proof. By equations (5) and (6) we have 
1
( ) ( ) ( )
S S
t t t t
r E r r r  

 ∣ (1 ( )) ( )
t
E r    where 
1 1 1
( ) ( ) / [ ( ) 1 ( )]
S S S
t t t t t t
F r F r F r   
  
    whenever 1
t
  . If 1
t
  , then (1)
S
t
r r . Given 
1
S
t
r

 fixed, we can easily show that ( )S
t t
r   is decreasing in 
t
 .Thus 
t t
    implies 
( ) ( )
S S
t t t t
r r   . By Proposition 1 it follows that ( ( )) ( ( ))S S
t t t t t t
I r I r   .     
 
It is worth noting that strategic complementarity alone cannot guarantee a high 
participation rate. According to a simulation result in NAIS (2009), the benefit from NAIS 
would increase if participation rates increase. However as producers are generally unaware of 
potential program benefits (Anderson 2010) the program is likely to be unattractive at the 
outset, even among the most cost efficient producers. As a result only a small fraction of 
producers are likely to participate, confirming the belief that participation generates little 
benefit. Such a vicious cycle repeats so that the program stalls at a low participation rate 
equilibrium.  
We will refer to the participation rates when plotted against time as the participation 
curve. Next we will provide a plausible condition under which the participation rate will 
increase over time without any intervention. This means the participation curve could not 
contain any downward sloping segment. 
Assumption 2: Assume that ( ) ( )( ( ) ( ))S S SJ r r E r E r r r  ∣  is decreasing in 
[ , ( )]
S
r r E r , where ( ) ( ) ( ) / [ ( ) ( ) 1 ( )]S S S S S Sr g r F r g r F r g r     denotes the proportion of 
participants among all silent producers. Here ( )Sg r ( ( ))SG I r . 
 
Proposition 4, to follow, shows that the purpose of Assumption 2 is to guarantee that 
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10
S S S
k
r r r    holds without any exogenous forces. This means that market interactions 
would ensure that the average disease-free rate among silent producers decreases 
monotonically over time. From Example 1, we can see that average disease-free rate among 
the silent producers will strictly decrease conditional on types 1 having a participation cost of 
below 5. This will generate momentum whereby the premium and participation rate both 
increase over time.  
The outcome 
10
S S S
k
r r r    will generally apply when the easily computable uniform 
distribution is assumed on cost and disease rate distributions and value to be protected is not 
small. In Appendix A we provide a demonstration. Therefore we could be assured that 
Assumption 2 is a plausible condition. 
Proposition 4: Under Assumption 2, the following three inferences apply: i) Average 
disease-free rate of silent producers will be non-increasing over time, i.e., 
10
S S S
k
r r r   ; 
ii) Premium from participation will be non-decreasing over time, i.e., 
0 1 k
I I I   ; iii) 
Participation rate will be non-decreasing over time, i.e., 
10 k
    .  
Proof. See Appendix A.     
 
Proposition 4 is similar to the Momentum Theorem of Milgrom, Qian and Roberts 
(1991). This asserts that the underlying force for momentum in the development of what they 
refer to as a manufacturing system is knowledge accumulation. Once a system starts along a 
path of growth in core variables
18
, this process will continue indefinitely until some 
exogenous forces disturb the system. Consistent with result ii) in Proposition 4, a steady 
increase in participation rates has occurred over the years for MNJDCP (Wells, Hartmann 
and Anderson 2008), and also for the tick eradication program to control Texas fever.  
                                                 
18
 Here core variables refer to the variables that are mutually complementary.  
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Effect of Program Effectiveness on Premium 
To this point we have assumed that the program does not improve the herd’s health status of 
the herd. We will refer to a program that only generates information on 
t
r  in period t  as the 
baseline program. In a technologically effective program, the act of participation will 
improve an initial disease-free rate 
t
r  to ( ) [0,1]
t
r  , where ( ) , [0,1]
t t t
r r r     and 
[0,1]
t
r   for which ( )
t t
r r  . Define the premium under the technologically effective 
program in period t  as ( )
S
t t
I I r , and the premium under the baseline program in period t  
as ( )
S
t t
I I r . Next in Lemma 2 we will compare those two premiums assuming that S S
t t
r r  
always hold.  
Lemma 2: If S S
t t
r r , then 
t t
I I . 
Proof: By Proposition 1 we have ( ) ( )S S
t t t
I I r I r   whenever S S
t t
r r . Under the effective 
program at least producers with 
S
t t
r r  can get the price premium as ( ) , [0,1]
t t t
r r r     and 
[0,1]
t
r   for which ( )
t t
r r  . Therefore: 
1
1
( ) ( ( ) ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) .
S
t
S
t
S S
t t t t t
r
S S
t t t t t t
r
I I r r r dF r
r r dF r I r I
 

  
   


 
     
Under Assumption 2 we can show that the price premium of the effective program will 
be no less than that of the baseline program in every period. 
Proposition 5: Compared to the baseline program, the effective program always generates a 
greater expected price premium if Assumption 2 holds. That is 1t  , 
t t
I I . 
Proof: As 
0 0
S S
r r , by Lemma 2 we know 
0 0
I I . By Lemma 1, it implies that 
1 1
  , which 
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further leads to 
1 1
S S
r r  by Proposition 3.  
By Proposition 4, part i), we know that 1t  , S S
t t
r r  whenever assumption 2 holds. By 
applying Lemma 2 again, we have 1t  , 
t t
I I .     
 
A Cobweb Version  
We could present our model in a manner tantamount to cobweb model, which shows 
dynamically how price and quantity converge to the equilibrium. Here we will show how the 
participation rate and disease free rate of the non-disclosing producers converge to the 
equilibrium. At period t  the participation rate 
t
  is determined by the disease free rate of the 
non-disclosing producers at the previous period, 
1
S
t
r

. That is 
1
( ),
S
t t
g r

 1t  . Here 
1
( )
S
t
g r
 1
( ( ))
S
t
G I r

 , meaning that ( )g   is contingent on producers’ participation cost 
distribution. By Proposition 1, it follows immediately that ( )g   is decreasing in 
1
S
t
r

.  
Now given participation rate 
t
 , 
S
t
r  is determined at period t  as ( )S
t t
r h   
1
( ) ( )
S
t t
E r r r 

 ∣ (1 ( )) ( )
t
E r    where 
1 1 1
( ) ( ) / [ ( ) 1 ( )]
S S S
t t t t t t
F r F r F r   
  
    
whenever 1
t
  . If 1
t
  , then (1)
S
t
r h r  . Here 1
1
( )
S
t t
gr 


 . We can easily see that 
function ( )h   is decreasing in 
t
  whenever Assumption 2 is true. Here ( )h   is contingent on 
producers’ disease free rate distribution.  
Now we have two functions in the system, namely ( )Sg r   that is decreasing in 
S
r  and 
( )
S
r h   that is decreasing in  . These two functions are represented by two downward 
sloping lines. The relative slopes of those two lines could not be easily compared. However, 
we could easily check the intercepts of these two functions on the two axes. The original 
point of the coordinate plane is ( , ) ( , 0)Sr r  . The intercepts of ( )g   and ( )h   are ( )g r  and 
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1
( )h r
  on the Sr -axis, and 1 (0)g   and (0)h  on the  -axis. Those intercepts satisfy the 
following two properties: 1) 1( ) ( ( )) 1 ( )g r G I r h r   ; and 2) 1 (0) (0)g h  , implied by 
0
( (0)) ( )
S
g h g r 0  and that the inverse function of ( )g   is decreasing. 
Based on these two properties, we could have three different cases: i) 1 (0) (0)g h  ; ii) 
1
(0)g

 (0)h  and 1( ) ( ) 1g r h r  ; iii) 
1
(0)g

 (0)h  and 1( ) ( ) 1g r h r  . Using linear 
approximations of those two functions, we could obtain three figures for those three cases. In 
the case of i) the NP equilibrium will be immediately reached, as illustrated in Figure 3 (a). 
This is because 1 (0) (0)g h   implies 
0
( (0)) ( ) 0
S
g h g r  , therefore the participation rate 
will be zero in the first period and will continue to be so without any exogenous change. For 
the case of ii) the FP equilibrium will be reached, as displayed by Figure 3 (b). Since a 
percentage of 
0
( ) 0
S
g r   producers will participate in the first period, it is clear from equation 
(3) that 
1 0
S S
r r . As a result 
1 2
   since ( )g   is decreasing. This process will continue until 
*
( ) 1g r   . Case iii) is shown in Figure 3 (c) where a PP equilibrium is reached. The same 
process of case ii) will repeat here except that * *( ) ( ) 1g r g r    . 
Suppose the initial average disease free rate 
0
(0)
S
r h  decreases, then we can expect case 
i) to be transformed into either ii) or iii). This means more producers will participate if the 
disease is more serious in the system. On the other hand, the cost structure could determine 
the intercepts of ( )g  . When the lowest cost c  decreases, we can expect participation rate at 
period 1, 
0
( )
S
g r  to increase. This means the intercept on the Sr -axis, 1 (0)g  , will increase. 
When the highest cost c  increases, we can expect the intercept on the  -axis, ( )g r , to 
decrease. Therefore, when the cost structure becomes more heterogeneous, we can expect the 
intercept of ( )g   increases on the 
S
r -axis, while decreases on the  -axis. Therefore Figure 
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3(c) is more likely to represent such a case, where PP is more likely to be the outcome. This 
is consistent with our conclusion based on Figure 2 in the previous section.  
MANDATORY PROGRAM 
A mandatory program requires all the producers to participate. However, the incentive to 
voluntarily participate in mandatory programs is often overlooked. This is a pity because 
mandates are likely to be most unpopular and likely ineffective when the post-mandate 
equilibrium involves a large fraction of involuntary participants. In this section we will show 
that the premium reaches a maximum when a program is mandatory. Therefore a mandate 
creates the greatest incentive for producers to remain in the program, given the strategic 
complementarity of participation decisions. 
Assume that there is no non-participant in the mandatory program. Again by Grossman 
and Hart (1980), the average disease-free rate among silent producers will be r . This means 
that even though disclosure is voluntary, it comes naturally as a by-product of the mandatory 
program participation requirement. By (4) the expected participation premium is: 
 
1
( ) ( ) ( )
r
I r r r dF r   (8) 
By Proposition 1, we know that ( ) max ( )e
e
r
I r I r , where [ , ( )]
e
r r E r  is defined by 
the equilibrium condition provided in equation (6). Therefore, the premium under a mandate 
will be no less than that in a voluntary program.  
There could be two types of participants in a mandatory program. Motivated type A 
participants incur a lower cost than the premium under full participation, so they have 
incentives to participate. The remainder belong to unmotivated type B; they participate only 
when the government spends effort auditing and imposes a fine for non-participants. 
According to this definition, we will present three possible cases of equilibrium as shown in 
Figure 3. These are when: 
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1. 
max
c I c  . This cost structure is represented by area M1, where there exist a 
mixture of motivated type A and unmotivated type B  participants in the market. 
Participants with 
max
[ , )c c I  are motivated types while those with 
max
( , ]c I c  are 
unmotivated types; 
2. 
max
c I . This is represented by area M2, where the market is comprised solely of 
type B participants;  
3. 
max
c I . This is represented by area M3, where the market is comprised solely of 
motivated types.  
Note that region M3 in Figure 4 contains exactly regions R4, R5 and R6 in Figure 2. This 
means that only type A participants exist in the alternative mandatory program whenever FP 
is an equilibrium in the voluntary program. This is because a mandatory program generates 
maximum incentives for producers to join. According to our calculations in Example 1, we 
know that this example will be located in region M3 in a mandatory program. Therefore the 
market is comprised solely of type A participants. No participant will deviate from 
participation even if the government spends no effort on auditing.  
When the cost structure lies in region M1 in Figure 3, which is most likely when cost 
structures vary widely (as in the U.S. cow-calf production sector) in reality, then opposition 
from some producers is inevitable. For example, the BTB eradication program encountered 
continuous resistance during its implementation (Olmstead and Rhode 2007). Opposition was 
also intense to the Texas fever tick eradication program (Strom 2000) and more recently to 
the NAIS (Anderson 2010).  
SIMULATION 
In this section we will use Johne’s disease as an example for simulation purposes. One 
objective of this section is to understand whether the current participation rate will increase 
in the long run or stagnate, an important factor to judge whether a voluntary program could 
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be successful or not. We will also calculate the percentage of motivated type A participants 
under the alternative mandatory program. Sensitivity analyses will be carried out to see how 
certain parameter changes might affect our results.  
Similar to Example 1, we will use uniform distributions to capture a producers’ cost 
structure and herd disease-free rate. The values of the model parameters are based on the 
current literature on Johne’s disease. This renders the theoretically defined equilibria under 
voluntary and mandatory programs calculable. We assume throughout the simulations that 
the average disease-free rate is uniformly distributed as [ ,1]r U r  and participation cost is 
uniformly distributed as [ , ]c U c c .  
 
Voluntary program  
By (4), in the original program the expected premium in period t is calculated as:  
 
2
1 1 (1 )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2(1 )
.
S S
t t
S S
S S t t
t t t
r r
r r r
I I r r r dF r dr
r r

 
 
    
 
   (9) 
For simplicity, we will choose a linear technology that satisfies the definition of a 
technologically effective program as ( ) 0.5(1 )r r   . This technology is appealing because 
it reflects decreasing marginal returns in that the increase in disease-free rate is 
0.5(1 )r r    0.5(1 )r , which is decreasing in the value of r . 
The expected premium in period t  in the technologically effective program is:  
 
1
1 1
( ) 2 1
2
( ) [ ( ) ] ( ) (0.5 0.5 )
1
   (1 ) .
1
S S
t t
S S S
t t t t
r r
S
t
I I r r r dF r r r dr
r
r
r


 



     

 

 
 (10) 
By (5), the disease-free rate among silent sellers in period 1t   is:  
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1
1
( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( );
( ) ( )
( ) ; ( )  ; ( ) ;
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1
( ) 0.5( ); ( ) 0.5(1 ). 
1
S
t
S S S S
t t t t
S S
S St t t t
t t tS
t t t
r
S S
t tS
r r
t
r r E r r r r E r
G I F r I c r r
r G I F r
G I F r G I c c r
r r
E r r r dr r r E r dr r
r r r
 


   
 
  
   
      
 
 
∣
∣
 (11) 
From an initial value of 
0
( )r E r  we calculate premium 
0
I  by either (9), when considering 
the baseline program, or (10), when considering the technologically effective program. Next 
when 
0
r  and 
0
I  are known, 
1
r  will be solved by use of (11). For 1t  , 
t
I  and 
1t
r

 can be 
computed in turn. Lastly, participation rate ( )
t
G I  can be obtained in each period given 
t
I .  
 
Mandatory program 
By (8), the expected premium from participation is: 
 
1
( ) 0.5 (1 ).
1r
r r
I r dr r
r
 

  

  (12) 
Thus the fraction of motivated type A participants is: 
 
0.5 (1 )
(0.5 (1 )) .
r c
G r
c c


 
 

 (13) 
 
Parameter Values  
Average milk cow prices
19
 for replacement cows in 2006, 2007 and 2008 were $1,730, 
$1,830 and $1,950, respectively (USDA 2010b). For the years 2009 and 2010, we will use 
the first quarter milk cow prices as provided by USDA: NASS, which are $1,630 and $1,340 
respectively. Based on these statistics, we will estimate the value of a healthy dairy cow as 
the simple average of prices over the five most recent years, i.e., $1, 696V  . For cows 
                                                 
19
 These are simple averages of quarterly prices, by States, weighted by the number of milk 
cows on farms on Jan. 1 of that year. 
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infected with Johne’s disease, the estimated slaughter value is assumed to be in the range 0-
30% of the original value (Groenendaal and Galligan 2003). So we assume that 
(0 0.3) / 2 0.15    .  
It is estimated that the average within-herd prevalence in the United States is about 5.5% 
(USDA 2005). Therefore the average disease-free rate is ( ) 0.945E r  . As we assume that 
the herd disease-free rate satisfies a uniform distribution on [ ,1]r , it immediately follows 
that 0.89r  . The cost of the JD control program ranged from $5.79 to $81.07 per cow per 
year (Pillars et al. 2009). Thus we assume that the cost satisfies a uniform distribution on 
[$5.79, $81.07]. 
 
Results 
According to the discussion on parameters in the last section, we have ~ [0.89,1]r U , 
~c [$5.79, $81.07]U , $1, 696V   and 0.15  . By (9) and (11) we can obtain the 
participation rates under the voluntary original program for the first 20 periods as displayed 
in Figure 5. Under the voluntary program, we can see that the participation rate increases 
slightly in the beginning and then stabilizes at an equilibrium participation rate of below 
20%. This means that the current VJDHSP is unlikely to attract the majority of producers.  
Under the alternative mandatory program which generates the greatest incentives, there 
will be a mix of both types of participants where 80% are content with the mandate and 20% 
are discontent, as obtained from (13). This means that the current voluntary program is 
located in region R1 of Figure 2 and that its mandatory alternative is located in region M1 of 
Figure 4. Therefore FP could not be an equilibrium in the voluntary program. A FP could 
only be achieved in the mandatory program if program implementation expenditures such as 
auditing cost should be incurred. However, the alternative mandatory program is likely to be 
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resisted by the remaining 20% of producers who do not have the incentive to participate. 
 
Sensitivity analyses 
Next we will carry out sensitivity analyses with regard to r ,   and V  on the voluntary 
participation program. Other parameters fixed, we obtain the participation rates for the first 
20 periods as shown in Figure 6(a) by choosing   among { 1, 0.6, 0, 0.3} . Similarly, we 
choose {0.8, 0.82, 0.85, 0.95}r   and the participation rate dynamics are provided in 
Figure 6(b). Finally, we choose if {$1, 300, $1, 500, $1, 700, $1, 900}V   and simulations are 
displayed in Figure 6(c).  
The results in Figure 6(a) follow from Proposition 1, where a lower   indicates a larger 
premium in the initial period and thus a greater participation rate during period 1. Next, by 
the strategic complementarity property proved in Proposition 3 we know that the equilibrium 
participation rate will increase as well. Similarly, Figures 6(b) and 6(c) could be explained by 
a combination of propositions 1 and 3.  
From Figure 6(a) we obtain a sense of how the consequences of Johne’s disease will 
affect participation rates in a voluntary program. For example, if the harm to human health is 
still unknown and the main loss comes from decreasing productivity, then we can assume 
that 0.3  . In this case the participation rate stabilizes at a rate lower than 20%. However, 
if Johne’s disease is proved to be connected to Crohn’s disease, then   is likely to be 
negative. In cases where { 1, 0.6}    , FP equilibrium will be reached.  
Figure 6(b) indicates that the equilibrium participation rate could be influenced by 
producer’s beliefs on within-herd disease prevalence. While our simulations have less than 
10% of producers participating when average prevalence level is 2.5%, FP equilibrium will 
be realized if the average prevalence rate reaches 10%. Increased unit cow value will also 
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enhance the equilibrium participation rate, but to a very limited extent because the value 
range is narrow. From Figure 6(c) we can see that, all else fixed, FP equilibrium will not be 
reached even if the unit value increase to $2,500. The effect of unit animal value on 
participation rate can also explain why the participation rate for beef herds is much lower 
than that for dairy herds (Wells, Hartmann, and Anderson 2008).  
A more general comment in this figure is that participation rates, and so eventually 
disease-free rates, increase as value to be protected increases. This value could take the form 
of non-stock production assets such as feeding, housing and manure management 
investments. This provides another form of complementarity; namely between a particular 
grower’s asset value at risk and the participation decision rather than between grower 
participation decisions. But the two forms of complementarity will themselves interact in a 
complementary manner. That is, regions with a preponderance of competitive species X 
growers will have high asset values to protect and will participate. This will encourage others 
in the region to participate and high region-wide participation rate is likely to promote 
investment in the region’s species X production sector. On the other hand, if a region has a 
marginal species X production sector then there will be low incentive to participate and this 
just confirms the region’s low sector productivity. 
 
Subsidy and Tipping 
The effect of tipping will be illustrated in this section. Suppose that the government 
provides temporary subsidies to a proportion of producers. These subsidies may eventually 
motivate all the producers to participate in the voluntary program. Due to our momentum 
inference in Corollary 2, subsidies will no longer be necessary after a certain proportion of 
producers participate. We assume that ~ [0.89,1]r U , ~ [$5.79, $81.07]c U , $1, 696V  , and 
we compare 0   with 0.4   .  
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Figure 7(a) displays the case where 0  . The equilibrium without subsidy will be 
reached in around the 5th period, where 29 percent of producers participate and the price 
premium is $27 for participation. In the 6
th
 period, suppose the government could provide 
subsidies to 30 percent of producers. Specifically, suppose the government could subsidize 
all producers whose cost lies in the upper 30% percentile of the cost distribution, i.e., 
~c [$58.47, $81.07]U  so that their cost will fall below $27. So long as low cost participants 
do not believe that they would become eligible for subsidies were they to procrastinate then 
the timing of the subsidies will not affect their participation decision.  
In reality, as the smaller producers are more likely to incur higher participation costs, 
government could provide subsidies to 30% of the smallest producers once it is realized that 
the participation rate is leveling off. The uniform subsidy could be set as $55 to ensure that 
even the highest cost producers incur a cost less than $27 after the subsidy. Then the 
participation rate will climb again and the new full participation equilibrium will be reached 
after another 13 periods. The FP equilibrium will generate a price premium of $85. Thus no 
producer in the FP equilibrium has the incentive to deviate from it even without a 
government subsidy. An alternative approach that could more quickly and more reliably 
secure an high participation rate would be to subsidize the participation costs of the smallest 
producers right from the outset. 
Figure 7(b) displays the case where 0.4   .  The equilibrium without subsidy will 
settle in around the 6
th
 period, with a 54% participation rate and $46 price premium. In the 7
th
 
period, suppose the government could subsidize all producers whose cost lies in the upper 
10% percentile of the cost distribution, i.e., ~ [$73.54, $81.07]c U  so that their cost will fall 
below $46. This could be a uniform subsidy of $36 to the smallest 10% of producers. Then 
after another seven periods the FP equilibrium will be reached, generating a price premium 
of $130.  
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This result is consistent with the results in the sensitivity analyses section. That is, as 
 decreases only reduced subsidies to a smaller percentage of producers are needed to tip the 
PP equilibrium to a FP one. In the extreme, no subsidy will be needed when the value of  is 
sufficiently low. Similar results hold when either V increases or r  decreases.  
 
Cost Heterogeneity 
Next we will simulate the effect of participation cost heterogeneity. We will compare 
~c [$5.79, $81.07]U  with a distribution that is a mean-preserving decrease in dispersion, 
~c [$15.79, $71.07]U . We will also choose two different values for  , namely -0.5 and 0.3. 
The resulting participation rates are displayed in Figure 8(a) and 8(b), respectively. In the 
case of a less heterogeneous cost structure, the equilibrium participation rate is either close to 
0% or 100%; while a more heterogeneous cost structure results in the PP equilibrium. When 
the participation premium increases relative to cost and costs are less heterogeneous then FP 
will result. This simulation result conforms with our observation based on Figure 2.  
 
Program Effectiveness 
From equations (10) and (11) we can obtain the participation rates under the 
technologically effective program for the first 20 periods. Compared to the baseline program, 
the effect of program effectiveness on program participation is displayed in Figure 9. When 
the program is effective in increasing the herd level disease-free rate, the participation rate 
will increase in every period. The equilibrium participation rate will also increase. In our case 
a FP is reached for the effective program. Intuitively, this is because if the program proves to 
be more effective then sellers could expect to obtain a larger price premium and this would 
strengthen participation incentives among sellers. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on voluntary programs in the following 
regards. Participation incentives are modeled at an industry level and in a dynamic setup. 
This allows to show that, due to strategic complementarity, momentum can build where both 
premium and participation rate increase iteratively in a mutually reinforcing manner and may 
in time support full participation even without government subsidies. This is in contrast with 
much of the current literature on infectious animal disease management programs, which 
implicitly assume that incentives for voluntary participation come either from direct 
productivity effects or government subsidies.  
Secondly, we show that the participation premium is contingent on disease consequences 
to human health, disease prevalence rate and the unit livestock value. Therefore participation 
rates may differ when these characteristics change. For example, if consumers perceive a 
serious human health consequence or producers believe the disease to be highly prevalent, 
then a full participation equilibrium could be more readily attained.  
We point out that due to the strategic complementarity property, the mandatory program 
maximizes the price premium and thus the incentive to participate. The private benefits to 
participation will be larger when calculated after the mandate is implemented. As our 
historical review attests, many initially hostile to a mandate may think differently afterwards. 
Theoretically, a sticks approach can dominates the carrots approach in regard to participation 
incentives. However enforcing the mandate might be difficult at the outset and when 
heterogeneity in implementation cost is large then many producers may never benefit from 
the mandate. A voluntary program with modest government subsidies might be welcome by 
all producers, perhaps in part because of the positive publicity generated (Lyon 2003). It 
would also place some of the costs on taxpayers/consumers who may be happy to pay for 
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greater confidence in the food supply chain. A voluntary approach may also afford producers 
with sufficient time to appreciate program benefits and initiate a virtuous cycle at low 
political cost.  
Finally, as demonstrated in the simulation section, our theoretical model can also be 
tailored for simulation purposes. This allows us to predict under given situations how the 
program participation rate may evolve over time, a new feature that has not been explored in 
the existing literature. Take Johne’s disease as an example. Our simulation results indicate 
that full participation is unlikely under the status quo. However, if the disease is were shown 
to cause serious human health consequences that becomes reflected in livestock values then 
the full participation rate is more likely to be attained. To the contrary, an underestimation of 
the disease prevalence rate could deter producers from participation. We also illustrate the 
process of tipping in the simulation, where the government could secure a FP equilibrium by 
subsidizing a small proportion of high cost producers to participate. Therefore the success 
and cost effectiveness of a voluntary Johne’s control program, or of any livestock disease 
control program in general, hinges crucially on obtaining the right statistics and educating the 
producers and consumers accordingly.  
A shortcoming of this paper is that animal health benefits are accounted for in a very 
reduced form manner. This feature might be improved upon, but at some loss in model 
tractability. Omission of animal health benefits in our simulations cause an underestimation 
of the program’s true benefit. Future developments could strengthen these model features. 
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APPENDIX 
Effect of test sensitivity on premium 
In reality tests may only identify a small group of diseased animal. For example, 
sensitivity of Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) tests are assumed to be 25% and 
that of fecal cultures are assumed to be 40% (USDA, 2010a). Jubb et al. (2004) defines 
ELISA sensitivity measure as “ / ( )
n
T A A B  where n = Test round, A = Number of 
reactors at 
n
T  and B  = Number of animals that tested negative at 
n
T but tested positive at 
subsequent tests.” Following Jubb et al. (2004), we will define the test sensitivity as the 
number of animals that tested positive divided by the number of true diseased ones.  
Next we will show in Proposition A1 that as long as test sensitivity is common 
knowledge, it will not have an effect on the expected premium from participation.  
Proposition A1: Test sensitivity will not affect the expected price premium from 
participation.  
Proof. Assume D  percent of the animals in the herd are diseased. And the sensitivity of the 
test is , which means that only  percent of diseased animal can be correctly identified. 
Suppose  is common knowledge among all the parties involved. Now D D  percent of 
the animal is identified as diseased. The buyer is willing to pay (1 )D V D V  for a herd 
with disease free rate D  when the sensitivity is 1. 
Now suppose that the sensitivity of the test is  , and the producers claim that the tested 
disease free rate is 1 D  . Then the buyer can infer that the actual disease free rate is 
1 /D  . Thus the buyer is willing to pay (1 / ) ( / )D V D V     . This is exactly the 
same as the price the buyer will pay when the sensitivity is 1.      □ 
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Validity of Assumption 2 
Assumption 2 always holds if we take on the computable function form and assume that 
both the average disease free rate and participation cost are uniformly distributed as 
~ [0,1]r U  and ~ [0,1]c U , and that (1 ) 2V    . 
Proof.  Obviously ( ) ( )SE r E r r r ∣  is decreasing in Sr . Therefore, assumption 2 will 
automatically hold if ( )
S
r is decreasing in Sr . 
 
2
2
1 ( )
'( ) 1
( ) ( ) 1 ( )
'( )[ ( ) ( ) 1 ( )] [1 ( )][ ( ) '( ) '( ) ( ) '( )]
[ ( ) ( ) 1 ( )]
( )(1 ( )) '( ) '( ) (
[ ( ) ( ) 1 ( )]
)
S
S
S S S
S S S S S S S S S S
S S S
S S S S S
S S S
g r
r
g r F r g r
g r g r F r g r g r g r F r g r F r g r
g r F r g r
g r g r F r g r F r
g r F r g r


 
  
  
      
 
 
 

 
 
Equivalently, this is to prove : 
 '( ) ( ( )(1 ( )) ') ( )S S S S Sg r F r g r g r F r    (A-1) 
Assume that the average disease free rate is uniformly distributed as ~ [0,1]r U and 
participation costs satisfy the uniform distribution ~ [0,1]c U . Then ( ) ;
S S
F r r '( ) ;1
S
F r   
1
2
( ) ( ( ) 0 1 )) .5 (
S
S S S S
r
g r I r r r dr r       and '( )
S
g r ( )
S
F r  0 . Under these 
specification we can show that condition (A-1) always holds as below. 
 
2 2
2
    (1 ) 0.5 (1 ) 1 0.5/ ( / /
[
(1 ) )
2 (1 ) 1 0.5 (1 / ])
S S S S
S S S
c cr r r r
r r r
c
c
  

    
    
 
 (A-2) 
Assuming that 2c  , condition (A-2) will hold if we could prove 
2
S
r 
2
(1 ) 1 (1 ])[
S S
r r   , which immediately holds as 2 (1 )(2 ).S Sr r    
 
114 
 
 
 
Proof of Corollary 2.  
Similar to (3) and (4), we have: 
 
1
1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )( ( ) ( ))
( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) ( ) ( )( ( ) ( ))
S S S S S S
t t t t t t
S S S S S S
t t t t t t
r r E r r r r E r E r r E r E r r r
r r E r r r r E r E r r E r E r r r
  
  

    
       
      
∣ ∣
∣ ∣
 
Suppose 
1
S S
t t
r r

 . In order to have
1
S S
t t
r r

 , we need the following condition to hold: 
 
1 1
( )( ( ) ( )) ( )( ( ) ( ))
S S S S
t t t t
r E r E r r r r E r E r r r 
 
    ∣ ∣  (A-3) 
Condition (A-3) holds when Assumption 2 is true. 
Next, inference ii) holds by inference i) and Proposition 1. Based on Lemma 1 and the 
assumption that 
0
0  , inference iii) follows immediately.      □ 
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Period t begins (t > 0)
Producers observe premium       and make a participation decision
A proportion (can be zero) of producers join the program
Test results are revealed and participators decide whether to disclose 
or not based on disease free rate of silent producers,
A subset (can be zero) of participators disclose the result
Disease free rate of silent producers and premium are 
determined.
Move on to period
1
S
t
r

S
t
r
t
I
1t 
t

1t
I

 
Figure 4.1. A flow chart of the model scheme. 
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Figure 4.1. Equilibria under different cost structures—voluntary program. 
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Figure 4.2 (a). Cobweb Effect---Non-Participation 
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Figure 4.3(b). Cobweb Effect---Full Participation 
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Figure 4.3 (c). Cobweb Effect---Partial Participation
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Figure 4.4. Participant Types under Different Costs---Mandatory Program 
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Figure 4.5. Participation rate and ratio of motivated Type A producers to all producers. 
  
 
Figure 4.6 (a). Participation rates under different values of  . 
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Figure 4.6 (b). Participation rates under different values of r .
 
 
 
Figure 4.6(c). Participation rates under different values of V . 
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Figure 4.7(a). Subsidy and tipping— 0  . 
 
Figure 4.7(b). Subsidy and tipping— 0.4   . 
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Figure 4.8(a). Cost heterogeneity— 0.5   . 
 
 
Figure 4.8(b). Cost heterogeneity— 0.3  . 
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Figure 4.9. Effective program vs. baseline program. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS 
Voluntary Program---Coarse Grading 
In this section we will present our model under the alternative assumption of a coarse 
grading test. A coarse grading test only distinguishes two possible cases. Producers obtain a 
certificate when their disease-free rate is above a threshold rˆ  and no certificate otherwise. 
The unit livestock price of a non-participating herd is 1 (1 )S S
t t t
p r V r V   , while the 
realized unit price of one that participates takes the following form:  
 2
ˆ(1 )                                 whenever  ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ[ | ] (1 [ | ])      whenever  .
S S
t t
t
r V r V r r
p
E r r r V E r r r V r r


   
 
    
 
Therefore the realized premium received by a producer who participates is:  
 
2 1
ˆ0, whenever   ;
ˆ ˆ( [ | ] )     whenever   .
t
t t
S
t t
r r
p p
E r r r r r r

  
  
 
The expected price premium from participating is thus:   
 
ˆ1
ˆ 0
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( [ | ] ) ( ) 0 ( )
ˆ ˆ           ( [ | ] )[1 ( )].
r
c S S
t t t
r
S
t
I r r E r r r r dF r f r dr
E r r r r F r


   
   
 
 (SM-1) 
Here ( )cI   represents the price premium function in the coarse grading case. Next, we 
will show that in the coarse grading system, price premium depends only on the lowest 
threshold. The number of thresholds and the value of other thresholds will not affect the 
premium. Therefore without loss of generality, we will focus on the single threshold case. 
Proposition SM1: Suppose there are two coarse grading programs with 1 2ˆ ˆr r . Program 1 
offers the certificate whenever the tested disease-free rate 1ˆr r ; program 2 offers level 1 
certificate whenever the tested disease-free rate satisfies 1 2ˆ ˆ[ , )r r r , level 2 certificate 
whenever the tested disease-free rate satisfies 2ˆr r . The expected premiums generated by 
the two programs are the same.  
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Proof :According to (SM-1), the expected price premium for program 1 is: 
 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( [ | ] )[1 ( )]c S S
t t
I r r E r r r r F r     (SM-2) 
The realized price charged by a producer participating in program 2 takes the following form:  
 
1
2 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2 2
ˆ(1 ) , w henever   
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ | ] (1 [ | ]) , w henever  
ˆ ˆ ˆ[ | ] (1 [ | ]) , w heneve
;
r .  
;
 
S S
t t
t
r V r V r r
p E r r r r V E r r r r V r r r
E r r r V E r r r V r r



   

        

    
 
Since the unit livestock price from non-participating is 
1
(1 )
S S
p r V r V   , we can 
calculate the realized premium from participating in program 2 as:  
 
1
1 1 1 2 1 2
2 2
ˆ0, w henever   
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( [ | ] ),          w henever   
ˆ ˆ( [ | ] ), w henever 
;
;
.  
t
S
t t t t
S
t t
r r
p p E r r r r r r r r
E r r r r r r


 

      

  
 
The expected price premium from participating in program 2 is: 
 
2
1 2
ˆ 1
1 2 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ
1 2 2 1 2 2
1 2 2 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ) ( [ | ] ) ( ) ( [ | ] ) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( [ | ] )( ( ) ( )) ( [ | ] )(1 ( ))
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[( [ | ])( ( ) ( )) ( [ | ])(1 ( ))]
r
S S S
c t t t
r r
S S
t t
I r r r E r r r r r dF r E r r r r dF r
E r r r r r F r F r E r r r r F r
E r r r r F r F r E r r r F r
 
 

      
        
      
 
1
1 1 1
1 1
ˆ(1 ( ))
ˆ ˆ ˆ( [ | ])[1 ( )] [1 ( )]     (By the Law  of Itera ted Expectations)
ˆ ˆ( [ | ] )[1 ( )].
S
t
S
t
S
t
r F r
E r r r F r r F r
E r r r r F r

 

 


   
  
(SM-3) 
This is exactly the expected price premium generated by program 1, as shown in (SM-2).     
In the coarse grading case, silent producers are comprised of two groups: participants 
who fail to obtain the certificate and the non-participants. Similar to the equilibrium defined 
in the fine grading case, we will define the equilibrium under coarse grading as: 
 
*
*
* *
*
* *
* *
ˆ( ) ( | ) [1 ( )] ( );
ˆ( )
ˆ( ) ; ( ( , )).
ˆ( ) 1
c
r E r r r r E r
F r
G I r r
F r
r
r
 

 
 
   
 
 
 (SM-4) 
As a counterpart to Figure 2 in the voluntary fine grading case, Figure SM1 displays all 
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possible types of equilibria when cost structures differ. As an example, we will show by 
Proposition SM2 that there are two possible equilibria in region R5. The proof resembles that 
in Proposition 2. 
Proposition SM2: Under the voluntary program coarse grading case, NP and FP are two 
possible equilibria when ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( ), ) ( ( | ), )c cI E r r c c I E r r r r    .  
 
We seek now to prove Proposition SM3, a counterpart to Proposition 4 in the fine grading 
case. In order to do so we will first show in Lemma SM1 that a counterpart of Assumption 2 
always holds in the coarse grading case. 
Lemma SM1: In the coarse grading case, an equivalent to Assumption 2 of the fine grading 
case will always hold. That is ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )( ( ) ( ))S S
t t
J r r r r E r E r r r  ∣  is decreasing in 
[ , ( )]
S
t
r r E r  where ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ( , )) ( ) / ( ( , )) ( ) 1 ( ( , ))S c S c S c S
t t t t
r r G I r r F r G I r r F r G I r r     
.  
Proof: As ˆ( ) ( )E r E r r r ∣ is a constant, we only need ˆ( , )S
t
r r  to be decreasing in S
t
r   
[ , ( )]r E r . This is obvious as ˆ( ( , ))c S
t
G I r r  is decreasing in S
t
r  and ˆ( )F r  is fixed.     
 
Proposition SM3: In coarse grading case, the following three inferences always apply: i) 
Average disease-free rate of silent producers will be non-increasing over time, i.e., 
10
S S S
k
r r r   ; ii) Premium from participation will be non-decreasing over time, i.e., 
0 1 k
I I I    ( ( )c S
k k
I I r ); iii) Participation rate will be non-decreasing over time, i.e., 
10 k
    .  
 
Lastly we will briefly revisit Example 1 in the coarse grading case, where an additional 
threshold parameter takes value of ˆ 0.98r  . It follows that:  
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1
ˆ
1
0.98
ˆ ˆ( ( | ), ) [ ( | 0 .98) ( | 0 .98)] ( )
[ ( | 0 .98) ( | 0 .98)]
0.8 * 500 4.
1 0.90
c
t t t t t t
r
t t t t
I E r r r r E r r E r r dF r
E r r E r r
dr
    
  
 



 
Therefore ˆ ˆ( ( | ), )c
t t
c c I E r r r r   . Now the case of Example 1 is located in region R3 
of Figure SM1, where the only equilibrium is NP and tipping will not occur. Therefore 
strategic complementarity as provided in Proposition SM3, may not lead to tipping. Next we 
will show that in a more general setup, coarse grading generates a smaller expected price 
premium, i.e., less incentive for producers to participate.  
Proposition SM4: Assume that ˆ ( )r E r . Then price premium under the coarse grading 
system ˆ( , )c S
t
I r r  is no greater than that under the fine grading system, ( )S
t
I r  for any given 
[0,1]
S
t
r  .  
Proof: Calculate 
 
1
ˆ
1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1
ˆ
1
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( [ | ] ) ( )
ˆ           [ | ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
           ( ) ( )
ˆ           ( ) ( )    (  ( ) )
        
y
 
B
  
S
c S S
t t
r
S S
t t
r r r r
S
t
r
S S
t t
r
I r r E r r r r dF r
E r r r dF r r dF r rf r dr r dF r
r r f r dr
r r f r dr r E r r
I

   


  
    
 
   


   


( ).
S
t
r
 
 
Note that condition ˆ ( )r E r , which means that participants only obtain a certificate 
when their disease-free rate is above the average, is a sufficient condition for Proposition 
SM4 to hold. This is because 
0
( )
S S
t
r r E r   (by equation (5)), thus producers with disease-
free rate ˆ( , ]
S
t t
r r r  will obtain a premium in fine grading case, but not in a coarse grading 
case. Thus ex-ante a producer has a lower expected premium in the coarse grading system.  
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Mandatory Program---Coarse Grading 
The average disease-free rate for the silent producers, who are comprised solely of the 
producers that obtain no certificate, is ˆ( | )E r r r . Thus by (SM-1) the expected price 
premium from participation is: 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( | ), ) [1 ( )][ ( | ) ( | )].cI E r r r r F r E r r r E r r r       (SM-5) 
Similar to Figure 4, Figure SM2 also displays three possible cases. These are:  
1. ˆ ˆ( ( | ), )cc I E r r r r c   . This cost structure is represented by region M1, where both 
types of participants exist. Those participants with ˆ ˆ[ , ( ( | ), ))cc c I E r r r r   are 
motivated type A participants, and those with ˆ ˆ( ( ( | ), ), ]cc I E r r r r c   are type B 
participants; 
2. ˆ ˆ( ( | ), )cc I E r r r r  . This is represented by region M2, where the market is solely 
comprised of unmotivated type B participants;  
3. ˆ ˆ( ( | ), )cc I E r r r r  . This is represented by region M3, where the market is solely 
comprised of motivated type A participants.  
As ˆ ˆ5.5 ( ( | ), ) 4cc I E r r r r    , we know that the case in Example 1 is now located in 
M2. This means that the market is comprised solely of type B participants, who would 
choose not to participate if the government spends no effort on auditing. As 
ˆ ˆ( ( | ), ) ( )
c
I E r r r r I r  ,
20
 region M3 of Figure 4 takes a larger area than M3 of Figure SM2. 
Therefore ceteris paribus, the coarse grading incentive structure entails no less 
implementation cost than the fine grading one.  
For the purposes of simulation we assume that the average disease-free rate is uniformly 
                                                 
20
 This follows as a combination of results in Proposition SM4 and Proposition 1. The former 
implies that ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( ), ) ( ( ))cI E r r r r I E r r r  ∣ ∣ , while from the latter we know that 
ˆ( ( )) ( )I E r r r I r ∣ .  
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distributed as ~ [ ,1]r U r  and participation cost is uniformly distributed as ~ [ , ]c U c c .  
 
Voluntary program: Coarse grading 
By (SM-1), the expected price premium from participating in the program in period t  is: 
 
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆ( [ | ] ) 1
ˆ ˆ( , ) (0.5 (1 ) ) .
1 1
S
c S St
t t
r
E r r r r r
I r r dr r r
r r
 
  
   
 
  (SM-6) 
Similar to (10), the disease-free rate among silent sellers in period 1t   is:  
 
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( | ) [1 ( , )] ( );
ˆ ˆ( ( , )) ( )
ˆ( , ) ; 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( , )) ( ) 1 ( ( , ))
ˆ ˆ( , )
ˆ ˆ( ( , )) ; ( ) ; 
1
ˆ 1
ˆ( | ) ; ( ) . 
2 2
S S S
t t t
c S
S t
t c S c S
t t
c S
c S t
t
r r r E r r r r r E r
G I r r F r
r r
G I r r F r G I r r
I r r c r r
G I r r F r
c c r
r r r
E r r r E r
 


   

 
 
 
 
 
  
 (SM-7) 
From initial values 
0
( )
S
r E r  and rˆ , we can calculate the premium 
0 0
ˆ( , )
S
I I r r  by (SM-
6). Then given 
0
S
r and 
0
I , we can solve for 
1
S
r  by (SM-7). Similarly for 1t  , 
t
I  and 
1
S
t
r

 will 
be solved. The participation rate ˆ( ( , ))c S
t
G I r r  in each period can also be obtained.  
 
Mandatory program: Coarse grading 
By (SM-5), the expected price premium from participating in the program is: 
 
1
ˆ
ˆ ˆ[ | ] [ | ]
ˆ ˆ( ( | ), )
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( [ | ] [ | ])(1 )
                          
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ[0.5(1 ) 0.5( )](1 )
ˆ                          0 .5 (1 ).
1
c
r
E r r r E r r r
I E r r r r dr
r
E r r r E r r r r
r
r r r r
r
r


 
  
 

   


   
  


 (SM-8) 
Thus among market participants the proportion with the incentive to participate is: 
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ˆ0.5 (1 )
ˆ(0.5 (1 )) .
r c
G r
c c


 
 

 (SM-9) 
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Figure 4.SM1. Equilibria under Different Cost Structures—Voluntary Program, Coarse 
Grading. 
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Figure 4.SM2. Participant Types under Different Costs—Mandatory Program, Coarse Grading. 
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CHAPTER 5: ROLE OF STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS IN DISEASE PREVENTION 
AND CURE EFFORT CHOICES 
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ABSTRACT 
For infectious diseases that can be cured but do not provide permanent immunity, 
incentives to prevent and cure interact in complex ways. There are intra-person temporal 
interactions. Incentives to prevent illness will increase as cure becomes more costly while 
incentives to cure will decrease as prevention becomes more costly. There are also inter-
person contemporaneous interactions. Incentives to cure decreases in light of free riding as 
the benefits from cure are shared. Incentives to prevent increase in light of strategic 
complementarities as diseases likely enter at the weakest link. This paper provides a succinct 
two-agent model to explore these interactions. Notwithstanding opposing interactions, we 
suggest that equilibrium levels of prevention and cure efforts are likely to increase as the 
magnitude of loss from disease increases. Public prevention effort complements both private 
prevention and private cure efforts. However, public cure effort substitutes for both private 
cure and private prevention efforts. 
INTRODUCTION 
The list of bacteria that are pathogenic to humans include Whooping cough, Diphtheria, 
Enteropathogenic E. coli (leading to diarrhea in infants), Helicobacter pylori (believed to 
cause the majority of peptic ulcers), Leprosy and Tuberculosis. Many sexually transmitted 
infection (STI) are caused by bacteria. Examples include chlamydia, gonorrhea, syphilis and 
trichomoniasis. The list of parasitic diseases includes intestinal helminths. Hookworm, 
whipworm and other helminth diseases are estimated to infect hundreds of millions of 
                                                 
21
 Primary researcher and author. 
22
 Author for correspondence. 
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humans in the developing world, being a major factor in morbidity and malnutrition (Miguel 
and Kremer 2004), and evidence suggests that eradication can have significant social welfare 
impacts (Bleakley 2007).  
All these diseases are curable. All are susceptible until they become infected, and become 
susceptible again after an infection is cured. The epidemiology modeling literature refers to 
these as SIS diseases.
23
 In addition, prevention and cure involve externalities in that the 
behavior of one’s neighbors matters too. Zoonoses are another disease class of concern to 
human health. Many of these have implications for the management of livestock farms. At 
the individual animal level a disease may not be of SIS with externalities form, but at the 
farm level it may be. Bovine tuberculosis and brucellosis are zoonotic diseases such that 
farms are either susceptible or infected and behavior on other farms affects any given farm’s 
prospects for prevention and cure. For both of these diseases and many others, governments 
in developed countries have waged lengthy campaigns with intent to eradicate the disease 
(Olmstead and Rhode 2007; Olmstead 2009).  
It is important to recognize that prevention and cure interventions are taken in different 
states. Prevention actions are taken in the susceptible state while cure actions are taken in the 
infected state. There is of course reason to believe that these decisions are linked. Hennessy 
(2008a), for example, studies the relationship between these two actions taken by the same 
individual. De Preux (2011) considers the impact of a change in the loss when diseased, 
through enhanced insurance availability in the form of Medicare, on prevention activities. 
Such analyses fall short when we think of the contagious nature of the most infectious 
diseases, for which the efforts of other parties should not be ignored when seeking to 
                                                 
23 Other types of disease include susceptible-infected (SI) and susceptible-infected-recovered 
(SIR). Diseases such as AIDS fall into the SI category (Kremer 1996). Vaccination models 
such as Geoffard and Philipson (1997) and Francis (2004) are modified SIR models in that 
susceptible individuals who vaccinate will also acquire permanent immunity. 
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understand disease prevention and cure.  
In this paper, we will develop a two-agent model of an SIS disease where the disease is 
passed on to a second agent instantaneously whenever one agent contracts it. The focus of 
our paper is on strategic interactions across disease states and across agents. For example, 
how does one agent’s prevention effort affect the other agent’s cure effort? Or how does an 
exogenous shock to cure effectiveness affect prevention actions? We find that the nature of 
interactions is such that responses may not be monotonic. However, we see reason to believe 
that incentives to take cure actions are likely to be weak. In particular, the own-price 
response could be negative under reasonable circumstances. Also, an increase in public cure 
efforts will lead to a decrease in private cure and private prevention efforts while an increase 
in public prevention efforts will lead to an increase in these efforts.  
The general model on how prevention and cure decisions interact in the presence of 
disease externalities is first developed and analyzed as far as a general analysis will allow us 
to go. We then provide a more specific and tractable version of the model to allow for 
explicit solutions and further development. We conclude with some brief comments.  
MODEL 
Setup 
This is a continuous time model. There are two possible states, namely the susceptible (S) 
and infected (I) states. In the susceptible state, each agent earns an income w . There are also 
two agents, labeled 1 and 2. Agent j  will take a disease prevention effort of magnitude 
j
a  
for j   {1, 2} . The continuous flow cost of taking effort level 
j
a  is ( )
j
C a  where, as is 
standard, it is assumed that 
1
( ) / ( ) 0
j j j
C a a C a     and 
2 2
2
( ) / ( ) 0
j j j
C a a C a    . Agent 
j  receives a utility of 
,
( ( ))
S j S
j
U w C a    in the susceptible state. Here, also as is standard, 
we assume that 
1
( ) / ( ) 0
S S
U w U       and 
2
( ) 0
S
U   .  
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Define 
1
x  and 
2
x  as the number of years passed before agents 1 and 2 contract the 
disease, respectively. In addition, assume that if one agent contracts the disease, then the 
other agent will contract it at the same time. The agent that takes least precautions is likely to 
be the weakest link. Therefore it will take 
1 2
min[ , ]x x  years for both agents 1 and 2 to 
contract the disease. Write the joint survival function beyond 
1
x  and 
2
x  given respective 
prevention actions 
1
a  and 
2
a  as 
1 2 1 2
( , ; , )F x x a a . Our intent is to develop a tractable model in 
which state transitions depend on actions only, i.e., they are time invariant. Write ( ) 0
j
j
a   
as the time invariant hazard rate at which the disease is contracted by Agent j  individually 
while 0   is the hazard rate at which the disease is contracted by both agents 
simultaneously, perhaps due to external forces. We assume that 
1
( ) 0
j
j
a   and 
2
( ) 0
j
j
a  , 
i.e., Agent j  can lower its own hazard rate at a decreasing rate by increasing its prevention 
action.  
The unique continuous univariate distribution with constant hazard rate is the 
exponential. In the bivariate case a variety of distributions satisfy the condition, where we 
choose the well-known and widely applied Marshall and Olkin (1967) distribution: 
 
1 2
1 1 2 2 1 2( ) ( ) m ax[ , ]
1 2 1 2
( , ; , ) .
a x a x x x
F x x a a e
    
  (1) 
One way of interpreting this distribution is to specify 
1 1
min[ , ]x    and 
2 2
min[ , ]x    
where 
1
 , 
2
  and   are independent random variables with negative exponential 
distributions having respective parameters 
1
1
( )a , 
2
2
( )a  and  . In this light   can be 
viewed as a common external shock causing simultaneous infection of both agents.  
From Marshall and Olkin (1967) we know that, perhaps surprisingly, 
1 2
min[ , ]x x  is 
exponentially distributed with parameter 
1 2
1 2
( ) ( )a a     , and so  
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1 2 1 2
1 2
]}
1
{m in[ ,
( ) ( )
E x x
a a  

 
 (2) 
Ceteris paribus an increase in prevention effort by either agent lowers hazard rate  .  
In the infected state each agent receives amount w L  where L  is the loss from disease. 
We assume that the disease will not be eradicated unless both agents get rid of the disease. 
Denote the cure effort taken by Agent j  as magnitude 
j
b  for {1, 2}j   while the efficiency 
of government is given as 
0
b . The probability rate for recovery is 
0 1 2
( , , )b b b . Of course the 
effort has some effect, i.e., 0 {0,1, 2}
jb
j    . We will also require the form of ( )   to be 
such that 
1
b  and 
2
b  substitute as success involves a joint effort to recover.
24
 The cost of 
j
b  is 
( )
j
m b  with 
1
( ) 0
j
m b   and 
2
( ) 0
j
m b  . Therefore, in the infected state Agent j  receives a 
utility of ,I j  ( ( ))
I
j
U w L m b  , which is again smoothly increasing and concave it w . 
 
Lifetime expected utility 
We define 
S , j
V  and 
I , j
V  as Agent j’s lifetime expected utility when in the susceptible 
and infected states, respectively. With r as the continuous time discount rate, the fundamental 
valuation equations are as given by (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984):  
 
, , , , , , ,
( );  ( ).
S j S j I j S j I I j S j I j
j
rV V V rV V V            (3) 
Each equation takes the form that interest rate times lifetime expected utility equals the 
instantaneous utility plus the expected gains or losses from a transition of state. That is, 
utility flow from being in the given state equals instantaneous utility given the present state 
                                                 
24Consider the case of hookworm, typically spread by infected individuals defecating in 
common areas where others tread barefoot. Prevention would involve installing a toilet or at 
least incurring the cost of moving to a more secluded place. There is a pool of infection 
where it doesn’t really matter who contributes to reducing the pool’s size, so efforts 
substitute. 
136 
 
 
 
plus the valuation implication of an instantaneous state transition. 
The solution to (3) is  
 
, , , ,
, ,( ) ( )
; ; .
S j I j S j I j
S j I jr r
V V r
r r
     
  
 
   
      (4) 
The difference in the expected lifetime utility between two different states is: 
 
, ,
, ,
.
S j I j
S j I j
V V
 


   (5) 
We can see that the surplus value in the susceptible state can be viewed as a bond paying 
utility flow 
, ,S j I j
   at discount rate   (Hennessy 2007).  
 
ANALYSIS 
In the susceptible state Agent j’s objective is to choose the optimal prevention measure 
j
a  to maximize 
,S j
V , or 
,
m ax
j
S j
a
V . The first-order condition (F.O.C.) is, {1, 2}j  , 
  
,
, ,
1 1 2
( )
( ) ( ( )) ( ) 0.
j
S j
S j I j S
a j j
j
V r
U w C a C a
a r

   

 
     

 (6) 
In the infected state the agent’s objective is to choose cure action level 
j
b  to maximize 
,I j
V , 
or ,m ax
j
I j
b
V . The first-order condition is, {1, 2}j  , 
  
,
, ,
1 1 2
( )
( ) ( ( )) ( ) 0.
j
I j
S j I j I
b j j
j
V r
U w L m b m b
b r

   

 
     

 (7) 
A pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) will be any 
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
( , , , ) ( , , , )
n n n n
a b a b a b a b  that 
satisfies the four conditions given in (6)-(7).  
Note that 0
ja
  , 0
jb
  , 
1 1
( ) ( ) 0
S
U C    and 
1 1
( ) ( ) 0
I
U m   . Therefore 
, ,S j I j
   for 
agents 1 and 2 when evaluated at any NE, i.e., the equilibrium utility in the susceptible state 
is greater than that in the infected state. Equilibrium conditions (6)-(7) can be rearranged to 
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be 
 
1 1
2 2
1
,1 ,1 ,1 ,1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
,2 ,2 ,2 ,2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
,1 ,1 ,2 ,2
1 1 1 1
( ) ( )
;
( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( )
;
( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
( ) ( )
( ( )) ( )
S I S I
b a
I n n S n n
S I S I
b a
I n n S n n
S I S I
a a
S n n
U w L m b m b U w C a C a
U w L m b m b U w C a C a
U w C a C a
     

     

     
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  

2
1 2
1 2 1 2
,1 ,1 ,2 ,2
1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2
;
( ( )) ( )
( ) ( )
.
( ( )) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
S n n
S I S I
b b
I n n I n n
U w C a C a
U w L m b m b U w L m b m b

     



 
 
   
 (8) 
Here system (8) defines a set of four conditions that characterize NE. The first pair of 
conditions are intra-personal. They equate the expected marginal cost of effort across states 
for the respective agents. Were this not true then lifetime expected utility could be increased 
by reallocating efforts across states. The other two equations are inter-personal. They assert 
that while the choices made may differ across agents, the differences are driven by the 
change in utility flow that the decisions are intended to secure; i.e., 
,1 ,1S I
   and 
,2 ,2S I
  . In all cases, the numerator can be viewed as a transition risk adjusted cashflow 
differential (i.e., susceptible less infected) over time that is being protected while the 
denominator is the present time cost so that the ratio should naturally be a hazard-rate 
augmented opportunity cost of capital,  .  
 
Linear specification 
From this point forward we make the assumption that cost and hazard functions are linear 
of the following forms: ( )
j a j
C a r a  with 
a
r  strictly positive; ( )
j b j
m b r b  with 
b
r  strictly 
positive; 
0 1 1 2 2
h h a h a     where 
0
h , 
1
h  are 
2
h  strictly positive; and 
0 1 1 2 2
g g b g b     
where 
0
g , 
1
g  are 
2
g  strictly positive. The motivation for form 
0 1 1 2 2
h h a h a     is given 
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by eqn. (2) where 
1 1*
1 1 1
( )a h a   , 
2 2*
2 2 2
( )a h a    and 
1* 2*
0
h     . Expression 
0 1 1 2 2
g g b g b     does not have a similar structural motivation and should be viewed as a 
reduced form expression seeking to capture substitution between 
1
b  and 
2
b . 
Notice that an increase in either , {1, 2}
j
h j  , amounts to an increase in the marginal 
effectiveness of prevention actions, while an increase in either , {1, 2}
j
g j  , amounts to an 
increase in the marginal effectiveness of cure actions. A decrease in 
0
h  can be viewed as an 
exogenous increase in effort to prevent. As such it could reflect expenditure on a public 
health campaign or on border measures to reduce disease prevalence within a region. An 
increase in 
0
g  can be viewed as an exogenous increase in effort to cure. It could also be 
viewed as expenditure on a public health campaign, or effort to reduce the extent of 
background infection through channels other than inter-personal interactions.  
We present first a symmetry result:  
Result 1: A symmetric Nash equilibrium 
1 1 2 2
( , ) ( , )
n n n n
a b a b  exists if and only if 
1 2
h h  and 
1 2
g g . 
Proof: For the if part; when 
1 2
h h  and 
1 2
g g  then the last two equations of (8) generate: 
 
1 1 1
1 1
1 2 2
2 2
1 1 1
1 1
1 2 2
2 2
( )
;
( ) ( )
( )
;
( ) ( )
( )
;
( ) ( )
( )
.
( ) ( )
S n
a
S n I n
a b a
S n
a
S n I n
a b a
I n
b
S n I n
a b b
I n
b
S n I n
a b b
U w r a h
U w r a U w L r b r
U w r a h
U w r a U w L r b r
U w L r b g
U w r a U w L r b r
U w L r b g
U w r a U w L r b r






   


   
 

   
 

   
 (9) 
When 
1 2
h h  and 
1 2
g g  then symmetry in the agent’s functional forms allows us to state 
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the following: For any 
1 1
( , )
n n
a b  satisfying the conditions in (9), then setting 
2 2 1 1
( , ) ( , )
n n n n
a b a b  
ensures that 
2 2
( , )
n n
a b  also satisfies these conditions. 
For the only if part; were 
1 2
h h  and/or 
1 2
g g  then 
2 2 1 1
( , ) ( , )
n n n n
a b a b  would lead to 
contradictions. For example the left-hand sides of the first two relations in (9) would be the 
same but the right-hand sides would not.     
 
Result 1 shows that when the efforts by the two agents have the same effectiveness then 
there exists a NE in which the two agents make the same prevention and cure efforts, and 
vice versa. Can we state anything about asymmetric solutions to (9) when agent technology 
opportunities are identical? If asymmetric solutions exist, and we will affirm that they do 
with an example, then the next result provides a characterization. The next result might be 
viewed as rationalizing hypochondriac behavior, at least in a relative sense. 
Result 2: Suppose that 
1 2
h h  and 
1 2
g g  and a non-symmetric Nash equilibrium 
1 1 2 2
( , ), ( , )
n n n n
a b a b  exists. Then 
1 2 1 2
( )( ) 0
n n n n
a a b b   ; that is, the agent making the higher level 
of cure effort also makes the higher level of prevention effort. 
Proof: Suppose instead that 
1 2 1 2
( )( ) 0
n n n n
a a b b   . For example, suppose that 
1 2
n n
a a , while 
1 2
n n
b b . By 
1 2
n n
a a  and the first two equations of (9) we have:  
 1 1 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S n I n S n I n
a b a b
U w r a U w L r b U w r a U w L r b        
 
(10) 
By 
1 2
n n
b b  and the last two equations of (9) we have: 
 1 1 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
S n I n S n I n
a b a b
U w r a U w L r b U w r a U w L r b        
 
(11) 
Note that (10) and (11) contradict. Similarly a contradiction will follow when we assume that 
1 2
n n
a a , while 
1 2
n n
b b . Therefore 
1 2 1 2
( )( ) 0
n n n n
a a b b    cannot be true, and our original 
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conclusion holds.    
 
 
So an agent who invests more in prevention efforts will also invest more in cure efforts. 
In other words, it may be rational for agents to maintain either prudent or reckless behavior 
throughout their lives. Intuitively, the agent who acts prudently perceives a high utility 
difference between the two states, while the one who acts recklessly believes that the utility 
difference between the two states is small. Since we assume a concave utility function, the 
agent who spends more in both states will end up having a large utility difference. Therefore 
their actions at NE reinforce their original beliefs, which further support their actions at NE.  
 
SUPERMODULARITY 
In this section we will check whether the game we study is supermodular (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1990), i.e., whether the agents’ strategies display the strategic complementarity 
property (Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer 1985). This is of interest as then an exogenous 
adjustment to the system could impact all actions in a beneficial and reinforcing way. For 
example a subsidy on any one action would induce an increase in all NE choices under 
optimal behavior.
25
 
Result 3: 
2 ,1
1 2
/ 0
S
V a b    , 
2 ,2
2 1
/ 0
S
V a b    , 
2 ,1
2 1
/ 0
I
V a b     and 
2 ,2
1 2
/ 0
I
V a b    . 
That is, i) the marginal impact of own prevention effort on expected lifetime utility in the 
susceptible state is decreasing in the cure effort of the other agent, while ii) the marginal 
impact of own cure effort on expected lifetime utility in the infected state is increasing in the 
prevention effort of the other agent.  
 
Result 3 holds that for two different agents, the disease prevention and cure efforts could 
                                                 
25 Proofs of results 3-5 are provided in Appendix A. 
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either be strategic substitutes or strategic complements. To be specific, in the susceptible 
state, one agent will choose to decrease her prevention effort in NE if the other agent 
increases her cure effort in the infected state (strategic substitutes). There is an incentive to 
free ride. However, in the infected state one agent will choose to increase the cure effort in 
NE if the other agent increases her prevention effort in the susceptible state (strategic 
complements).
26
 Here the other agent’s additional prevention efforts increase the probability 
that own cure efforts are effective. 
Result 4: 
2 ,
1 2
/ 0 {1, 2}
S j
V a a j       and 
2 ,
1 2
/ 0 {1, 2}
I j
V b b j      . That is, i) the 
marginal impact of own prevention effort on expected lifetime utility in the susceptible state 
is increasing in the prevention effort of the other agent, while ii) the marginal impact of own 
cure effort on expected lifetime utility in the infected state is decreasing in the cure effort of 
the other agent.  
 
From Result 4 we see that in the susceptible state, two agents’ disease prevention efforts 
are strategic complements. Were Agent 2 to increase her prevention effort, then the 
probability that Agent 1 would contract the disease from Agent 2 decreases. Therefore Agent 
1 will have an incentive to increase her prevention effort to ensure that she will not contract 
the disease first. Stated differently, were Agent 2 to decrease her prevention effort then Agent 
1 will decrease her effort too since she is more likely to acquire the disease from Agent 2 
anyway.  
In the infected state, however, the two agents’ cure efforts are strategic substitutes. If the 
total cure efforts increase, then the probability of transiting from I to S increases. Here when 
one agent contributes more to the total cure effort, the other agent will choose to free ride.  
                                                 
26 All findings in Result 3 are inter-personal. Hennessy (2008a) demonstrated similar, but 
intra-personal, results. 
142 
 
 
 
Result 5: 
2 ,1
1 1
/ 0
S
V a b    , 
2 ,2
2 2
/ 0
S
V a b    , and 
2 ,1 2 ,2
1 1 2 2
/ / 0
I I
V a b V a b        . 
That is, for both expected lifetime utility in the susceptible state and in the infected state, the 
marginal impact of own prevention effort is unaffected by an increase in own cure effort. 
 
Result 5 establishes that the disease prevention and cure efforts are strategically 
independent for any agent. Note that all decisions at issue are intra-personal. So Result 5 is 
consistent with eqn. (6) of Hennessy (2008a), and shows that local independence of intra-
personal decisions across states extends to the case where there are inter-personal 
interactions. Intuitively, one agent’s marginal increase in cure effort generates two effects for 
herself, current loss and future gain. These two effects exactly offset each other at NE and the 
lifetime expected utility in the infected state remains the same.
27
 
We turn attention now to the matter of whether structure allows for monotone 
comparative statics, as in Milgrom and Shannon (1994). To clarify what is meant here 
consider the following context. Agent 1 takes action y while Agent 2 takes action z. Payoffs 
are 1 ( , ; )W y z   for Agent 1 and 2 ( ; )W z   for Agent 2 where   is an exogenous variable 
impacting both agents.  
Suppose i) 2 1 ( , ; ) / 0W y z y z    , 2 1 ( , ; ) / 0W y z y      and 2 2 ( ; ) / 0W z z     . 
Under standard assumptions it is not hard to show that the Agent 2 optimal choice of z will 
increase with an increase in  , and furthermore that the Agent 1 optimal choice of y will also 
increase with an increase in  . The latter response is due in part to the complementary 
spillover arising from the impact of   on optimal z. However if instead ii) 
2 1
( , ; ) /W y z y z   0 , 
2 1
( , ; ) / 0W y z y      and 2 2 ( ; ) / 0W z z      then we cannot 
be sure what impact   would have on y. While the direct effect of an increase in   on y 
                                                 
27 Were they not to offset each other at NE, the agent would have an incentive to increase one 
of her efforts. Thus the status quo efforts will not be a NE, a contradiction. 
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would be to increase its optimal value the indirect effect through z would oppose that effect. 
Finally if iii) 2 1 ( , ; ) / 0W y z y z    , 2 1 ( , ; ) / 0W y z y      and 2 2 ( ; ) / 0W z z      
then we can sign the effect of an increase in   on optimal y. To see this just write z z   , 
1ˆ ( , ; )W y z  
1
( , ; )W y z  , and 
2 2ˆ ( ; ) ( ; )W z W z   . The transformed objective functions 
satisfy the properties laid out in i) above. However, such transformations are of no assistance 
in our problem. 
Result 6: The system cannot not be transformed into a supermodular game. 
Proof: We summarize Results 3 to 5 as: 
 
2 ,1 2 ,1 2 ,1
1 2 1 1 1 2
2 ,1 2 ,1 2 ,1
1 2 1 1 1 2
2 ,2 2 ,2 2 ,2
2 1 2 2 2 1
2 ,2 2 ,2 2 ,2
2 1 2 2 2 1
0; 0; 0;
0; 0; 0;
0; 0; 0;
0; 0; 0.
S S S
I I I
S S S
I I I
V V V
a a a b a b
V V V
b b b a b a
V V V
a a a b a b
V V V
b b b a b a
  
  
     
  
  
     
  
  
     
  
  
     
 (12) 
We cannot transform arguments in this system such that derivatives are all nonnegative, as in 
Milgrom and Shannon (1994, p. 172). This is because terms such as 2 ,1
1 2
/
S
V a b    and 
2 ,2
2 1
/
I
V b a    cannot be simultaneously positive no matter how we reverse the sign of the 
j
a  as a set or of the 
j
b  as a set.     
 
Result 6 implies that there is little hope of identifying a general result in which a subsidy 
for one class of action, be it prevention or cure, will have a clear monotone impact (in any 
direction) on all decisions in the linked system. By the reasoning in Result 6 it is also clear 
that a system containing any three out of four endogenous variables could not be transformed 
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into a supermodular system. It is obvious however, that if we view the cure efforts by both 
agents as exogenous, then the system with only two endogenous variables is now a 
supermodular one. That is, prevention efforts complement and encouraging prevention by 
one agent will encourage prevention by others. This point has been made elsewhere in 
Hennessy (2008b).  
 
AN EXAMPLE 
In this section, we will construct a specific example where NE is solvable under this 
setup. Similar to Hennessy (2008a), we assume CARA utility function for both states 
( )
S
U x ( )
I
U x
x
e

   with 0  . As we have already shown, the NE solution 
1 1 2 2
( , , , )
n n n n
a b a b  is determined by equations (6) and (7). Under our linear technology 
specification and CARA, the equivalent for (6) and (7) are {1, 2}i  :  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
[ ] ;
[ ] .
b j a j a j
b j a j b j
w L r b w r a w r a
j a
w L r b w r a w L r b
j b
h e e e r
g e e r e
  
  
 

      
       
 
 
 (13) 
Assume NE solutions are 
1 1 2 2
( , , , )
n n n n
a b a b . We can manipulate the system to be, {1, 2}i  :  
 
( ) ( )
( )(1 ) (1 )
; 1.
 
n n n n
a j b j a j b j
n n
a j b j
L r a r b L r a r b
L r a r bj j
a b
h e g e
e
r r
 

   
     
   
   (14) 
Thus 
( )
1 / 0
n n
a j b jL r a r b
b j
e r g

 
  
    so that 0n n
a j b j
L r a r b   . We will explore next the 
equilibrium solution set. 
Result 7: Necessary conditions for an interior NE to exist for all possible prices 
a
r  and 
b
r  are 
1 2
g g  and 
1 2
h h . 
Proof: Difference the expressions in (14). As 
( )
1
n n
a j b jL r a r b
e
  
 , division by 
( )
1
n n
a j b jL r a r b
e
  
  is 
admissible and establishes ( ) / ( )
a j b j a b
r g r h r r   , so that  
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 1 2 1 2  .
a b
h h g g
r r
 
  (15) 
We can see from the above derivation that parameters 
a
r , 
b
r , 
1
h , 
2
h , 
1
g  and 
2
g  should 
satisfy (15) for system (14) to have a pure strategy NE solution. Suppose (15) holds for all 
possible prices 
a
r  and 
b
r , then it is necessary that 
1 2
g g g  and 
1 2
h h h  .     
 
Note that in Result 1 we have shown that the same effectiveness of two agents’ efforts is 
required for a symmetric NE to exist. Result 7 shows that, under our specific setup, for a NE 
to exist under all possible effort prices then the effectiveness of two agents’ efforts should be 
the same. If 
1 2
g g g   and 
1 2
h h h  , then relation ( ) / ( )
a j b j a b
r g r h r r    implies that 
 
0 1 2 0 1 2
  ( ) ( ).
n n n n
b a
g h
r g g b b h h a a
r r 
         (16) 
Next, use (14) when evaluated at equilibrium to obtain: 
 
( )
  .
n n
a j b jL r a r bb
a
hr
e
gr
  
  (17) 
From (16) and (17) we can obtain equations containing only action sums as sufficient 
statistics. With 
0 0
r g h     one can write: 
 
1 2 1 2 1
2
1 1
2
2 2
1
( ) ( ) ;
1
 ln ;
2
1
  ln . 
2
n n n n
b a
n n a
b a
b
n n a
b a
b
g h
g b b h a a
r r
gr
r b r a L
hr
gr
r b r a L
hr




 
        
 
  
    
 
  
    
 
 (18) 
Elementary manipulation then establishes the NE solutions for 
1 2
n n
a a
 
and 
1 2
n n
b b  as
28
 
                                                 
28 The detailed derivation is in Appendix B.  
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1 2
1 2
1 2 2 ln[( ) / ( )]
;
1 2 2 ln[( ) / ( )]
.
n n b a b
a a b a b
n n a a b
b a b a b
r gL g r g r h
a a A
r r g r h r g r h
r hL h r g r h
b b B
r r g r h r g r h

 

 

    
 

    
 
 (19) 
If we assume that 
0 0
, , , , , ,
a b
r r h g h g  and L  take such values that both 0A   and 0B  , 
then pure strategy NE exist. Due to the same effectiveness requirement, at any state only the 
sum of the two agents’ efforts matters, as shown in (19). There are multiple Nash equilibria 
but all satisfy 
1 2
n n
a a A   and 
1 2
n n
b b B  . From Result 2 and non-negativity, if we 
arbitrarily assume that 
1
0.5
n
a A  then we know that 
2
0.5
n
a A , 
1
0.5
n
b B  and 
2
0.5
n
b B . 
Result 8: Assume that 
1 2
g g g   and 
1 2
h h h  . Without further loss of generality assume 
that 
1
0.5
n
a A . Then NE solutions take the form 
1 1 2 2 3 3
( , , , ) 0.5( / , / ,
n n n n
a b
a b a b A r B r      
3 3
/ , / )
a b
A r B r     where constant 
3
[0, min{ , }]
a b
Ar Br  . 
Proof: As both equations in (13) hold for both agents 1 and 2, we can further obtain: 
 
2 2
2 1
1 1
2 2
2 1
1 1
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
;
.
n n
b a
n n
a
n n
b a
n n
b a
n n
b
n n
b a
w L r b w r a
r a a
w L r b w r a
w L r b w r a
r b b
w L r b w r a
e e
e
e e
e e
e
e e
 

 
 

 
    

    
    

    






 (20) 
It follows immediately from (20) that 
2 1 2 1 3
( ) ( )
n n n n
a b
r a a r b b     , and so 
2 1 3
 /
n n
a
a a r   and 
2 1 3
/
n n
b
b b r   . The result follows from the positivity requirement on 
actions.     
 
We turn now to the effects of exogenous shocks to the system. Given that solutions exist 
on plane segments 
1 2
n n
a a A   and 
1 2
n n
b b B   with choice values bounded below by 0 but 
are otherwise indeterminate, we can only find the effect on aggregate action levels. 
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Result 9: i) 
1 2
( ) / 0
n n
a a L     and 
1 2
( ) / 0
n n
b b L    . That is, the aggregate levels of 
private prevention and cure efforts both increase with an increase in the magnitude of loss 
from disease. ii) 
1 2 0
( ) / 0
n n
a a h     and 
1 2 0
( ) / 0
n n
b b h    . That is, aggregate action levels 
both increase with an increase in public health expenditure on prevention. iii) 
1 2 0
( ) / 0
n n
a a g     and 
1 2 0
( ) / 0
n n
b b g    . That is, aggregate action levels both decrease 
with an increase in public health expenditure on cure. 
Proof: We have already shown that 0
n n
b j a j
L r b r a   , {1, 2}j  . Thus we know from (17) 
that 
a b
gr hr . Then differentiate (19).     
 
From Result 9 we can see that public health prevention efforts complement private 
prevention and cure efforts but public cure efforts crowd out private prevention and cure 
efforts. This suggests a strategic motive to prefer public intervention to prevent over public 
intervention to cure. At least one is strengthening private incentives. We complete the 
analysis with a study of price shocks.
29
 
Result 10: i) 
1 2
( ) / 0
n n
a
a a r    and 
1 2
( ) / 0
n n
a a g    . That is, the aggregate level of 
private prevention effort decreases whenever such effort becomes more costly or cure actions 
become more effective. ii) 
1 2
( ) / 0
n n
b
a a r     and 
1 2
( ) / 0
n n
a a h    . That is, the aggregate 
level of private prevention effort increases whenever the cure action becomes more costly or 
prevention effort becomes more effective. 
 
The findings are mostly in accord with standard intuition. The price response in part ii) 
asserts that private prevention effort complements cure effort in the sense that the sum of 
                                                 
29
 Proofs of results 10-11 are provided in Appendix B. 
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private prevention efforts increases with an increase in the unit cost of cure. This finding is 
consistent with Hennessy’s (2008a) study of private actions absent externalities. The 
responses of private cure actions are somewhat more involved. 
Result 11: i) 
1 2
( ) / 0
n n
b b h    . That is, aggregate private cure effort increases whenever 
prevention effort becomes more effective. ii) the signs of 
1 2
( ) /
n n
b b g   , 
1 2
( ) /
n n
a
b b r    and 
1 2
( ) /
n n
b
b b r    cannot be determined without further information. However, if 2
b a
r h r g  
then 
1 2
( ) / 0
n n
b b g    , 
1 2
( ) / 0
n n
a
b b r     and 
1 2
( ) / 0
n n
b
b b r    .  
 
From Result 11, we learn that higher levels of cure effort will be taken when preventative 
effort becomes more effective. Agents will invest more in curing a disease if they assume 
that the susceptible state can be more easily maintained. However, the cure effort will drop 
with a increase in cure effectiveness whenever 2
b a
r h r g , i.e., ceteris paribus the cost of 
cure is not very low. The own price effect of the cure input is interesting. The own price has 
two impacts. One involves a decrease in input demand given the disease state at hand, or a 
Hicksian substitution effect away from the input. The other involves a probabilistic switch in 
states as that is why the input is used. This latter state probability effect is similar to the 
income effect in Marshallian demand analysis. As Hennessy (2008a) has pointed out, the 
cure input could turn out to be a Giffen good when this state probability effect outweighs the 
substitution effect. In our example, the cure effort could increase with an increase in own 
price when the preventative effort is relatively effective and the cost of cure input is not very 
low. Both conditions lead to a high state probability effect. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper shows that private healthcare choices across time and individuals interact in 
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involved ways, suggesting pessimism in regard to understanding any overall response to an 
exogenous shock. However in a simple model we do show that an exogenous improvement 
in prevention, perhaps through a government program, will encourage both private 
prevention actions and private cure actions. By contrast an exogenous improvement in cure 
will discourage all private actions. If the view is that private healthcare actions are lower than 
those that maximize social welfare then the analysis provides some evidence in favor of 
public prevention programs over public cure programs. 
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APPENDIX A  
Proof of Results 3 to 5: First, based on (6)-(7) we can solve for
2 ,
/
S i
i j
V a a   , 2 , /S i
i i
V a b    
and 
2 ,
/
S i
i j
V a b    at the NE point:  
151 
 
 
 
 
2
2
3 3
3
, ,
,
1 13
, , , ,
, ,
2 ( )( ( )
2 ( )( ( )(
( )(
0
)
( ( )) ( )
) )
)
;
i j j
i j j i
i j
a a
S i I i
S i
S n n
i i
S i I i S i I i
S i I i
a
i j
a a a a
a a
V
U w C a C a
r r
r r
a a
r r
r r
r
    
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
  

 
 
 
 




 

 

 (A-1) 
 
,
1 1
, ,
1 13
,
2
2
2
3 3
, , , , ,
3
,
( )
( )( ( )
( (
( ( )) ( )
)
( ( ))
)( ( )
(
( )
) () )
i i
i i i
i i i i i i
i i
S i
S n n
i i
S i I i
I n n
i
b b
i
S i I i S i I i
i i
a b a
b a a b a b
a
S i I i
b
S i
V
U w C a C a
r
U w L m b m b
r r
r
r
a b
r r
r r
r r


 
 
     
  
  
     
         
 


 
 

 
  
 
   





3
,
( )
)
0 .
I i
r
r r

 

     
 (A-2) 
Note that 
2 ,
/
S i
i j
V a b    resembles the form of 2 , /S i
i i
V a b    but without the last term. 
Therefore:
 
,2 , , 3
( ( ) / ( ) 0/ )
i j
S i S
i j
i
a b
i I
a b rV r          . 
Next, based on (7)-(8) we will solve 
2 ,
/
I i
i j
V b b   , 2 , /I i
i i
V b a    and 
2 ,
/
S i
i j
V b a    at 
the NE point:  
 
, ,
,
1 13
, , , ,
3
, ,
2
2
3
3
)
( ( )) ( )
)
2 ( )( ( )
2 ( )( ( ( )
( )
;
)
)(
0
i j j
i j i j
i j
S i I i
I i
I n n
i i
S i I i S i I i
S i I
b b b
i j
b b b
b
i
b
b
V
U w L m b m b
r r
r r
r
r r
b b
r r
r
    
   
 
 
   
 


  



 
 
 
 
  

 

 


 
 (A-3) 
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i
i i i i i i
i i
S i
b b a
i i
a
I iI i
S n n
i i
I n n
i i
S i I i S i I i S
b a b a b a
b a
i I i
S i I i
V
U w C a C a
r r
U w L m b m b
r
r r
b
r
a
r
r
r
r
r
 
 

     
     
 
        
  
 




  
  


  
  

 
  
  
 ( ) 0 .r r        
 (A-4) 
Finally, note that 
2 ,
/
I i
i j
V b a    resembles the form of 2 , /I i
i i
V b a    but without the last 
term. Therefore ,2 3, ,(/ ) / ( 0)
i j
I i
i j
S i I i
b a
b aV r        .     
APPENDIX B 
System (18) can be manipulated into form: 
 
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2
;( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
n n n n n n n n
b b b b a
r g b b r h a a r r g b b r g a a g          (B-1) 
We can solve for 
1 2
n n
a a  as:  
 
1 2
1 2
1 2 1
ln
1 2 2 ln[( ) / ( )]
.
b
a b
b a
a b b a a b b
b a b
a a b a b
n n r g
a a
r g r h
r g h g gr
L
r g r h r r r g r h hr
r gL g r g r h
r r g r h r g r h

 

 
 
 

      
          
       

  
 

 (B-2) 
Similarly 
1 2
n n
b b  at NE can be expressed as:  
 
1 2
1 2
1 2 1
ln
2 ln[( ) / ( )]1 2
.
n n a
a b
a a
a b b a a b b
a a b
b a b a b
r A hA
b b
r g r h
r grg h h
L
r g r h r r r g r hr
r hL r g r hh
r r g r h
h
r g r h

 

 

 

      
          
       

  
 
 (B-3) 
Proof of Result 10: From the NE solutions defined in Result 8 we can calculate the 
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following: 
1 2
2 2
2
( ) 1 2 2 ln[( ) / ( )]
( )
2[ ( ) ] 2 ln[( ) / ( )]
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ln[( ) / ( )]
2
( )
(
n n
b a b
a a b a b a b
a b a b a a b
a b a b a b
a b a a b
a b
a b
a
a a r gL g r g r h
g g r r g r h r g r h r g r h
r r L r g r h gLr r g r h
r g r h r g r h r g r h
r g r h gr r g r h
r g r h
r r
r g

 




   
    
     
 
  
  
 




2 2
2
2 2 ln[( ) / ( )]
) ( ) ( )
( ) ln[( ) / ( )]
2
( )
2 2 2 ln[( ) / ( )] 1
0;
( )
b a b
b a b a b
a b a a b
a b
b a a b b
a b a b b a b a b b
Lhr r g r h
r h r g r h r g r h
r g r h gr r g r h
r g r h
r r hL h r g r h r
B
r g r h r g r h r r g r h r g r h r



  
 
 
 


   
         
      
(B-4) 
 
1 2
2 2 2
2 ln[( ) / ( )]( ) 1 2
( )
2 ( ) / ln[( ) / ( )]2
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 ln[( ) / (2 /
n n
b a b
a a b a b a b
b b b a b b a b
a b a b a b
b b a b
a b a b b
r g r g r ha a gL
h h r r g r h r g r h r g r h
r r gLr r g r h h r r g r hg
r g r h r g r h r g r h
r r gL g r g rg h
r g r h r g r h r

 




   
    
     
 
   
  

   
 
)]
( )
2 2 ln[( ) / ( )]1 2 / 1
( )
/ ( / )
0;
a b
b b a b
a b a a b a b b a
b a a b
a b b a
h
r g r h
r r gL g r g r h g h
r g r h r r g r h r g r h r r
r r g h r g h r
A
r g r h r r


   

 
 
 
 
     
   
  
   
  
 (B-5) 
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1 2
2
2 2 2 2
( ) 1 2 2 ln[( ) / ( )]
( )
1 2 2 ( ) / ln[( ) / ( )]
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 ln[(
n n
b a b
a a a a b a b a b
b a b a a b
a a b a b a b
b
a b a b a b a
a a r gL g r g r h
r r r r g r h r g r h r g r h
r g g L g r g r h r g r g r h
r r g r h r g r h r g r h
g r gL g
r g r h r g r h r g r h r

 

 


   
    
     
 
    
  
   
  
2
2
) / ( )] 1
( )
1 1
0;
a b
a b a
a b a a
r g r h
r g r h r
g
A
r g r h r r
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
  
(B-6) 
1 2
2 2 2
( ) 1 2 2 ln[( ) / ( )]
( )
2 2 ( ) / ln[( ) / ( )]
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 ln[(
n n
b a b
b b a a b a b a b
b a b b a b
a b a b a b
b a
a b a b a b b
a a r gL g r g r h
r r r r g r h r g r h r g r h
r h ghL g r g r h r h r g r h
r g r h r g r h r g r h
h r gL g g r g
r g r h r g r h r g r h hr

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



   
    
     
 
   
  
    
  
) / ( )]
( )
1 2
0.
b
a b
a b a b
a b a
a b b a b a
r h
r g r h
h g
A
r g r h r hr
h r g r h r g
A
r g r h hr r hr r

 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
    
  
 (B-7) 
Proof of Result 11: 
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2 2
2
2 ln[( ) / ( )]( ) 1 2
( )
2[ ( ) ] 2 ln[( ) / ( )]
( ) ( ) ( )
(1 / )( ) ln[( ) / ( )]2
( )
n n
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b a b a b a b
a b a b b a b
a b a b a b
a b b a b
a b
a
r h r g r hb b hL
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r g r h
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 
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   
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 
   
  
  


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2 2
2
2 2 2
2 ln[( ) / ( )]2
( ) ( )
( ) ln[( ) / ( )]2
( )
2 ( ) ln[( ) / ( )]2
( ) ( ) ( )
2
b a a b
a b a b a b
a b b a b
a b
a b a a b a a b
a b a b a b
a b
a b a b a b
r r gL r g r h
r g r h r g r h r g r h
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r g r h
r r r gL r g r h r g r g r h
r g r h r g r h r g r h
r r gL
r g r h r g r h r g r






 
  
 


 
   
  
  
  
ln[( ) / ( )]2 2
1
0;
a b
a a b
a
a b a
g r g r h
h r r g r h
r
A
r g r h r
 

 
  
 
 
   
  
 (B-9) 
1 2
2 2 2
( ) 1 2 2 ln[( ) / ( )]
( )
2 2 (1 / )( ) ln[( ) / ( )]
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 / ln[(
2
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b a b a b a b
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a b a b a b
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
 




   
    
     
 
  
  
   
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) / ( )]
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1 2 ln[( ) / ( )]
2
( )
1 2 /
2
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a b
a b
a a b
b a b a b a ba
a b
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a a b
a b a b
r g r h
r g r h
r hL h r g r h
r r g r h r g r h r g r hr
r g r h h g
r r
r r g r h
B
r g r h r r g


 
 

 
 
 
  
     
    
  
  
 
 
 
 
    
  
 (B-10) 
The inequality in (B-10) holds whenever 2 .
b a
r h r g  
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1 2
2 2
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ln[( ) / ( )]( ) 1 2 2
2
( ) ( )
(1 / )( ) ln[( ) / ( )]2
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2 2 2
n n
a a b
a a b a b a b a b
a
a b a b a b
a a b a b
a b
a
a b a b a b a
r r g r hb b hL h
r r r r g r h r g r h r g r h
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r g r h
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r g r h r g r h r g r h r g

 
 



   
    
     
  
  
 


   
  
ln[( ) / ( )]
1 2
0;
a b
a b a b
a b b a a b
n
i
a a b
h r g r h
r g r h r g r h
g h
B
r g r h r r g r g r h
b g
g r r g r h



 

 
 
  
 
     
  

  
 
 (B-11) 
The inequality in (B-11) holds whenever the inequality in (B-11) holds, i.e., whenever 
2
b a
r h r g . 
1 2
2
2 2 2
2
( ) 1 2 2 ln[( ) / ( )]
( )
1 2
( ) ( )
2 (1 / )( ) ln[( ) / ( )]
( )
2 2 2
n n
a a b
b b b a b a b a b
a
b a b a b
b a b a b
a b
a
a b a b a b b
b b r hL h r g r h
r r r r g r h r g r h r g r h
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r r g r h r g r h
h r r g r h h r g r h
r g r h
h r hL
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
 





   
    
     
   
 
  


    
  
2
2
2
ln[( ) / ( )] 1
1 1
1 1
0.
2 2
a b
a b b
a b b b
b b b b b
h r g r h
r g r h r
h
B
r g r h r r
h B
B
r h r h r r r
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
     
  
 (B-12) 
The inequality in (B-12) holds whenever 2
b a
r h r g .     
 
 
